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Foreword
 he Cross City Campaign
 for Urban School Reform  
 is a national network of 
school reformers who work to create 
high-quality public schools that 
ensure educational success for all 
urban young people. We advocate 
for sweeping policies and practices 
that move authority, resources, 
and accountability to the school 
level, reconnect schools with their 
communities, give voice to parents 
and students, and completely rethink 
the role of central ofﬁce. 
We currently focus our work in nine 
cities: Baltimore, Denver, Chicago, 
Houston, Los Angeles, New York, 
Oakland, Philadelphia, and Seattle. 
Collectively our network is a vital 
force in the campaign for educational 
equity and excellence. The Cross City 
Campaign enables reform leaders 
from inside and outside school 
systems to share information, to 
mount collective advocacy efforts, 
and to create a national voice for 
urban students. We are advocates, 
teachers, principals, community 
organizers, parents, students, central 
ofﬁce administrators, policy analysts, 
researchers, union ofﬁcials, and 
funders. We provide leadership-
development training and technical 
assistance, produce research-driven 
publications and practical tools, 
connect reformers through cross-
site visits and national meetings, 
and build local and national 
constituencies to advance  
reform efforts.
Since our inception in 1993, the 
Cross City Campaign has been a 
leader in promoting and writing 
about urban district redesign. The 
fundamental question driving this 
work has been, “What is the role 
of the central ofﬁce in improving 
instruction?” Our ﬁrst publication, 
Reinventing Central Ofﬁce: A Primer 
for Successful Schools, made a 
strong case for rethinking district 
functions and recommended a 
dramatic revision of urban public 
school systems, one that shifted most 
of the funds and authority to the 
schools and dismantled centralized, 
bureaucratic structures. A number 
of years later, as our vision of the 
district’s role in supporting schools 
evolved, we published Changing 
Rules and Roles: A Primer on School-
Based Decision Making. In this 
publication, Angus McBeath, the 
superintendent of the Edmonton 
Public Schools (Alberta, Canada), 
described how his district created a 
radically different role for the central 
ofﬁce. We learned from Edmonton 
how an urban district, with a strong 
center and an unwavering focus on 
student achievement, could empower 
principals and teachers and redesign 
the central ofﬁce to support their 
work.
To further our understanding of the 
district’s role in instructional reform, 
we directed a qualitative study in 
2000-2003 that examined the role 
and importance of district/school 
interactions in the implementation of 
local instructional improvement. The 
three districts we studied, Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and Seattle, already had 
promising systemic reform initiatives 
underway as well as experience 
in decentralizing authority and 
resources to schools. (See Appendix 
B for city demographics.) The multi-
year research project was led by Dr. 
Patricia Burch (primary investigator) 
and Dr. James Spillane (project 
consultant) and was directed by the 
Cross City Campaign. 
The ﬁrst report from this study, 
Leading From The Middle: Mid-
Level District Staff and Instructional 
Improvement, was published in 
August, 2004. Since its publication, 
Leading from the Middle has been 
an important tool in helping school 
and district staff, policy makers, 
researchers, and reform advocates 
think differently about the role 
of the district in instructional 
improvement. A Delicate Balance: 
District Policies and Classroom 
Practice, the second report in this 
series, moves the conversation to 
a deeper level by providing case 
studies that take an in-depth look at 
the challenges that these three urban 
districts faced as they attempted 
large-scale instructional reform. The 
case studies illustrate the demands 
on school systems as they balance 
central support and pressure, district 
mandates and school autonomy, and 
large-scale instructional reforms and 
school practices.
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Leading from the Middle looked 
at the ground that many people 
lump together as “the bureaucracy.” 
While not glamorous, it is important 
territory that is home to an army 
of administrators — program 
managers, content-area directors, 
budget specialists, and more — who 
have a signiﬁcant impact on how 
district instructional initiatives are 
understood and acted upon by 
school leaders. After superintendents 
and school boards establish new 
policies, mid-level staff have the 
job of translating big ideas like 
“improving literacy district-wide” or 
“closing the achievement gap” into 
strategies, guidelines, and procedures 
that are “handed down” to schools. 
In this report, we argue that mid-
level administrators who bring 
school people to the table to pool 
their expertise and then translate this 
collective expertise into strategies, 
guidelines, tools, and procedures 
are more likely to be successful 
in moving policies into classroom 
practice.
The most promising work we 
studied came from a commitment 
to collaboration from people who 
Leading From The Middle: Mid-Level District 
Staff and Instructional Improvement
saw school staff not just as targets 
of policy change but as substantive 
sources of expertise who could 
help the district understand what 
people in schools were experiencing. 
Unfortunately, the prevailing 
orientation that central ofﬁce staff 
brought to their work with schools 
was authoritative, not collaborative.
In our report, we urge super-
intendents and school boards  
to take the ﬁrst steps toward 
substantially changing the way 
their mid-level managers work  
with schools by:
■ Reorganizing mid-level staffs’ 
work so they could spend more 
time in the schools.
■ Increasing the skills and 
knowledge of mid-level staff 
around teaching and learning. 
■ Drawing on the enormous 
expertise of principals and 
teachers in the design of 
new reform policies and 
implementation strategies.
■ Minimizing interruptions that 
distract school and central ofﬁce 
staff from focusing on instruction. 
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Executive Summary 
“I don’t have any quarrel with the 
way it’s organized at the central 
ofﬁce. I see a lack of quality and 
commitment for the right things. See, 
I see everything in terms of deliver-
ing instruction and making learning 
happen. And the further we get from 
my classroom, the less I see that they 
maintain that idea...”
—Teacher
 ince 1993, the Cross City   
 Campaign for Urban School  
 Reform has been examin-
ing the role of central ofﬁce and its 
relationship to schools. In 2000 we 
The three districts we studied had 
decentralized resources and author-
ity to the schools in different ways 
and had undergone signiﬁcant orga-
nizational changes to facilitate their 
ambitious instructional improvement 
plans. The unfortunate reality for 
the many principals and teachers 
we interviewed is that the districts 
were unable to change and improve 
practice on a large scale. And the 
evidence is indisputable: you can’t 
improve student learning without 
improving instruction. 
The three districts had all formulated 
their grand district-wide visions, 
ostensibly focused on improving 
instruction. But the districts largely 
failed to communicate and trans-
late their “big ideas” into improved 
instruction because their tools and 
mandates were not informed by 
school level expertise and were not 
accompanied by the kind of support 
and capacity building necessary to 
change instruction. 
These case studies raise fundamental 
issues that resonate across these three 
different districts and highlight where 
the opportunities for success or fail-
ure lay.  The Cross City Campaign 
believes that when principals and 
teachers are not integral in driving 
the policy agenda and are not pro-
vided with adequate resources and 
support, big initiatives announced 
with much fanfare will be impotent at 
best and, at worst, will make it more 
difﬁcult for schools to provide quality 
instruction.
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embarked on a three-year qualita-
tive study in Chicago, Milwaukee, 
and Seattle that examined the role 
and importance of district/school 
interactions in the implementa-
tion of instructional improvement 
initiatives. Then in August 2004 
we released our ﬁrst report from 
this research, Leading From the 
Middle: Mid-Level District Staff and 
Instructional Improvement, which 
looked at the important leadership 
role that mid-level central ofﬁce staff 
can play in implementing district 
reforms. The three case studies in 
this report examine district policies 
and initiatives and give voice to the 
school perspective. 
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Introduction
 he Chicago, Milwaukee, and 
 Seattle school districts have
 pursued a number of reforms 
in recent decades, many of them in 
response to signiﬁcant demographic 
and social shifts in their student 
populations: busing to achieve 
desegregation; the creation of magnet 
and specialty schools; the provision 
of choice opportunities through 
charter schools and vouchers; 
and a return to neighborhood 
schools. During the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, each district 
began to decentralize authority 
and resources to the school site. 
As site-based management became 
institutionalized, the standards 
movement and the expansion of 
state and federal inﬂuence over 
schools, culminating in the No 
Child Left Behind act of 2001, 
created pressure on the districts to 
transform themselves into agents of 
instructional reform. School leaders 
faced the seemingly paradoxical 
challenge of maintaining their 
autonomy to craft programs and 
align resources to meet the needs of 
their students and, at the same time, 
respond to increasing district pressure 
and control to improve student 
learning as measured by standardized 
tests.
During the time of our research, each 
of these school districts was on the 
front end of pursuing an approach 
to system-wide instructional 
improvement that was linked to 
standards-based reform. While the 
three districts had much in common, 
each pursued the goal of helping 
their diverse student populations 
achieve high academic standards 
through a unique set of district-
wide policies. In the Chicago Public 
Schools (CPS), emphasis on high-
stakes accountability remained 
paramount even as the district 
transitioned to incorporate a focus 
on content-based instruction. The 
Milwaukee Public Schools’ (MPS) 
“education marketplace” strategy 
of enabling parental choice, 
reﬂected in its neighborhood 
schools initiative, elevated the 
goal of stemming enrollment 
decline through competition to 
the same level of importance as 
the educational goal of enabling 
students to achieve academically. 
The Seattle Public Schools (SPS) 
was engaged in an intense reform 
effort to become a standards-based 
district. This effort worked on many 
different fronts simultaneously to 
achieve the district’s dual goals of 
helping all students meet standards 
and eliminating the achievement gap 
between white students and students 
of color. 
In the three cities, principals and 
teachers did not view the standards 
implementation policies and 
initiatives as directly linked to 
instruction. In Chicago, teachers 
typically interpreted standards-based 
practice in terms of consistency 
of curriculum coverage across 
classrooms and schools. One 
teacher noted, “There were a lot of 
inconsistencies within the school 
system in terms of exactly what 
type of instruction was being given 
to students. So it did make it easier 
once the Chicago Public Schools 
came up with a set of standards 
aligned with the state goals, and that 
they were published in a book so that 
the teachers clearly understood what 
they were expected to do.” And as 
noted in Seattle, “The district policy 
assumed that teachers would know 
how to do this [translating standards 
into practice], while teachers looked 
to the district for direction.” District 
policies for school transformation 
did not directly inﬂuence instruction, 
but were intended to guide schools 
to focus on improving teaching and 
learning. Milwaukee school staff 
believed that the standards were 
educationally sound and aligned 
well to state and national standards. 
However, the standards speciﬁed 
only content and did not address 
pedagogy. 
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In the three cities, prin-
cipals and teachers did 
not view the standards 
implementation policies 
and initiatives as directly 
linked to instruction.
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While the standards message was 
diffused, the message that teachers 
and principals heard most clearly 
from central ofﬁce was that schools 
would be held accountable for 
student outcomes. The emphasis 
on standardized test scores was 
prevalent in all three districts. And 
while there was apparent acceptance 
by school staff that a strong emphasis 
on test-based accountability in the 
era of No Child Left Behind would 
remain, principals and teachers 
still expressed a sense of unfairness 
when discussing the pressures 
of accountability. Teachers and 
principals were calling for the central 
ofﬁce to focus on student growth 
rather than status measures. Although 
Milwaukee teachers were committed 
to performance assessments, they 
realized that the administration was 
giving greater and greater value 
to standardized tests as a major 
part of their accountability system. 
A Chicago principal noted, “We 
are taking tests all the time. We 
know that we have to live with that 
throughout our lives. The emphasis 
on testing is one that I sometimes 
question because the day that the 
children have to take the test—it’s 
like a judgment day. We’re working 
with human beings. There are people 
that can test well. And there are 
people that cannot test well. In the 
work of a child, you have to look at 
the whole child.” 
Over the years, changing district 
leadership and the resulting changes 
in district policies and practices 
resulted in a culture of skepticism 
and mistrust at many schools, 
especially among teachers. Teachers 
interviewed for our study typically 
felt disconnected from the decision-
making that was bringing change to 
their classrooms. The predominance 
of one-way communication from 
the district to schools in Seattle 
limited opportunities for teachers 
and principals to have a voice in 
shaping district policies. As a result, 
school level perspectives differed 
signiﬁcantly from those at the 
central ofﬁce. As a Chicago teacher 
noted, “I really don’t think that 
enough time and attention is given to 
what teachers think. Things are just 
thrown at us. I’d like to try some of 
these new techniques, but I want to 
know some results before I go on to 
the next thing” 
Chicago and Seattle attempted to 
establish coherent, content-based 
professional development programs 
in place of previous programs that 
were fragmented across departments 
and topics with no consistent 
message. Both were attempting to 
link their professional development 
initiatives with their content-based 
instructional strategies. Toward the 
end of this study, the Chicago Public 
Schools had begun an aggressive 
effort to redesign professional 
development according to a set of 
research-based design principles 
and link it to its district-wide literacy 
initiative. Seattle’s professional 
development program was 
improving, but it lacked an overall 
strategy for integrating its offerings. 
On the other hand, in Milwaukee, 
the district was no longer delivering 
intensive professional development 
on a school-by-school basis, instead 
it was making schools shoulder the 
burden of procuring professional 
development services on their own.
Demands on principals’ time to 
respond to sometimes overwhelming 
central ofﬁce requests, along with 
the time principals spent overseeing 
6
“We are taking tests all 
the time. We know that 
we have to live with that 
throughout our lives. The 
emphasis on testing is one 
that I sometimes question 
because the day that the 
children have to take the 
test—it’s like a judgment 
day. We’re working with 
human beings. There are 
people that can test well. 
And there are people 
that cannot test well. In 
the work of a child, you 
have to look at the whole 
child.” 
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school operations, made it difﬁcult 
for principals to focus on school 
instruction. The demands created a 
“dual focus” for principals in all three 
districts where school leaders walked 
a thin line. They had to respond to 
external policy messages—improve 
teaching practice, increase student 
learning, raise test scores—while at 
the same time they were expected 
to craft instructional programs that 
addressed the unique learning needs, 
interests, and skill levels of their 
students, and create an instructional 
climate of support for teachers. As a 
result, principals had to hone their 
leadership skills in order to integrate 
multiple agendas to create coherence 
for their staff and to build school 
ownership of district-wide policies. 
Much of the time, this work was 
done with minimal central ofﬁce 
support and resources.
Teacher leaders were also 
an important component in 
implementing district reform efforts. 
In Seattle, a number of teacher 
leaders who truly embraced the 
Transformation Plan effort emerged 
at several schools.1 This leadership 
generated school ownership and a 
commitment to carry out the plan. In 
Milwaukee, school leadership was 
shared by principals, school level 
coordinators, resource teachers, and 
classroom teachers. Principals and 
teachers increased their collaboration 
as a way of meeting multiple 
expectations. Emphasis on a given 
actor varied at times throughout 
the year as central ofﬁce demands 
to focus on one or another task 
changed. In Chicago, teachers also 
spoke of their dual responsibility to 
change the way they taught even 
while striving to help their students 
perform well on standardized tests.
External organizations were of 
varying importance in providing 
support to school staff in the 
three cities. The Seattle case study 
provides an interesting look at the 
importance of external leadership 
to principals and teachers. School 
staff overwhelmingly identiﬁed 
external partners as key players in 
reform, while central ofﬁce staff were 
rarely mentioned. We found that 
those external funders were able to 
shape the direction of district reform 
by exposing leaders to new ideas. 
The expertise from external agents 
helped individual schools make 
sense of what were often perceived 
as vague, incomplete, and sometimes 
conﬂicting policy mandates. Whereas 
Seattle’s external support came from 
outside agencies, Chicago’s was more 
likely to come from a combination 
of central ofﬁce staff and external 
partners (e.g. universities, reform 
organizations), particularly for 
the schools on probation.2 On the 
other hand, Milwaukee school staff 
rarely mentioned external partners. 
The general perception by MPS 
central ofﬁce staff was that school 
staff, especially principals, had 
assumed a greater leadership role 
in all aspects of school operations, 
including instruction, and that local 
school capacity for instructional 
improvement had increased. 
The following case studies provide a 
rich opportunity for policy makers, 
school practitioners, researchers, 
parents, and students to better 
understand what conditions need 
to be in place for instructional 
reforms to reach into schools 
and classrooms and contribute to 
meaningful changes in learning and 
instruction. The three case studies 
underscore changes needed in school 
organization to accommodate the 
work of teachers as they attempt 
to learn new practices to address 
their students’ needs, interests, and 
abilities. They also make clear that 
school leaders need strong support 
in becoming instructional leaders. 
In so doing, a focus on instructional 
leadership casts a spotlight back on 
the central ofﬁce and how it can most 
effectively support the development 
of instructional leadership system-
wide. Finally, the case studies of 
these decentralized school districts 
undertaking standards-based reforms 
illustrate the delicate balance needed 
between school-level autonomy, 
central guidance and direction, and 
shared responsibility for student 
learning. 
7
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
T
Lessons Learned 
 he lessons learned and rec-
 ommendations we present 
 below draw upon the large 
database collected during our three-
year study of district and school 
interactions around instructional 
reform and complement the ﬁndings 
from our ﬁrst report in this series, 
Leading from the Middle: Mid-Level 
Central Ofﬁce Staff and Instructional 
Improvement. 
■ District-wide instructional policies 
and mandates had little impact on 
improving classroom instruction. 
 
Despite sweeping initiatives to 
improve student achievement, few 
district policies were able to improve 
teacher practice. Milwaukee teach-
ers reported that district policies and 
tools, such as standards and cur-
ricular materials, had modest effects 
on instruction because the policies 
did not relate speciﬁcally to actual 
classroom practices. They felt the 
most speciﬁc district guidance was in 
operational areas, such as in creating 
neighborhood schools, rather than in 
instruction. Few Seattle policies were 
targeted directly at improving instruc-
tion and principals indicated that 
there was little substantive conversa-
tion from district administrators about 
teaching and learning. School level 
staff interpreted many district policies 
as shallow and uninformed because 
the central ofﬁce staff did not really 
know the culture of their schools. The 
Chicago teachers in our study under-
stood that the district’s instructional 
programs were standards-based, but 
they equated standards with uniform 
content coverage across schools and 
classrooms. They gave little indica-
tion that they understood that their 
teaching practice might need to 
change in a standards-based class-
room. 
■ The districts’ rhetoric about 
improving instruction did not match 
the reality of their relentless focus 
on increasing standardized test 
scores. 
In spite of superintendents’ and cen-
tral staff’s rhetoric about improving 
classroom practice and transforming 
teaching and learning, their com-
munications about meeting stan-
dards were deﬁned by increased 
test scores, particularly in Chicago 
and Seattle. Chicago principals and 
teachers in low, middle, and high 
achieving schools all heard the cen-
tral ofﬁce’s message loud and clear: 
the driving priority was increased 
test scores. Instructional goals were 
often talked about in terms of student 
outcomes or achievement levels as 
opposed to instructional quality. The 
Seattle school leaders in our study 
felt that if their test scores were good, 
no one cared if they were teaching 
to standards, utilizing the adopted 
curriculum, or using the classroom-
based assessments. As one principal 
stated, “At the same time that they 
ask you to think out of the box, they 
are also becoming more and more 
prescriptive.” Even in Milwaukee, 
where schools used multiple assess-
ments to gauge overall student and 
school performance, standardized 
test scores played an increasingly 
important role in the competition 
for recruiting public school students 
and in meeting No Child Left Behind 
requirements.
■ Teacher voice and expertise were 
excluded from policy development 
and implementation discussions. 
Teachers generally felt isolated from 
most discussions and decisions 
about instructional improvement 
that occurred outside their 
schools. Chicago teachers had few 
interactions with central ofﬁce staff 
and learned about district policies 
through their principals, through 
centrally created instructional 
materials or tools, or through large, 
district-sponsored meetings. As 
one teacher stated, “My interaction 
is zero. No one from any place 
higher than this building has been 
in my classroom or anything. I’ve 
never talked to anyone.” Milwaukee 
classroom teachers rarely saw central 
ofﬁce personnel. Some teachers 
served on district committees 
that sought feedback on the 
implementation of district policies 
that were already formulated. Seattle 
school staff noted that they had 
little or no input into the design of 
important policy instruments, limiting 
the school’s opportunity to have a 
voice in shaping district policies. 
Consequently, school views differed 
considerably from those at the central 
ofﬁce.
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isolated from most 
discussions and decisions 
about instructional im-
provement that occurred 
outside their schools.
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■ The districts failed to provide 
the kind of support and capacity 
building that school staff needed 
to achieve the districts’ ambitious 
goals.
School leaders faced the daunting 
challenge of implementing large-
scale reforms without having the 
comprehensive infrastructure needed 
to support new skills and knowledge 
development. In Seattle, the district 
tended to overestimate individual 
schools’ capacity to make sense of 
guidelines and their ability to design 
programs that might lead to improve-
ments in teaching and learning. 
Without adequate professional devel-
opment and the resources to address 
instructional needs, schools saw 
the district’s demands for account-
ability as unfunded mandates. The 
Milwaukee central ofﬁce had limited 
central control of curriculum and 
instruction and held principals pri-
marily responsible for teacher sup-
port. District staff paraphrased the 
superintendent as having said, “Give 
me 160 excellent principals and I’ll 
give you a great district.” This senti-
ment demonstrated the kind of rela-
tionship many central ofﬁce leaders 
envisioned between schools and  
central ofﬁce. The Chicago principals 
in probationary schools received 
considerable support from central 
ofﬁce and appreciated the help of 
probation managers and external 
partners. However, teachers were 
more skeptical of these external sup-
ports and appreciated assistance 
that had practical application in the 
classroom but had little patience for, 
“more people for us to be account-
able to, or more people for us to  
follow their paperwork.” 
■ Principals had multiple respon-
sibilities that often worked at cross 
purposes with their role of instruc-
tional leader.
The principal’s job grew increasingly 
complex due to external pressures 
and demands of accountability and 
internal needs to increase the capac-
ity of school staff. Almost every 
Seattle central ofﬁce department 
called the principals with questions 
ranging from discipline data, to bus 
schedules, to requests for payroll ﬁg-
ures. Seattle principals had to exert 
considerable leadership to integrate 
multiple agendas especially when 
there was confusion surrounding new 
initiatives. One principal, in decid-
ing not to worry about the district’s 
indecisions stated, “I’m just going to 
sit out until the district has ﬁgured 
out what its focus for the schools 
really is. Because you’re asking us to 
be budget professionals, to budget for 
hiring, for instructional leadership, 
and you can’t do it all.” Milwaukee 
principals frequently commented 
that it was difﬁcult to perform mul-
tiple functions that included instruc-
tional leadership, student discipline, 
professional development, budget 
oversight, marketing, personnel deci-
sions, fundraising, and community 
relations. Chicago principals had 
to comply not only with external 
policy messages to improve teaching 
practice and to raise test scores, but 
they also had to address the unique 
learning needs of their students. One 
principal, in describing her role in 
carrying out central ofﬁce policies 
said, “ This chair is not a popular 
one….Some of my directives are 
questioned, and of course, why 
not…? My directives are coming 
from someplace else.” 
■ Professional development was 
fragmented and not directly tied to 
district initiatives.
School leaders had little patience 
for district provided, top-down 
staff development that did not 
relate to work going on in the 
schools and in the classrooms. 
Milwaukee teachers saw themselves 
as becoming increasingly self-
sufﬁcient in seeking out professional 
learning. School staff reported they 
were more proactive in seeking 
out appropriate professional 
development from non-district 
providers than from the district. 
Chicago teachers in our study were 
typically critical of the district’s 
efforts at professional development, 
describing a range of problems 
from facilitators’ lack of preparation 
to a one-size ﬁts-all approach. 
A CPS administrator described 
central ofﬁce efforts as “drive-by”, 
uncoordinated, and not focused on 
the core of what teaching is about. 
In Seattle, professional development 
for teachers was improving and 
the strength of the individual 
professional development offerings 
was sometimes quite high. 
However, there was no overarching 
strategic plan for professional 
learning.3
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■ Principal leadership was an impor-
tant determinant in how district-
wide policies were implemented.
Astute principals helped teachers 
make sense of district initiatives 
through existing communities of 
practice and through mediating and 
buffering district policies to ﬁt into 
their schools’ culture. The strength 
of school leadership in Seattle was 
key in determining the school’s abil-
ity to use district policies to further 
school goals, mobilize resources 
needed to build communities of 
practice, and to create a vision that 
motivated the community to engage 
in new ideas about instructional 
practice. However, schools that 
lacked a collaborative community 
found this work to be overwhelming. 
The role of Milwaukee principals was 
an important factor in how school 
staff perceived and participated in 
school operations. The extent to 
which principals involved teachers 
in working on the school’s Education 
Plan (school plan for improvement) 
affected teachers’ perceptions of the 
quality and legitimacy of the plan. 
Chicago principals were key actors 
who interpreted central ofﬁce mes-
sages for their staff and shaped the 
schools’ response to district policies. 
As the critical link between the cen-
tral ofﬁce and the schools, principals 
mediated relations between district 
policies and classroom practice.
Recommendations
Superintendents need to have 
a vision of good instruction. 
Improving test scores is not a 
vision. It is a political slogan that 
is used to satisfy politicians and 
the business community. Instead, 
superintendents need to spend 
time in classrooms and have 
conversations with principals and 
teachers about how to channel 
district resources and energy 
into making that vision of good 
instruction a daily reality in every 
classroom.
Central ofﬁce policies and 
mandates should be evaluated 
based on how they help 
principals and teachers improve 
instruction and student learning. 
Policies that cannot stand 
up to this scrutiny should be 
eliminated. School staff need 
to be involved in designing 
instructional policies and in 
making decisions about how they 
will be implemented.
Districts should be responsible 
for providing a plan, a realistic 
time-line, and sufﬁcient 
resources to build staff capacity 
when new instructional policies 
are adopted. In those plans, the 
district needs to allow adequate 
time and opportunity for teachers 
to observe new instructional 
methods. The district needs to 
provide resources for coaching 
and content experts to work 
alongside teachers as they learn 
how to use the new methods, and 
they need to supply the resources 
to purchase necessary tools and 
materials.
Student academic needs should 
drive the district’s policy agenda. 
Principals and teachers routinely 
assess student learning and 
have ﬁrst-hand knowledge of 
their academic needs. Central 
ofﬁce staff should draw on 
that enormous expertise when 
they design new policies and 
implementation strategies 
and when they create new 
communication and support 
structures.
Professional development should 
be school-based and embedded 
in teachers’ daily work.  The 
district’s role is to provide the 
conditions and resources so 
that school staff have ample 
opportunities for individual 
and group learning that builds 
knowledge, capacity, and 
collaboration.
If teachers and principals are 
to truly focus on instruction, 
central ofﬁce demands need to 
be drastically reduced. School 
staff can no longer be expected 
to juggle multiple responsibilities 
and comply with extraneous 
requests that are cumbersome 
distractions to teaching and 
learning.
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Research Context and Deﬁnitions 
This paper is the second report from a large, qualitative study of district-
school interactions conducted by the Cross City Campaign for Urban 
School Reform. The goal of this report is to help policy makers, practitio-
ners, and others gain insight about what conditions need to be in place 
for instructional reforms to reach into schools and change classroom 
practice. 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and Seattle approached district-wide initiatives and 
decentralization in distinct ways: Chicago, through democratic localism 
(based on site-based and shared decision-making) and high-stakes testing; 
Milwaukee, through a substantial school choice program, resource real-
location strategies, and actions to restructure the district into a cost-for-
service center; and Seattle, through needs-based funding and school-site, 
standards-based improvement efforts. 
This report is based on people’s accounts and perceptions of their own 
work and the work of others. As might be expected, the views of central 
ofﬁce staff and school staff members converged at times and deviated 
considerably at other times. Our hope is that this report will provoke 
conversations among policy makers, educators, academics and reformers 
and provide direction in thinking in new and productive ways about the 
district’s role in instructional change. 
The Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform does not assert that 
the perceptions or experiences surfaced in this report are statistically 
representative of the districts as a whole. However, the perceptions and 
experiences reﬂected here represent those that were prevalent among our 
interview subjects.
A description of research design and methodology can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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In each of the following case 
studies, the researcher provides 
the reader with a brief history 
of the district’s role in instruc-
tional reform, a description 
of major district instructional 
reforms that were initiated  
during the time of the research, 
the ways in which central 
ofﬁce staff communicated and 
implemented these initiatvies, 
the school staff members’ 
perspective on district instruc-
tional priorities, and the roles 
that school leaders played in 
improving instruction.




 he story of the Chicago   
 Public Schools (CPS) during  
 our ﬁeld research is of a large 
urban district tackling systemic 
reform. Since passage of the 1988 
Chicago School Reform Act, the 
Chicago system has undergone reform 
in three distinct phases. During the 
ﬁrst phase (1988-1995), decentraliza-
tion transformed the 600+ schools 
into a site-managed system.  School 
restructuring efforts set at least 35  
percent of CPS elementary schools 
on the road to improvement (Bryk 
et al, 1993).  In the second phase 
(1995-2001), high-stakes account-
ability practices gave CPS a national 
reputation for policies ending social 
promotion and intervening in low-per-
forming schools. Central ofﬁce efforts 
in the third phase, beginning in 2001, 
focused on achieving a district-wide, 
high-quality instructional program.
Case Study
The Chicago Public Schools
By Lauren E. Allen
Over the past three decades, the “sil-
ver bullet” of school improvement 
has ricocheted from central ofﬁce 
mandates to organic school change, 
from teacher enhancement to prin-
cipal leadership, from parent and 
community involvement to increased 
state and (now) federal government 
oversight. The story of the Chicago 
Public Schools suggests that effective 
instructional improvement requires 
dynamic and reciprocal relationships 
throughout the entire educational 
system and appropriate instructional 
tools and resources. The Chicago 
story also suggests a deﬁnitive role 
for the central ofﬁce in supporting 
instructional change and improve-
ment in local schools. 
Systemic Reform
The 1983 publication of A Nation 
at Risk launched a contentious and 
continuing national debate over 
the quality of public education. An 
ensuing tidal wave 
of cumulative policy 
initiatives resulted in 
the call for systemic 
reforms. Politicians 
and business leaders 
targeted classrooms 
and called for teachers 
to employ more rigor-
ous and intellectually 
ambitious instructional 
practices in order to 
improve student out-
comes. Helping the vast majority of 
young people to surpass minimum 
competency expectations and to 
achieve high academic standards 
became the overriding goal of U.S. 
school districts. 
Two linked approaches created the 
context for systemic reform (Cohen, 
1995). The ﬁrst created new policy 
instruments to “drive” or guide 
instruction. These included new 
content standards and instructional 
frameworks; standards-based assess-
ments that focused students’ and 
teachers’ work on intellectually 
authentic tasks; ambitious curricula 
that were consistent with new stan-
dards and assessments; and changes 
in teacher education that under-
girded quality instruction. The second 
approach facilitated a coherent direc-
tion for change by reducing the over-
lapping and often conﬂicting policies 
that obstruct substantive reforms.  
In its pursuit of systemic reform, CPS 
was faced with the challenge of how 
to devise a coherent and coordinated 
system of instructional guidance 
that was linked to standards and that 
supported large-scale instructional 
change. This arguably included sort-
ing out roles and responsibilities at 
all levels of the educational system—
federal, state, local, and school—and 
aligning all efforts toward the goal of 
improved student achievement. 
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Recent History of 




The Charge for Reform
On a 1987 visit to Chicago, U.S. 
Secretary of Education William J. 
Bennett declared the city’s school 
system “close to educational 
meltdown” (Lenz, 1987). At that time, 
the troubled CPS was a system roiling 
with power politics, educational 
neglect, scandal, and blame, 
conditions that would cause Bennett 
to declare Chicago schools “the 
worst in the nation” (Lenz, 1987) and 
galvanize a broad base of business, 
civic, parent, and community leaders 
to provide the impetus for reform. 
Responding to the business 
community’s criticism of the public 
schools, teacher union unrest, 
and negative national headlines, 
the mayor in 1987 convened an 
“Education Summit” of leaders 
from the business community, 
civic agencies, area universities, 
the teachers’ union, and the board 
of education to seek sustainable 
solutions to long-standing problems. 
In the fall of 1987, a 19-day teachers’ 
strike ignited and mobilized 
widespread demonstrations of 
parents and community activists 
who demanded not only the 
reopening of schools but also the 
redress of intolerable educational 
conditions. In response, the mayor 
appointed a large group of parent 
and community representatives to 
the Education Summit. Meanwhile 
several bills introduced by various 
Chicago reform coalitions of parent 
and advocacy groups were struggling 
through the state legislature, 
eventually resulting in a compromise 
school reform bill. In December 
1988, the Illinois General Assembly 
adopted the Chicago School Reform 
Act and the governor signed it into 
law.
The 1988 Chicago School 
Reform Act
In a radical dismantling of central 
ofﬁce bureaucracy, the 1988 law 
transferred considerable authority 
over instruction, resources, hiring, 
and autonomy to local schools. Its 
major components were: 
■ A set of goals to guide school 
improvement planning over a 
ﬁve-year period 
■ The reduction in central ofﬁce 
staff, with a shift of $40 million 
dollars to the schools 
■ A system of school-based man-
agement centered on the estab-
lishment of Local School Councils 
(LSCs) consisting of parents, 
teachers, community members, 
students, and the principal, with 
authority over school improve-
ment plans, budgets, and princi-
pal hiring 
■ Cadres of teachers advising on 
curriculum and instruction
■ Principal authority to ﬁll teaching 
positions based on merit alone 
■ The shift of state poverty dollars to 
school control 
■ The creation of 40 new schools 
that had been school branches 
Chicago School Reform—
Second Phase
By 1995, state legislators and 
Chicago’s business and civic lead-
ers were impatient with the lack of 
signiﬁcant progress at schools where 
children were still performing far 
below national norms. With civic and 
business support, the mayor asked for 
and received authority from the state 
legislature to assume control over the 
school system. The amended School 
Reform Act gave the mayor unfettered 
authority to appoint a new, scaled-
down, ﬁve-member school board 
of trustees and a central ofﬁce team 
headed by a chief executive ofﬁcer 
(CEO). The CEO was responsible for 
the management of the system and 
had all the powers and duties of a 
general superintendent of schools. 
The school board president and the 
CEO rapidly laid out key elements 
of a system-wide plan that included 
academic standards, a new testing 
system, student promotion standards, 
streamlined school improvement 
planning, and interventions in low-
performing schools. The board of 
trustees and the CEO created a new 
Ofﬁce of Accountability and gave it 
the mandate to “focus on identifying 
and supporting the desired educa-
tional outcomes and standards of 
performance, giving schools a certain 
time period to reach them, measuring 
those outcomes at the end of the pre-
determined time, and then providing 
incentives for success and penalties 
for failure” (Chicago Public Schools, 
1997).
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I
The new accountability system con-
sisted of a set of corrective actions 
and technical supports. Policy tools 
included: 1) remediation, a relatively 
mild sanction aimed at correcting 
school problems in the early stages; 
2) probation, a more structured 
intervention which included central 
ofﬁce supports and signiﬁcant central 
control over curriculum, instruction, 
stafﬁng, and budget; and 3) reconsti-
tution, the most severe sanction, with 
authority to replace the principal, 
the staff, and order new Local School 
Council elections. To a large extent, 
the support provided by central ofﬁce 
at this time through a network of 
external partners leveraged an exist-
ing base of relationships in the city. 
Ten area colleges, universities, edu-
cational organizations, the central 
ofﬁce, and “successful” principals 
provided technical assistance and 
support to schools on remediation or 
probation. 
During the 1996-97 school year, the 
CPS central administration sent shock 
waves through the school system by 
placing 71 elementary and 38 high 
schools on probation. This tough 
action attracted media attention and 
generated big headlines. Intervention 
in one out of ﬁve Chicago Public 
Schools sent a clear message that the 
central ofﬁce would no longer toler-
ate low student achievement. At the 
outset, the probation process was 
widely criticized as being arbitrary 
and punitive in nature. Schools that 
found themselves on the “probation 
list” were stunned. Teachers, par-
ents, and students felt stigmatized. 
Principals felt exploited. One clear 
effect of the central ofﬁce’s new 
approach to accountability, however, 
was a distinct shift at the school level 
to a heavy concentration on devising 





 n 2001, a new central ofﬁce
 leadership team communi-  
 cated its intent to work on build-
ing systemic instructional capacity as 
well as to continue to hold schools 
accountable for results. Within the 
ﬁrst year of the new administration, 
six former administrative regions 
were reorganized into 24 “instruc-
tional areas.” Each Area Instructional 
Ofﬁce (AIO) was charged with the 
responsibility to provide management 
and organizational support to a clus-
ter of schools within its jurisdiction, 
as well as instructional support and 
professional development. 
There was a measure of apprecia-
tion for the previous administration’s 
efforts among those interviewed for 
this study at the central ofﬁce and 
schools. At the central ofﬁce, there 
was a sense that former leaders had 
restored public conﬁdence in the 
Chicago Public Schools. According 
to a central ofﬁce administrator, there 
was general acknowledgment that 
before accountability became the 
watchword in Chicago, “everybody 
was saying, well, you know, if they 
did their job, I could do my job. 
Now, people are saying maybe that’s 
true, but I still got to make sure I do 
my job.” This administrator went on 
to say that the previous administra-
tion’s policy of imposing sanctions on 
low-performing schools was neces-
sary to “shake things up a little bit” 
so that everyone in the school system 
would accept responsibility for stu-
dent results. Additionally, mayoral 
control “brought an urgency,” that is, 
the new administration “knew they 
had to get results quickly. For the ﬁrst 
time, schools had to perform better or 
consequences would happen.” 
Another central administrator felt that 
it was necessary for the school sys-
tem to experience the previous phase 
in order for the current administration 
to be able to focus more heavily on 
instruction:
It’s like your primary needs. 
You’re not going to be interested 
in learning if you come to school 
hungry, sleepy, sick, and so on. 
So, when the previous administra-
tion started to address issues of 
facilities, local school councils 
and their relationships with the 
principals, those were issues that 
the administration really had to 
pay attention to ﬁrst. 
A teacher at High School A noted:
I think the ﬁrst thing you need 
to have is a comfortable envi-
ronment. You can deﬁnitely 
see where the district has spent 
money on maintenance of this 
building. It’s a decent place for 
your kid, you know? And it’s a 
decent place to work.
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Two comprehensive efforts were 
launched in 2001-02 with direct 
oversight provided by the Chief 
Educational Ofﬁcer: 1) the Chicago 
Reading Initiative; and 2) a system-
wide professional development 
program. A new Reading Unit 
was created to realign all of the 
central functions devoted to read-
ing and language arts under one 
domain. Similarly, a new Ofﬁce 
of Professional Development was 
established to consolidate the 
district’s professional development 
functions and to be at the center 
of the district’s transition to a more 
intensive instructional focus.
The Chicago Reading 
Initiative
 
At the beginning of the 2001-02 
school year, only one-third of CPS 
elementary students read at or 
above national norms. To address 
this issue, the ﬁrst major initiative 
of the new administration was the 
Chicago Reading Initiative. Central 
ofﬁce administrators described this 
effort as a research-based, content-
focused strategy to provide a sys-
temic (K-12) response to students’ 
needs. One administrator noted that 
under decentralization, the school 
system had become “an unmanage-
able type of monster with every-
body just kind of doing their own 
thing...that’s really where reading 
fell down.” According to another 
administrator,
There were pieces of reading 
in a lot of different places and 
that led to a lack of clarity 
in the ﬁeld in terms of what 
should actually be taking 
place. A full-time focus was 
needed so that we could really 
begin to look at reading from 
the standpoint of what the 
research says works best for 
schools. 
An expert with extensive previous 
involvement with the National 
Reading Panel was recruited 
from the University of Illinois at 
Chicago to work with the Chief 
Educational Ofﬁcer on the devel-
opment of the reading initia-
tive. They introduced a four-part 
instructional framework to help 
teachers focus attention on the 
speciﬁc reading skills.
Central ofﬁce took additional steps, 
including the deployment of school-
based reading specialists to 114 of 
the school system’s lowest-perform-
ing schools to provide classroom 
support and ongoing professional 
development to teachers and prin-
cipals. All schools in the system 
were informed that they were to 
substantially increase the amount of 
time dedicated to reading and writ-
ing instruction to a minimum of two 
hours per day. CPS also provided dol-
lars to create classroom libraries in 
the primary grades. One of the read-
ing specialists noted:
This is the ﬁrst instance in [my] 
18 years that somebody’s actu-
ally been interested in a ‘reading 
credential’, which is unbeliev-
able. But it’s true. I think it’s a very 
interesting shift in the system and 
a positive one.
Chicago Reading Framework Focus of Instruction
Word Knowledge
Refers to children’s understanding 
of word recognition and meaning. 
Includes sight vocabulary, phonemic 
awareness and phonics, spelling, 
structural analysis, and word 
meaning.
Reading Comprehension
The construction of meaning by 
making connections between what 
is already known and the new 
information encountered. Includes 
an understanding of text structure 
(headings, subheadings, graphics, 
and the organization of print). 
Fluency
The combination of reading speed 
(words per minute), oral reading 
accuracy (number of words correctly 
identiﬁed), phrasing (grouping of 
words and attention to punctuation), 
and expression.
Writing
The process of composing original 
text. Involves detailed understanding 
of the skills and strategies of reading. 
Writers identify the purpose for 
their communication (to narrate, to 
describe, to persuade, to explain) 
and vary their language and style 
according to their audience. 
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The reading specialists’ role was to 
ensure that the reading framework was 
being implemented in classrooms. 
Prior to going into the schools, the 
reading specialists received two weeks 
of intensive training on the theory 
behind the reading framework as well 
as techniques for coaching and men-
toring teachers. At the schools, their 
responsibilities were to spend their 
time on staff development consistent 
with the instructional framework, 
classroom observations, classroom 
demonstrations, coaching and provid-
ing feedback to teachers, and help-
ing teachers and principals assess 
and evaluate the progress of reading 
instruction under the new initiative.
The Challenge of Changing Practice. 
The reading specialists had a difﬁcult 
role to play in getting teachers to 
change their instructional practices. 
As one reading specialist noted, “My 
job probably has more to do with trust 
than any other job in the system, so 
I had to build a little credibility and 
some trust with teachers.” The special-
ist described the challenge of coach-
ing teachers to be more reﬂective, less 
defensive, and to assume an active 
stance over their own learning: 
We want [teachers] to look at how 
they are teaching. If you have a lot 
of kids that are ﬂunking the unit 
test, you have some problems. You 
need to go back and re-teach some 
things. I think that what has hap-
pened is, as a whole system, we’ve 
been so ingrained in just keeping 
up with the pacing that we forget 
to go back and re-teach. We’re try-
ing to get [teachers] to change their 
perception of how they’re doing it.
What’s Changed?  The Chicago 
Reading Initiative attempted to 
accomplish a major change in the 
way CPS worked to build capacity 
to teach reading. Prior to the reading 
initiative, this function was performed 
in a couple of ways. A school would 
use its discretionary funds to hire a 
curriculum or reading specialist to 
assist in reading. An administrator 
noted that persons in these posi-
tions often were assigned to do other 
duties: “A reading specialist gets used 
as a substitute teacher, an extra asso-
ciate, assistant principal—overall the 
stories are legion about how badly-
used they were.” A second approach 
was through centrally-funded pro-
grams such as Read and Write Well 
that sometimes had to stretch scarce 
resources to try to serve as many 
schools as possible. (See discussion 
below under Communicating and 
Implementing District Instructional 
Initiatives.) Under CPS’s new ini-
tiative, reading specialists were 
assigned to the schools, they did not 
report to the principal (they reported 
to central ofﬁce), and their responsi-
bilities were focused solely on read-
ing. According to one central ofﬁce 
administrator:
The principals have been told 
that these individuals are not to 
be used for anything other than 
reading matters. They are not to 
be used for substituting; they are 
not to be pulled for other sorts 
of duties. As a matter of fact, 
they report directly to the central 
ofﬁce, so if there’s any deviation 
from what they have been told are 
their duties and responsibilities, 
the central ofﬁce can pull them 
from that particular school. 
Professional Development
A recent research study on teacher 
professional development within the 
Chicago Public Schools found that 
while more CPS teachers were expe-
riencing quality professional develop-
ment, for many teachers it remained 
largely a fragmented and individual 
pursuit. Moreover, teachers reported 
that their professional development 
lacked qualities to make it effective 
(Smylie et al., 2001). In our study, 
a CPS administrator described the 
short-comings of previous central 
ofﬁce efforts: 
I’d probably say three things about 
it in general. One is that it was 
‘drive-by’ in comparison—no sus-
tainability. Two, it was not coor-
dinated or coherent with system 
goals or school-level goals. It was 
fragmented in the sense that even 
central ofﬁce units weren’t talking 
to each other and were duplicat-
ing services. And three, it was not 
content-focused. Instead, it was 
focused on all the other things 
that kind of surround teaching but 
not the core of what teaching is 
about. 
This central ofﬁce administrator’s 
view validated the views of teach-
ers in the current study who typi-
cally were very critical of the central 
ofﬁce’s efforts at professional 
development for many of the same 
reasons. According to one teacher, 
“eating donuts and writing lesson 
plans” was how her colleagues spent 
their time in mandatory staff develop-
ment workshops. 
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CPS Professional Development Principles
 1. Curriculum-Focused: Deepens staff knowledge of the subjects they teach and provides them 
with research-based instructional strategies that support improved student learning. 
 
Content 2. Student-Centered: Enhances staff understanding and appreciation for the unique gifts and 
talents of all students and improves staff skills in creating productive learning environments that 
are responsive to student needs. 
 
 3. Data-Driven: Strengthens staff skills to use multiple sources of information to analyze the impact 
of their instruction and programs on student learning and utilize data to determine priorities, 
establish plans, monitor progress, and adjust direction as required.
 4. Coherent: Aligns professional development programs and activities with school-wide goals and 
system-level priorities and builds a common language across schools and the entire system. 
 
Process 5. Continuous: Produces a variety of on-going, job-embedded professional development programs 
and activities to address the needs of individuals and schools at different developmental stages.
 
 6. Results-oriented: Establishes clear goals for improving teaching and learning; provides 
opportunities to build knowledge, reﬁne skills, practice new learning, obtain feedback, receive 
coaching; and evaluates results in terms of their impact on improving student learning.
 7. Learning Communities: Develops professional communities that work collaboratively to 
help adults discuss their work, problem solve collectively, reﬂect on their practice, and take 
responsibility for improving student learning.
 
Context 8. Shared Leadership: Identiﬁes and supports skilled teachers and administrative leaders who 
utilize principles of adult learning and change management models to transform classroom 
instruction and organizational performance.
 
 9. Access to Resources: Requires extended and sustained time, access to research-based expertise, 
high-quality staff members, and adequate ﬁnancial resources to support adult learning and 
collaboration. 
Source: An Education Plan for the Chicago Public Schools (2002).
The CPS Education Plan offered nine principles of effective professional development that administrators said were  
guiding the redesign effort: 
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The CPS professional development 
initiative was facing daunting chal-
lenges, according to an inventory 
and audit of school and system-level 
spending on professional develop-
ment (Chicago Public Education 
Fund). This analysis compared CPS 
spending to other school districts, 
and evaluated the results against 
the above principles. Among the 
audit’s ﬁndings was that the Chicago 
Public Schools spent $194 million on 
professional development in 2001-
2002. The spending occurred on two 
levels: the central ofﬁce controlled 
$123 million, roughly 3.4 percent 
of the district’s $3.6 billion operat-
ing budget. Of the centrally-con-
trolled spending, $56 million was for 
instruction-free days or other times 
for teacher professional development. 
Additional audit ﬁndings were:
■ Standards. There were no com-
mon standards for instructional 
quality, and this hindered efforts 
to provide targeted support to 
measure progress and to maintain 
accountability.
■ Strategy. Spending on profes-
sional development for individu-
als and schools was fragmented 
and uneven, undermining a com-
prehensive strategy.
■ Expenditures. Contractual “profes-
sional development days” negoti-
ated for teachers were a major 
expenditure and missed opportu-
nity, but one that could be easily 
recaptured.
In July 2002, CPS’s new professional 
development unit launched an ambi-
tious summer training program to 
support the implementation of the 
reading initiative. The training institute 
was focused on building knowledge 
and skills for instructional leader-
ship system-wide. Multiple groups 
of participants, ranging in number 
from 24 to 1,500, participated in the 
training sessions. These included the 
24 Area Instructional Ofﬁcers (AIOs) 
that had been identiﬁed as part of the 
district reorganization to support the 
new instructional focus; principals 
and assistant principals in the low-
est-performing (quartile one) schools; 
leadership teams from an additional 
178 schools (quartiles two and above); 
and summer school teachers (regular 
education, English Language Learners 
[ELL], and special education) who 
received 60 hours of professional 
development in designing and pilot-
ing reading instructional strategies. 
According to CPS administrators, 
each training institute had extensive 
follow-up, consistent with CPS’s new 
principles of effective professional 
development. 
The challenge ahead for the central 
ofﬁce was to continue to streamline 
and align its array of professional 
development opportunities consistent 
with the principles contained in its 
education plan. This goal was com-
promised by system fragmentation, 
conﬁrmed by the aforementioned 
inventory/audit and by teachers and 
administrators interviewed for this 
study. As one CPS administrator 
noted, there is always a provision for 
“planned redundancy” in systems, 
but CPS has “lots and lots of redun-
dancy that we [don’t] need to have.” 
Resolving the issues concerning 
roles, relationships, cooperation, and 
authority would require deep efforts.
The Education Plan
In September 2002, the central ofﬁce 
presented an eight-point plan for 
achieving a high-quality instructional 
program. The plan included the fol-
lowing components: 
■ Building instructional capacity 
■ Having high-quality teaching and 
leadership 
■ Creating learning communities 
and providing professional  
development
■ Supporting student development 
and post-secondary training and 
education 
■ Having schools as centers of  
communities in partnership with 
families 
■ Strengthening existing high school 
programs 
■ Expanding choice within neigh-
borhoods 
■ Ensuring accountability to support 
improvement in all schools
They raised issues rang-
ing from how to help 
lower-performing schools 
become more self-sufﬁ-
cient, to how to develop  
an array of instructional 
supports that would be 
available to all schools  
on an ongoing basis. 
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In our ﬁeld research, central ofﬁce 
administrators identiﬁed the follow-
ing challenges to implementing this 
agenda:
Creating a Coherent Instructional 
Focus. Central administrators iden-
tiﬁed the priority to align central 
ofﬁce resources to create a coher-
ent instructional support system. 
According to one administrator, 
“There was a strong sense, from my 
perspective and the ﬁeld perspective, 
that there was fragmentation within 
the system that led to a lack of clarity 
in the ﬁeld in terms of what should 
actually be taking place.” To advance 
an instructional agenda, this admin-
istrator felt the central ofﬁce needed 
“to realign things so that they make 
sense and everyone is clear on our 
focus so that their work can proceed 
in a more focused manner.” The same 
administrator claimed that the central 
ofﬁce was employing an intentional 
strategy to create a coherent instruc-
tional focus as follows: 
We’re boring in that we’re saying 
the same thing over and over and 
over again because, you know, 
we want people to get it. We want 
the language to be consistent. We 
feel that the importance of hav-
ing a simple reading framework 
is to ensure that people clearly 
understand what it is they should 
be doing.
Supporting All Schools. Some central 
administrators recalled their days 
as principals and their relationships 
with central ofﬁce: “There was no 
support whatsoever from central 
ofﬁce” and “I just know what it’s like 
to be out at a school trying to get an 
answer to something and just getting 
the run around.” These administra-
tors identiﬁed the need to expand the 
external support system from lower-
performing schools to all schools. 
They raised issues ranging from how 
to help lower-performing schools 
become more self-sufﬁcient to how 
to develop an array of instructional 
supports that would be available to 
all schools on an ongoing basis. To 
the suggestion that creating a more 
coherent infrastructure of support 
might require an ambitious effort to 
retrain central ofﬁce support staff, an 
administrator responded that efforts 
of this nature needed to be “across 
the board.” 
Strengthening Instructional 
Leadership. CPS’s capacity-building 
plans included both teachers and 
principals. Central ofﬁce administra-
tors, as well as building-level admin-
istrators, emphasized the need for a 
change in teaching practice before 
students would achieve high stan-
dards. Additionally, central adminis-
trators emphasized the importance 
of helping school principals become 
effective instructional leaders. A cen-
tral ofﬁce administrator noted that it 
was time to attend to the “real issue 
of education, that is, the teacher 
teaching and the student learning. 
Everybody is realizing that we’re not 
going to make a change in the system 
for students until we make sure that 
teachers can teach and students can 
learn.”
Maintaining External Pressure. On 
the role of providing external over-
sight and pressure on schools to 
improve, one administrator defended 
the previous administration’s tough 
stance, noting:
People that don’t want to change 
aren’t going to change just by 
you going in there and saying, in 
a nice way, ‘It’s time to change, 
would you please change?’ 
Sometimes if you can’t change 
people’s [attitude] at least you  
can change the way they do 
things. Without that kind of  
toughness, many of those schools 
were not going to change because 
it was so inbred in so many of our 
teachers that they were doing the 
best that they could.
Another administrator appeared to be 
no less tough-minded but somewhat 
more willing to take school culture 
into account:
You’ve got to remember this read-
ing initiative is new. You have to 
acknowledge our reading special-
ists for what they are, as people 
who go out and dance the dance, 
and they’re part of the process 
now. So anytime you add in a 
new entity, things change. 
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E
Underlying this recognition was the 
resolution to stay the course: 
One of the reading instructors 
called me this morning: ‘These 
teachers are resistant in this par-
ticular thing and that particular 
thing. Should I back off?’ I said, 
‘No! We won’t back off. Go back 
and do this, or ask them that, or 
tell them this. Don’t be disruptive 
and try to be supportive, but don’t 
back off. This isn’t optional, but, 
you know, let’s be polite about 
it.’ We care very much what our 
teachers are doing.
The identiﬁcation of these chal-
lenges by central ofﬁce administra-
tors suggested their belief that a key 
continuing role for central ofﬁce was 
to provide a balance of both sup-
port and pressure for instructional 
improvement.
Communicating  
and Implementing  
District Instructional 
Initiatives
I’ve been in this system long 
enough to know that you just go 
from thing to thing and every time 
we do one of these things, it’s the 
be-all, end-all. And the minute 
someone else [comes] in, we 
chuck ‘em all. 
Read Write Well. During the study 
period, the new central ofﬁce team 
considered the possibility of salvag-
ing the Read Write Well program.  
A question for consideration was 
whether Read Write Well, which had 
produced moderately positive results 
despite limited capacity, could be 
aligned with the new reading ini-
tiative. Read Write Well created a 
voluntary literacy specialist position 
to work in schools. As stipulated, 
these were schools above the proba-
tion school level (25 percent to 35 
percent of students in participating 
schools were at or above national 
norms in reading). The program was 
restricted to 90 schools, giving each 
of six centrally-assigned literacy spe-
cialists responsibility for 15 schools. 
Thus, the amount of time that spe-
cialists could actually spend in the 
schools working with teachers was 
limited to only one day per month, 
on average. 
At the Central Ofﬁce 
Uncertainty. Some central ofﬁce 
staff had initial concerns over how 
the new instructional program might 
change the focus of their work. For 
example, although the Department of 
Curriculum and Instruction no longer 
had responsibility for reading/lan-
Early implementation 
of the Chicago Reading 
Initiative illustrated how 
a systemic effort can 
catalyze both positive and 
negative effects, creating 
new resources but also 
new tensions at the central 
ofﬁce and schools.
 arly implementation of the  
 Chicago Reading Initiative  
 illustrated how a systemic 
effort can catalyze both positive 
and negative effects, creating new 
resources but also new tensions at 
the central ofﬁce and schools. 
At the Schools 
The introduction of the reading ini-
tiative caused at least one central 
instructional support program, the 
Comprehensive Approach to Student 
Achievement (CASA), to be canceled 
and another, Read Write Well, to be 
put on hold, pending redesign. 
CASA. The previous administration’s 
CASA program, which was scheduled 
to begin implementation in the 2001-
02 school year, was designed to pro-
vide curriculum support to the 200 
lowest-performing schools identiﬁed 
by the central ofﬁce. Each school 
was to receive $50,000 to select a 
curriculum and $40 per pupil for 
textbooks. Working cooperatively, 
the departments of Curriculum and 
Instruction and Accountability had 
compiled a catalogue of curriculum 
models to assist schools in their 
selection. The leadership change at 
the top led to CASA being canceled. 
Schools, unfortunately, held a jaded 
view of this type of occurrence. A 
teacher at School B (a higher-per-
forming elementary school) noted: 
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guage arts, it retained responsibility 
for providing instructional support 
for the other content areas of math, 
science, and social studies. A spe-
ciﬁc example is the Chicago Urban 
Systemic Program (CUSP) which pro-
vided math and science instructional 
support to high schools and elemen-
tary/middle schools. Funded by a 
National Science Foundation grant, 
one of the program’s functions was to 
provide overall professional develop-
ment in the content areas of math-
ematics and science for the entire 
system. According to a program 
administrator, leadership change had 
the following impact:
There’s tremendous upheaval 
when administrations change, 
because it’s just not the top guy. 
It’s all of those people that work 
under him, and who they impact, 
that is changing. And so we don’t 
know what professional develop-
ment means any more. Is the new 
professional development unit 
going to include content area 
stuff? Is it going to include generic 
teacher training? We don’t know.
Mixed Messages. The Department of 
Critical School Support monitored 
school activities in lower-perform-
ing schools and also conducted 
instructional reviews. Staff from this 
department visited schools, helped 
to identify school-speciﬁc needs, and 
wrote reports with recommenda-
tions, which were to be addressed 
in the school’s corrective action 
plan and its school improvement 
plan. This department also assigned 
external partners to these schools. 
During the transition, one of this 
department’s early tasks was to make 
sure that the reading specialists, the 
school principals, and the external 
partners were working in concert. 
Conﬂicts between principals, read-
ing specialists, and external partners 
emerged due to confusion over roles. 
According to one administrator, “The 
principal should be the instructional 
leader so the principal and the read-
ing specialist have to work together.” 
Another administrator claimed that 
the schools were deﬁnitely getting 
mixed messages from central ofﬁce:
I’m not sure how successfully 
the entire central ofﬁce has been 
engaged in [this] vision. There 
are some things that really worry 
me. For example, within the 
Ofﬁce of Accountability there are 
10 people who go out and tell 
schools to do direct instruction, 
which doesn’t particularly mesh 
with the reading initiative. I know 
that there are efforts afoot trying 
to align these things up, but I’m 
not quite sure that [it’s happen-
ing]...I don’t know about putting 
all of our eggs in one basket, but 
if this is important then everybody 
should be doing it. They shouldn’t 
be doing other things that could 
be competing. 
Gaining Cooperation/Buy-In. 
Communication clearly is a key ele-
ment within any change initiative, 
as well as an ongoing challenge. 
Speaking optimistically, one central 
ofﬁce administrator commented on 
central ofﬁce communication pat-
terns:
I think we’re moving towards 
that point where we realize that 
units that are within CPS need to 
complement one another, need to 
talk with one another rather than 
believing that each individual unit 
must be a stand-alone, all-encom-
passing piece. 
This administrator was referring to 
departments with responsibilities for 
instructional support to schools such 
as early childhood, bilingual and 
special education, and the gaps and 
redundancies that can occur as they 
carry out their roles in the absence of 
structures and processes for collabo-
ration and coordination. 
Sometimes a high level of prior-
ity was needed before an initiative 
gained the attention—and coop-
eration—of others. For example, a 
central ofﬁce administrator felt she 
gained the cooperation of other cen-
tral ofﬁce units only when the central 
ofﬁce’s organization chart showed 
her program directly linked to the 
CEO and Chief Educational Ofﬁcer. 
Then, “everyone looked at us in a 
different light.” Another administrator 
provided a similar summary of CPS 
relationship patterns:
I’ve been in a few places before 
Chicago over the years and I must 
say, I’ve never seen a place quite 
as top down as it, and I don’t 
mean that the leaders are intru-
sive. I mean people on the line, 
people on the ground level, really 
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want to know what the people 
above them think...a kind of wait-
ing to see what the boss thinks. 
You know, the sort of notion is, 
we don’t want to talk to anybody 
that nobody sent. There’s really a 




Other issues discussed by central 
ofﬁce administrators suggested the 
need for ways to build consensus 
across diverse perspectives on how 
to achieve system-wide goals and 
to integrate discrete areas of work. 
Through the following story, one 
administrator shared an insight on 
how two program areas came to a 
meeting of the minds: 
A reading program manager  
received a call from a science pro-
gram manager expressing concern 
about the impact of the reading 
initiative on science education. 
Speciﬁcally, the science program 
manager anticipated that the 
increased emphasis on literacy 
would require students to surren-
der their lab time to the textbook. 
The science program manager had 
seen the tape [announcing the 
literacy initiative] and went, ‘Uh-
oh! He’s gonna mess up science 
education. This guy doesn’t know 
what he’s doing.’ The science pro-
gram manager sent the reading 
program manager a strong e-mail 
message, initiating a back and 
forth e-mail exchange. The reading 
program manager held his ground, 
explaining to the science program 
manager how the two programs 
could be integrated. Some months 
later, the two managers were in a 
meeting together for the ﬁrst time. 
The reading manager thought the 
science manager was going to 
continue expressing her concerns 
in person. But to his surprise, she 
said, ‘You know, you won me over, 
I’m on board. I want you to know 
that we set up our year’s science 
education stuff and incorporated 
your stuff and you’re right. It’s not 
an issue.’ 
The reading program manager under-
scored the signiﬁcance of this single 
interaction between program units 
within central ofﬁce:
That science program manager 
sits down multiple times, meets 
with every science teacher or 
department head in the high 
school and in the middle school 
upper grades. Any in-service that’s 
planned for those people, the sci-
ence program manager plans it. If 
that program manager is on board 
and says, ‘Hey wait a minute, this 
[reading initiative] isn’t stupid, this 
actually makes sense,’ this means 
when I go out to a high school 
and say we need to do this read-
ing initiative, instead of all the 
science people going, ‘Oh, yeah, 
here we go, you know, yawn,’ 
a number of them are sitting in 
there saying, ‘Hey, this is what we 
heard about from our people.’ 
“I think we should start 
all over when it comes  
to assessment and 
accountability, taking 
what we’ve got with all 
of its imperfections and 
trying to create some 
better indicators of 
school improvement.”
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The science program manager’s 
contacts with classroom people in 
the schools were invaluable for help-
ing to facilitate the integration of 
the reading initiative with science 
instruction at local schools. As the 
reading program manager noted, 
“Yeah, I want those people on board. 
I want any lever that’ll work. Any 
lever that will get kids the instruction 
they need.”
Unresolved Issues 
Central ofﬁce interviews identiﬁed 
two additional domains of instruc-
tionally-related issues that had not 
been given priority in the current 
administration’s instructional agenda:
Student Assessment.  One admin-
istrator noted that the new CEO 
intended to improve the district’s 
research, analysis, and evaluation 
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capability in order to make the dis-
trict more “data driven.” What was 
equally important to this adminis-
trator was that revisions in student 
assessment also be considered:
I think we should start all over 
when it comes to assessment and 
accountability, taking what we’ve 
got with all of its imperfections 
and trying to create some better 
indicators of school improve-
ment. I’m really hoping that this 
central ofﬁce is shifting away 
from—somebody called it com-
mand central—to an instructional 
support ofﬁce. I think we’ve got 
to get rid of the Iowa test in the 
next couple of years. ESEA [the 
federal Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act] is going to change 
assessment and accountability in 
the next couple of years, but how 
hard are we all going to lobby the 
state to do it right? 
 
Special Education.  The second key 
unaddressed issue was special edu-
cation, an area where people at both 
the central ofﬁce and school level 
expressed serious concerns. A cen-
tral ofﬁce administrator explained 
that the “model” underlying the 
legislation for special education was 
ﬂawed, because it did not help to dis-
tinguish students’ learning difﬁculties 
from problems due to poor instruc-
tion. Moreover, according to this 
administrator, “none of the schools” 
had the resources for the “extremely 
expensive” remedial strategies asso-
ciated with special education. “The 
system is broken,” this administrator 
said.
School Perspectives 
on the District’s 
Instructional 
Priorities
        cademic standards and   
   instructional frameworks,  
     assessment and account-
ability systems, and professional 
development for standards-based 
instruction are among the tools 
of systemic reform that are used 
to change classroom instruction. 
Principals and teachers in the sample 
schools expressed a mixture of appre-
ciation and constructive criticism of 
the central ofﬁce’s provision of these 
instructional resources and tools. 
Schools also clearly held a jaded 
and fatigued view of the policy and 
program shifts that inevitably accom-
panied a change in top district lead-
ership.  Moreover, school staff had 
even stronger and more widely held 
concerns about the district’s assess-
ment and special education programs 
than voiced in central ofﬁce inter-
views.  
Academic Standards  
Both teachers and principals referred 
to Chicago’s instructional program as 
“standards-based.”  There was, how-
ever, little recollection from teach-
ers in our sample of how they had 
initially been exposed to standards 
other than through the receipt of the 
“standards book.”  Nor did teach-
ers articulate any deep changes in 
teaching practice that may have been 
underway.  Teachers and principals 
typically talked about standards in 
terms of the need for a system-wide 
set of student achievement expec-
tations by grade level, for teacher 
guidance, and for instructional con-
sistency across classrooms within 
schools and across schools. A teacher 
at Elementary School B noted, “You 
have to know what you’re teaching. 
I mean, if you don’t have standards, 
you’d have no way to judge any-
body.” The principal at School D 
stated:
There were a lot of inconsisten-
cies within the school system—
two schools being right next door 
to each other in terms of exactly 
what type of instruction was 
being given to students. So it did 
make it easier once the Chicago 
Public Schools came up with a 
set of standards aligned with the 
state goals, and that they were 
published in a book. And that the 
teachers were given copies, so 
that the teachers clearly under-
stood what they were expected 
to do. 
During the time of this study, the les-
son plan was the ubiquitous manifes-
tation of CPS standards implementa-
tion. In addition to language about 
“expectations,” teachers referred to 
standards in the language of  “cov-
erage,” i.e., they were required to 
meet the system’s expectations for 
speciﬁc content being taught at any 
given time during the school year. 
To help the schools in this regard, 
the central ofﬁce provided the 
Structured Curriculum, a detailed 
daily lesson plan for each of the core 
content areas. A teacher at School B 
explained the beneﬁt of having such 
a tool:
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Years ago, you would follow the 
textbook, chapter by chapter, 
page by page. And now, the board 
has given us their own Structured 
Curriculum, which we follow day 
by day. And it tells you lesson 
one, on day one, lesson two, on 
day two. So if the student transfers 
in from another school, we can 
be on the same page, and if one 
of my students transfers out, the 
teacher at his or her new school 
can pick up where we left off. 
Curriculum and Instruction  
Although CPS was a decentralized 
system, lesson planning was a mode 
through which the central ofﬁce 
inﬂuenced the school curriculum. 
Principals and teachers at each 
school mentioned the central ofﬁce 
mandate that teachers prepare and 
submit weekly lesson plans to the 
central ofﬁce for review, indicating 
the alignment between the class-
room lesson, the state goal(s) and 
the Chicago academic standard(s). 
School personnel also were begin-
ning to notice increased central 
ofﬁce attention on academic content 
and pedagogy. Following the launch 
of the Chicago Reading Initiative, 
the principal of High School E noted 
an increased emphasis on teaching 
students to read differently: “. . .as a 
structural tool that helps kids decode 
and see meaning, and build mean-
ing into the printed page.  We hear 
[that] in every meeting.”  Schools 
were also noticing efforts at capacity-
building. During the central ofﬁce’s 
ambitious professional development 
effort during the summer of 2002, the 
principal at School D noted: “I think 
one of the main differences [with the 
new reading initiative] is that there is 
an attempt being made to make sure 
that everyone within the school sys-
tem is in-serviced.”
Instructional Support
On the one hand, schools appre-
ciated the resources that often 
accompanied new programs. On the 
other hand, there were occasions 
when schools viewed a new initia-
tive as an additional burden. For 
example, CPS’s MINT (Mentoring and 
Induction of New Teachers) program 
provided mentoring and professional 
development support to new teachers 
in meeting their certiﬁcation require-
ments. At the time of this study, 
the central ofﬁce had expanded 
the MINT program to four years to 
align with the state’s newly revised 
teacher certiﬁcation program which 
gave teachers four years to obtain a 
standard teaching certiﬁcate. A High 
School E teacher saw this commit-
ment as onerous:
The board has started this program 
called the MINT program. At ﬁrst 
it was a one-year program. Then it 
was a two-year year program. And 
now, all teachers coming in have 
to go through it for four years. The 
program, I think, has good inten-
tions. But four years—that’s four 
years that a teacher has to give up 
to go to a MINT class. The inten-
tion was to help support these 
new teachers. But then again, you 
know, there has to be some bal-
ance.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, 
the Structured Curriculum was 
well received at both the higher 
and lower-performing schools in 
this study Chicago sample (it was 
required in the probation schools). 
Principals explained that inexperi-
enced teachers needed the structure 
and the easy reference to resources 
provided by this tool, and that it was 
a useful addition to the instructional 
repertoire of more experienced 
teachers as well. As noted by the 
School C principal, “They give you 
the bibliography, the homework, 
everything is written there. The only 
thing that you have to do is put 
enthuse (sic) into it.” A high school 
teacher at School A liked the fact that 
at his discretion, “...I’m going to take 
some of this and not use some of the 
other,” meaning that he didn’t have 
to “reinvent the wheel” every time he 
did a lesson plan.
Overall, our sample schools 
appeared to exhibit a justiﬁable “wait 
and see” attitude in response to cen-
tral ofﬁce initiatives, as schools have 
seen many programs come and go. 
Overall, our sample 
schools appeared to 
exhibit a justiﬁable  
“wait and see” attitude  
in response to central 
ofﬁce initiatives, as schools 
have seen many programs 
come and go. 
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For example, when School D was 
still slated to receive CASA resources 
(prior to the program’s cancellation), 
the head teacher at School D dis-
played a sense of cautious anticipa-
tion: 
Now that we are a CASA school, 
we’ve had more interaction with 
central ofﬁce. The central ofﬁce 
wants to make sure that they are 
as fully supportive as possible in 
giving resources and manpower, 
and staff development. It’s just 
that this is new for them as well, 
and so the way it was coming 
across [from central ofﬁce] was, 
‘this is all new, but we’re going to 
work together. Let us know what 
you need, but we’re taking one 
step at a time. We’re kind of feel-
ing our way.’
The Reading Initiative
The principals of both the low-per-
forming School D and the higher-
performing School C spoke positively 
about the new reading initiative. 
The principal at School D felt even 
though the school’s external partner 
and on-staff curriculum specialist had 
previously exposed School D teach-
ers to many of the strategies that the 
newly-provided reading specialist 
presented, the new reading initiative 
reinforced those best practices and 
“allowed the teachers to connect 
a little better. It gave the teachers a 
larger menu of best practices that 
they could choose from to make sure 
that the students were thinking criti-
cally about the reading process.” The 
higher-performing Elementary School 
C did not receive a reading special-
ist from the central ofﬁce but already 
had a curriculum specialist on staff, 
paid for from School C’s budget. This 
principal had attended one of the 
central ofﬁce’s 2002 summer profes-
sional development institutes and felt 
she had received sufﬁcient informa-
tion on the initiative to communicate 
with School C teachers.
Low-Performing Schools
The principals in this study’s lower-
performing schools greatly appreci-
ated the help of external partners 
and probation managers. The pro-
bation managers were current and 
past principals, central ofﬁce staff, 
or external consultants. They super-
vised and coached principals, over-
saw the implementation of school 
improvement plans and budgets, 
and monitored school progress. The 
principal of School D, a lower-per-
forming elementary school, attributed 
the school’s successful effort to be 
removed from probationary status 
to central ofﬁce support. Noting the 
difﬁculty of doing classroom obser-
vations due to time constraints, the 
principal welcomed the two staff 
members provided by the external 
partner to work in classrooms with a 
core group of teachers. According to 
the School D principal, the feedback 
on teacher performance by these per-
sonnel “validated” some of her con-
cerns over the quality of instruction 
at her school.  
The principal of School E, the high 
school still on probation at the time 
of this study, appreciated the external 
partner’s “practical ways” of deal-
ing with classroom issues. School E’s 
principal also spoke highly of CPS’s 
High School Redesign materials 
because these provided a “blueprint” 
for the redesign of their school into 
small learning communities. The 
principal of the moderately-improv-
ing High School A acknowledged a 
good relationship with its probation 
manager, a former deputy superin-
tendent in the school system, whom 
the school was allowed to select, and 
who “came in a supportive role.” It 
should be noted that teachers tended 
to be more skeptical than principals 
of the external supports provided by 
the central ofﬁce. Similar to the view 
of principals, teachers appreciated 
assistance in the form of suggestions 
for “practical” application in the 
classroom. However, teachers had 
little appreciation for “more people 
for us to be accountable to, or more 
people for us to follow their paper-
work.”
Test-Based Accountability
After several years of high stakes 
accountability, there was an apparent 
acceptance at the school level of the 
reality of operating under daily pres-
sure to improve student achievement. 
Similar to the views of some central 
After several years of  
high stakes accountabil-
ity, there was an apparent 
acceptance at the school 
level of the reality of  
operating under daily  
pressure to improve  
student achievement.
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ofﬁce administrators, sample school 
principals tended to appreciate the 
actions of the previous administra-
tion, in particular the focus and sense 
of direction, as a necessary and posi-
tive turning point for the system. As 
the principal of Elementary School 
C, noted: “We couldn’t go any 
other way but up. And [the previous 
administration was] very supportive 
of that.  I think, in general, people 
had a really good feeling about the 
last administration, just because 
there was a mission, you know? Even 
as lame as that mission was, which 
was to increase test scores, we knew 
where we were going. We had some 
sort of vision.”
It should be noted that this more 
recent perspective on Chicago’s 
accountability program was in stark 
contrast with school-level views at 
the beginning of the previous admin-
istration. Notwithstanding the fact 
that achievement levels at that time 
indicated the school system had 
much work to do, low-performing 
schools felt that the penalties and 
sanctions handed out by the former 
administration, based on a single 
administration of a standardized 
test, were punitive and unfair (Allen 
& Hallett, 1999).  At the time of the 
current study, some principals con-
tinued to question the efﬁcacy of the 
school system’s testing program and 
the fairness of centralized decisions 
impacting students and schools based 
largely on standardized tests. This 
was particularly the case in those 
schools in our sample with high pro-
portions of low-income and special 
needs students. From the principal of 
High School A:
You have to have something to 
measure your school by. I think 
the previous administration’s 
emphasis was good. But whether 
it was fair—I can’t say it was fair 
because you don’t get the same 
students. Therefore, some schools 
have to work twice as hard as 
other schools do.
The strong accountability message 
delivered during the previous admin-
istration continued to resonate at the 
school level through the schools’ 
perception of the continuing impor-
tance of standardized test scores. 
As a matter of course, principals 
and teachers in our sample schools 
accepted the notion that annual 
standardized testing was necessary 
to provide an external benchmark of 
school efforts and to provide data for 
the central ofﬁce to do cross-school 
comparisons. The principal of School 
D expressed a commonly held view: 
“Well, there must be some type of 
measure to determine what students 
know and don’t know. And also 
what’s being taught and what’s not 
being taught.”
Notably, however, school-level 
responses also suggested that princi-
pals and teachers deﬁned account-
ability around a different set of 
priorities than central ofﬁce adminis-
trators, possibly because school-level 
educators were in closer contact with 
students.  This often led to conﬂict-
ing goals.  Schools had to focus on 
the abilities, interests, and needs of 
individual children as well as the 
requirement of the school system to 
demonstrate progress. The principal 
of Elementary School C explained 
this dual focus: 
We are taking tests all the time. 
We know that we have to live 
with that throughout our lives. 
But the emphasis on testing is one 
that I sometimes question. The day 
that the children have to take the 
test is like a judgment day. We’re 
working with human beings. 
There are people that can test well 
and there are people that cannot 
test well. In the work of a child, 
you have to look at the whole 
child.
The message schools heard most 
clearly from the central ofﬁce was 
—improve test scores. Principals 
and teachers in our sample schools 
believed that the central ofﬁce’s 
driving priority was for students to 
perform at or above national norms 
in reading and math. According to a 
teacher at High School A, “It’s almost 
like a mantra that we hear all the 
time from the mayor, from the [for-
mer] board president to the [former] 
CEO. We need to increase the scores 
for the kids on the standardized 
tests.” The central ofﬁce’s priority on 
standardized testing led the princi-
pal at Elementary School C to sense 
“a hidden message” to the schools 
to emphasize reading and math “at 
possibly the cost of teaching the 
other subject areas because reading 
and math are the two areas that are 
tested, especially at those benchmark 
grades.” A teacher at High School 
E believed that the central ofﬁce’s 
priorities were based, to a degree, 
on looking good in the public eye: 
“They want to make sure that media 
at least has a really good sense of 
how they are working really hard to 
increase instructional development 
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and improvement in the schools. But 
they [also] want to raise test scores. 
They want to look good on paper.” 
Where Changes are Needed
The most critical school-level reac-
tions to central ofﬁce initiatives 
occurred in three areas: professional 
development, student assessment, 
and special education. 
Professional Development. Teachers 
typically held CPS professional devel-
opment offerings in low regard. This 
appraisal cut across all schools in 
our sample. Generally, teachers felt 
that CPS’s in-service trainings were 
of poor quality and not directly use-
ful for their particular instructional 
purposes. They described a host of 
problems ranging from facilitators’ 
lack of preparation to a “one-size-
ﬁts-all” approach. As a teacher from 
Elementary School C explained, 
“One problem is that they’re deliver-
ing the workshop as if I’ve been a 
teacher for two years, not, you know, 
as if I’ve been a teacher for 27 years.” 
Teachers also expressed reluctance 
to leave their students for an activ-
ity that they perceived, at best, to be 
not directly relevant to classroom 
instruction and, at worst, an insult 
to their professionalism. In terms of 
constructive solutions to this prob-
lem, an Elementary School D teacher 
suggested: 
I really don’t think that enough 
time and attention is given to 
what teachers think. We are asked 
to do this, do that—or told [to do 
something] at times. Sometimes 
the teachers need to talk. 
Sometimes we need to let them 
know we’re having a problem 
with this; we want to know more 
about that. Things are just thrown 
at us. I’d like to try some of these 
new techniques. But I [also] want 
to know some results before I go 
on to the next thing. 
Student Assessment. There were a 
number of issues concerning the 
district’s testing program, with no 
discernible differences in opinions 
expressed by higher-performing and 
lower-performing schools. All were 
focused on raising test scores, a 
clear legacy of Chicago’s high stakes 
accountability climate. The lower-
performing schools were working to 
remove themselves from interven-
tion status. The higher-performing 
schools were working to make sure 
that their performance levels did not 
decline and place them on interven-
tion status. Even though they were 
compliant with the central ofﬁce’s 
testing mandates, teachers described 
a sense of unrelenting pressure that 
affected what and how they taught. 
Some resented the implication that a 
student’s low achievement might be a 
reﬂection on their teaching. 
The high schools were vociferous 
on issues relating to fairness in test-
ing. Both School E and School A 
had low-income, minority student 
populations—one Latino, the other 
African-American. Both called for the 
central ofﬁce to look at gains when 
calibrating achievement instead 
of absolute attainment levels. As a 
teacher from High School E noted:
When you look at the TAP [Tests 
of Achievement and Proﬁciency] 
test, this is all we hear: ‘You are 
not performing at grade level. 
We’re going to close your doors. 
We’re going to ﬁre you. This is 
your fault. You are a bad teacher.’ 
And I say—what was the change 
in the student from when we got 
them to where they are at now? 
How did their scores change? 
Because if there is improvement, 
then we are doing our jobs. 
School A’s principal discussed the 
need for coherence in the district’s 
student assessment program, express-
ing doubt that the central ofﬁce 
“had either sat down and thought 
this thing out the way it should be 
thought out or brought people to the 
table to assist with it.” This principal 
shared the concern of the central 
ofﬁce administrator who suggested 
the need for an overhaul in student 
assessment practices to serve more 
as an aid to instruction. The principal 
noted:
Even though they were 
compliant with the central 
ofﬁce’s testing mandates, 
teachers described a 
sense of unrelenting pres-
sure that affected what 
and how they taught. 
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We need to continue to look at 
the Iowa test, but really we should 
be looking at the rate of gain in 
the school more than ‘the percent 
at or above.’ I guess the basic 
principles are: we want multiple 
indicators and we want these 
indicators to be measured. 
Special Education. Developing 
adequate capacity to serve children 
with disabilities was described as 
a serious challenge by both central 
ofﬁce administrators and school per-
sonnel. The issue was expressed both 
in terms of students’ rights and the 
school district’s obligation to adhere 
to both the letter and the spirit of the 
law. CPS’s settlement of the Corey 
H. law suit against the school district 
and the State of Illinois, requires that 
special needs children be educated 
in the “least restrictive environ-
ment.” Students with disabilities 
must be placed in regular schools or 
classrooms unless they are unable 
to progress academically in those 
settings, even with extra supports 
(Catalyst, 2002).  
Special education student assign-
ments, however, fall more heavily on 
some schools than others. For exam-
ple, at High School E, the principal 
noted that special education students 
comprised 24-25 percent of the stu-
dent body. Some teachers expressed 
their concern that central ofﬁce dealt 
with special education strictly as a 
compliance issue rather than as an 
instructional priority. An Elementary 
School C teacher noted: “Special 
education gets addressed when 
there’s some violation of Cory H. and 
somebody’s got to come down here 
from central ofﬁce. Other than that, 
you know, it’s swept under the table. 
They don’t want to hear about it 
really. They really don’t.” 
Regular education teachers expressed 
frustration at their inability to appro-
priately respond to the needs of their 
special needs students.  If a student 
was possibly a true candidate for spe-
cialized services, teachers believed 
that an appropriate and timely 
response was often compromised by 
burdensome documentation require-
ments. To complicate the issue, the 
central ofﬁce issued a policy direc-
tive to schools telling them to limit 
their special education referrals. This 
was in partial response to the pattern 
of teachers using special education 
referrals as a classroom management 
tactic.  Along these lines, teachers 
also complained about the lack of 
appropriate classroom supports for 
students already classiﬁed as having 
a disability. When asked what would 
help, an Elementary School C teacher 
replied, “That we get more help.” For 
example, this teacher suggested that 
if learning disability teachers spent 
time in the regular classroom work-
ing with the same children they pull 
out for half of the day, “It would be 
the best of both worlds.”  
T
School Instructional 
Leadership Roles  
 he stated purpose of the 2002  
 district reorganization was  
 to provide instructional sup-
port to schools in carrying out 
instructional leadership. Across the 
system, Chicago school leaders were 
now expected to change core teach-
ing and learning practices.
Principals in our sample listed mul-
tiple responsibilities associated with 
the complex work of school leader-
ship: provide instructional guidance 
as well as manage the day-to-day 
school operations;  buffer out exter-
nal pressures that interfere with 
classroom teaching while at the 
same time serve as the catalyst for 
bringing external resources into the 
school; comply with external policy 
mandates (e.g., improve teaching 
practice, increase student learning, 
raise test scores), while at the same 
time, craft instructional programs 
that address the unique learning 
needs, interests, and skill levels of 
the school’s student body; and cre-
ate a climate of support for teachers. 
Complexity notwithstanding, prin-
cipals and teachers stated that their 
overriding priority was to help their 
students achieve, often despite daunt-
ing obstacles and challenges.  
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stated that their overriding 
priority was to help their 
students achieve, often 
despite daunting obstacles 
and challenges.  
Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform
School Strategies to Improve 
Instruction
Principals and teachers described 
several approaches they were using 
to improve instruction: school-wide 
focus on student outcomes; teacher 
collaboration and coordination; 
school-based professional develop-
ment; data analysis and test prepara-
tion; and classroom observations of 
teaching and learning. We use the 
following framework of exemplary 
instructional leadership themes and 
strategies to discuss these approaches 
in the sample schools. 
Focus/Vision
School-wide Focus on Student 
Outcomes. Generally, the Chicago 
Academic Standards and Frameworks 
provided the structure for CPS 
schools to craft an instructional 
program. Schools shaped their own 
curricula, although the central ofﬁce 
mandated that lesson plans refer to 
the state standards and the Chicago 
Academic Standards. Low-perform-
ing schools were required to use the 
Structured Curriculum for lesson 
planning and teaching. 
In the sample schools, instructional 
goals were more often articulated 
in terms of student outcomes or 
achievement levels than in terms of 
instructional quality, that is, what the 
schools do to help students achieve. 
Nonetheless, each school had shown 
improvement on standardized tests 
over the ﬁve years leading up to 
the study, reﬂecting a press toward 
improved student achievement. 
During the course of this study, the 
Chicago Reading Framework  
was introduced to the schools  
and became a guide for reading 
instruction. 
Each sample school had a strong 
leader. The two high school princi-
pals had similar styles, explicit and 
ﬁrm on expectations for the school. 
For example, High School E, a school 
that had been in a turbulent state for 
years prior to the current principal’s 
arrival, was being organized into 
small learning communities. The 
principal noted, “I took very, very 
tedious time to work with teachers 
to set clearly what the expectations 
would be.” A teacher at this school, 
however, expressed disapproval of 
the principal’s aggressive approach: 
There’s lots of teachers in this 
building that have left recently 
because of the school’s adminis-
tration and the policies that have 
occurred. In the beginning, when 
the principal showed up, she said 
that she was just going to sit and 
Exemplary Instructional Leadership Themes  
and Strategies
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1.  Focus/Vision: Marriage of clear conception of instruction with 
intense organizational focus.  
■ Expectation of commitment across the entire school.
■ Consistent implementation of coherent design across classrooms.
■ Symbolic acts or statements to reinforce instructional focus. 
2. Practice Communities: Social context for deepening the work 
through commitment to instructional focus and improvement  
across the school. 
■ Safe environment for instructional innovation.
■ Emphasis on shared leadership, collaboration, and communication.
■ Creation of a culture of accountability. 
3. Rearranged Principal Priorities:  Bonding more closely with       
 teachers and everyday classroom activities. 
■ Focus on student work.
■ Managing time for instructional emphasis.
■ Becoming a supporter and service provider to teachers.
           
Source: Supovitz & Poglinco, 2001
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
observe. Then there was this tone 
of ‘I’m going to make it very dif-
ﬁcult for you, the people that I 
don’t want here in this building.’ 
She was getting what she wanted. 
Similarly, the principals of the high-
est-performing and the lowest-per-
forming elementary schools—School 
C and School D—displayed lead-
ership styles which provoked dis-
satisfaction among some teachers. 
The principal of Elementary School 
B, on the other hand, had a more 
participatory leadership style and 
expressed an emphasis on teacher 
autonomy among the faculty. This 
principal felt as long as student per-
formance was improving, the teach-
ers should have the ability to teach 
as they pleased. According to one of 
the teachers at School B:
The principal is into empower-
ment. So is the assistant princi-
pal. They want you to be the best 
that you can be when you cross 
that threshold. Here it is. Do it 
whichever way will improve your 
students and make them happy. 
And involve the parents. And 
raise the scores. If there’s a prob-
lem, come to me. Let’s talk about 
it and we’ll make some changes. 
But it’s basically up to you.
Practice Communities
Teacher Collaboration and 
Coordination. There was a lot of 
activity in the sample schools to 
help teachers establish habits of 
working collaboratively on school 
improvement planning, lesson plan-
ning, and professional development 
activities. To facilitate teacher col-
laboration around student work, two 
of the lower-performing schools, 
School D and School E, hired a staff 
person especially for the purpose 
of helping to coordinate teachers’ 
work on curriculum and instruction 
matters. A reading specialist for the 
same purpose had been on staff at 
the high-performing School C for 
several years. 
After determining that teacher reli-
ance on non-standards-based text-
books was a problem, the school 
leaders at School B established “col-
laborative working groups” to focus 
teachers on standards-based instruc-
tion.  At the assistant principal’s 
behest, the collaborative working 
groups met weekly for 30 minutes 
at the beginning of the school day 
to “group the standards together [so 
that they would] ﬂow sequentially.” 
The project eventually bogged down 
in minutiae, the teachers “got soured 
on it” and it was tabled.  Although 
upon reﬂection, the assistant princi-
pal believed that this initiative was 
unsuitable for initiating a collabora-
tive teacher effort, he also expressed 
a continuing need at his school for 
staff development on standards-
based instruction. 
Teacher collaboration at School C 
occurred on a more voluntary basis. 
The principal noted, “It just helps, 
you know, to be with another grade-
level teacher. It hasn’t happened 
through all the grades, but every 
year it seems to just pick up a little 
bit more.” This principal, however, 
required regular cluster meetings of 
teachers at the early childhood, pri-
mary, intermediate, and upper levels 
in addition to their more sporadic 
voluntary efforts. At these meetings, 
the principal pointedly asked the 
teachers how they addressed speciﬁc 
instructional matters.
As part of a strategy to remove 
his school from probation status, 
the principal at High School A 
determined that all of the school’s 
departments had to work together 
interdepartmentally and intradepart-
mentally “in order to get the best out 
of their youngsters.” A weekly read-
ing task force was one of the collab-
orative structures at School A:
We came up with working 
together as English 1 teachers, 
English 2 teachers, English 3 
teachers. What they do is sit down 
and cover ‘main idea’ this week; 
next week, ‘comparison and con-
trast.’  Another week, [we cover] 
another skill, as mandated by the 
system. What we have to do is 
prepare for the eventuality—that’s 
the test. 
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Similarly, the principal at School D 
described a number of meetings that 
occurred regularly at her school. 
This school leader estimated that 
80-85 percent of the teachers (out 
of a faculty of roughly 75) were new 
teachers, having taught less than 
ﬁve years. As teacher turnover was 
a problem system-wide in low-per-
forming schools, part of the chal-
lenge at School D, according to the 
principal, was having “teachers who 
were brand new to basically be on 
the same page as the whole school 
system, as far as teaching to the cur-
riculum.”
A believer in small schools, School 
E’s principal thought her entire 
school needed to be reorganized to 
provide a more supportive instruc-
tional environment. Along those 
lines, the principal organized the 
freshman class into small learn-
ing communities, ﬁve “cores” of 
approximately 125 students, grouped 
around four core teachers: English, 
math, science, and social studies. The 
teachers in each core met weekly for 
45 minutes to discuss student issues, 
content issues, or cross-curricular 
projects. According to the principal, 
“Conversations can happen about 
teaching and learning in small learn-
ing communities.” The intent was for 
students to remain in the small learn-
ing communities throughout high 
school, beginning with each fresh-
man class. School E applied to par-
ticipate in the school district’s small 
high schools’ initiative but was not 
selected for the ﬁrst round. 
School-Based Professional 
Development.  Schools conducted 
their school-based professional 
development activities generally 
every few weeks on half-days accu-
mulated by banking time. Activities 
included School C’s participation in 
the Chicago Systemic Initiative, staff 
development conducted by the cur-
riculum specialist at School D, and a 
peer-to-peer strategy of encouraging 
faculty members to demonstrate their 
skills to each other at High School A. 
According to the principal at High 
School A:
I’ve always maintained that a staff 
is talented, and because they are 
talented, we need to use those 
talents. They are diamonds in the 
rough—people who go to faculty 
meetings and won’t say a word. 
We decided to get together as a 
team and develop our own staff 
development activities, rather 
than bringing some folks in from 
the outside. 
Data Analysis and Test Preparation. 
Principals and teachers discussed 
their efforts to prepare their stu-
dents for spring testing. Some of the 
schools’ practices consisted of group-
ing students (with the implication that 
those closest to the target of meeting 
national norms would get the most 
assistance) and frequent testing of 
students in the standardized test for-
mats. According to a teacher at High 
School A, their efforts aimed “to get 
the kids focused on the big picture 
for the spring. We start in the fall, and 
it’s all geared toward the spring.” At 
this school, teachers from the English 
department worked with teachers 
from the social studies department 
to devise joint activities for their stu-
dents. The math and science teachers 
also worked together. The students 
were tested every ﬁve weeks. 
The teacher at High School A felt a 
big part of the test preparation effort 
was to get the students to under-
stand the different types of questions 
appearing on the test as well as to 
build their vocabulary and higher-
order thinking skills: “You know, a lot 
of times, a kid may understand what 
they’ve read. But they get to a ques-
tion, and either it’s worded in a way 
that they can’t get the inference, or 
there’s a word in the question they 
don’t understand. And if you don’t 
understand, particularly if it’s a key 
word, it can throw off your whole 
answer.”
“We decided to get 
together as a team and 
develop our own staff 
development activities, 
rather than bringing 
some folks in from the 
outside.” 
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At Elementary School D, students 
were tested weekly to monitor their 
learning. The principal noted, “If 
they’re not exposed, when it’s time 
for the yearly exam that determines 
the fate of everything, then we’re 
not doing our jobs.” The principal 
advised that the weekly assessments 
addressed higher-order thinking skills 
and required students to write out 
answers completely. The principal 
explained, “Whether it’s fair or not, 
we can’t change the state test. And 
we cannot change the CPS assess-
ment instrument, the Iowa. The bot-
tom line is we can’t change it. So we 
will have to do everything that we 
can to make sure that the students 
are successful.” 
CPS schools receive their test score 
data from the central ofﬁce. At the 
beginning of the school year, it is 
standard practice for schools to look 
at their test score data from the previ-
ous year’s spring testing.  According 
to the principal of School D, “We’re 
constantly in dialogue with central 
ofﬁce in terms of disaggregating the 
test data, in terms of how students 
are grouped, what students we need 
to target, in terms of students that will 
be able to make the greatest gain, 
and how we will be able to move our 
scores up.” Elementary School B also 
reviewed the test score data provided 
by central ofﬁce to identify areas of 
weakness in student performance, 
giving students practice tests with old 
tests provided by the central ofﬁce, 
and also utilizing retired teachers, 
paid for by the central ofﬁce, to help 
tutor students before spring testing. 
The principal of High School A said 
teachers there had the process of 
analyzing test scores “down to a sci-
ence,” and followed up by working 
on the areas of strength and weak-
ness identiﬁed by test data. Prior to 
the central ofﬁce’s cancellation of 
one of its exams, there were three 
sets of test score data for high schools 
to review. The principal at High 
School A described the experience 
of analyzing these data: “It has you 




Classroom Observations. Principals 
and assistant principals in our 
sample schools reported that they 
increased classroom observations at 
the behest of the central ofﬁce. As 
a result, classrooms were becoming 
more transparent zones of interac-
tion between teachers and students. 
The principal at School C noted that 
she was required to submit quar-
terly reports on classroom teacher 
observations along with samples of a 
student’s work. At School D, the prin-
cipal, assistant principal, curriculum 
specialist, and head teacher went 
into classrooms to observe. This was 
in addition to the external partner 
who coached and modeled lessons 
with the teachers. Higher-perform-
ing schools were also required to do 
classroom observations, although 
without the assistance of an external 
partner. 
Although their styles varied, all of 
the principals placed a priority on 
observing instruction. The principal 
of School C noted that her manner of 
observing was to tune in to whether 
the teachers were asking questions to 
develop students’ higher-order think-
ing skills. A teacher at School B noted 
that the principal of her school “goes 
and sits at the back of the room. Or 
he’ll just walk around the perimeter 
of the room to listen, to see what’s 
going on. And he’ll ask you at that 
time, is there anything I can do for 
you? If the answer’s no, he’s on his 
way. If the answer is yes, he’ll take 
the time to listen and write down 
what your needs are, and get back to 
you.” In fact, this teacher noted that 
both the principal and the assistant 
principal were “always around.” At 
High School A, the principal asked 
the assistant principals, counselors, 
attendance ofﬁcer, and disciplinar-
ian to go into selected classrooms to 
assist the teachers. And the School E 
principal, eschewing the CPS class-
room monitoring checklist, instead 
looked at how classrooms were 
arranged and noted the “positive 
things teachers do that help support 
teaching and learning.”
Principals and assistant 
principals in our sample 
schools reported that 
they increased class-
room observations at 
the behest of the central 
ofﬁce.
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Summary of Issues 
and Suggestions  
Policy Churn
Policy changes that accompanied 
turnover in top district leadership 
created dislocations at both the 
central ofﬁce and schools. School 
effects included cynical “wait and 
see” attitudes and lack of commit-
ment of effort. Central ofﬁce effects 
included discontinuity in service 
provision to schools and mixed mes-
sages from unaligned department 
units. Structures and resources to 
coordinate and integrate central-level 
services are needed to minimize the 
damaging effects of policy churn.
Instructional Support
Schools appreciated tools that were 
practical aids to instruction, helped 
to focus and structure their work, and 
did not add to their burden. Schools 
needed a system that “listened” to 
schools, supported schools in being 
internally and externally account-
able, and provided schools with 
appropriate tools to shape instruc-
tional programs that address their 
student needs and interests. 
Professional Development
CPS’s research-based professional 
development principles provided 
the framework for creating effective, 
high-quality professional develop-
ment for teachers and administrators.  
Following these principles, profes-
sional development resources should 
be coordinated in ways that support 
coherent instructional programs 
at individual schools. Professional 
development efforts should respond 
to teacher needs over their career 
spans and closely align with state 
certiﬁcation requirements. 
Assessment
Schools believed that the emphasis 
on testing was misplaced and dispro-
portionately punitive, especially as 
student populations became increas-
ingly diverse-racially, ethnically, cul-
turally, economically, academically, 
and linguistically. Although cogni-
zant of the purposes of standard-
ized testing, principals and teachers 
continued to question the usefulness 
and fairness of a system of student 
assessment that they believed largely 
served non-instructional purposes. 
There were opportunities to change 
the system under new federal law, 
but it will take political courage to 
establish a system of instructionally-
supportive assessment. 
Data
Data formats supported test prepa-
ration. Data also need to support 
teacher reﬂection, analysis, and re-
teaching efforts. The central ofﬁce 
should make information available to 
schools in user-friendly formats. The 
central ofﬁce also should re-invigo-
rate its research and evaluation unit 
and look at system performance as a 
whole and disaggregated in terms of 
trends over time.
Special Education
As special education presently was 
constituted in Chicago, it was often 
difﬁcult to tell the extent to which a 
student’s learning difﬁculties were 
due to a disability or to inadequate 
teaching and instructional support. 
The risks of mislabeling students 
were high. There were not enough 
classroom resources to accommo-
date the mandate for inclusion. There 
were also disproportionate assign-
ments of special needs students to 
certain schools. 
Schools believed that 
the emphasis on testing 
was misplaced and dis-
proportionately punitive, 
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Concluding 
Thoughts on the 
Central Ofﬁce and 
Systemic Reform
Uniformity
There appeared to be striking unifor-
mity of instructional strategies among 
the sample schools. The schools 
appeared to be complying with central 
ofﬁce policies without much adapta-
tion to individual school contexts. 
This suggested a strong centralized 
presence, even though Chicago was a 
decentralized system. To illustrate this 
point, the principals of the highest and 
lowest-performing elementary schools 
in our sample described their role in 
terms of carrying out central ofﬁce 
policies:
This chair is not a popular one. 
So even though we try to work 
together in everything, some of my 
directives are questioned, and, of 
course, why not, you know? My 
directives are coming from some-
place else. 
Teachers don’t understand the sys-
tem. Many individuals think that 
schools run themselves, that deci-
sions that I make are my decisions. 
They’re not my decisions. And I 
constantly have to remind staff  
that I have a boss. I have several 
bosses. 
One interpretation of the observed 
uniformity is that a strong account-
ability footprint still shaped Chicago 
school activities. It is questionable 
whether there is sufﬁcient “psycho-
logical space” to create a safe environ-
ment for teachers to risk moving away 
from centrally-approved practices.
Isolation
Teachers appeared to be isolated 
from conversations and decision-
making regarding instructional poli-
cies and practices. A few teachers 
noted that on occasion they might 
volunteer to participate on a speciﬁc 
project which extended beyond their 
classroom or school. These occasions 
usually coincided with special fund-
ing to undertake such a project, often 
from a private source. On the whole, 
however, teachers lacked the beneﬁt 
of regular, ongoing professional con-
versations about instruction with their 
peers and the opportunity to partici-
pate in decision-making that affected 
their practice. Moreover, the teach-
ers in the ﬁeld study schools only 
“knew” central ofﬁce remotely: from 
the information conveyed to them by 
their principals; through instructional 
materials, such as the Structured 
Curriculum; through offsite profes-
sional development workshops; or 
through their external partners, if 
they were on probation. According to 
one teacher at High School A:
My interaction is zero. No one 
from anyplace higher than this 
building has been in my class-
room or anything. I’ve never 
talked to anyone. So that’s all I 
can tell you. Just from what I hear 
from the principal, I know, as a 
matter of fact, that he has high 
interaction with the central ofﬁce. 
Information is disseminated down 
to us. But as far as myself—zero.
Paradoxes and Cautions
The work of systemic reform contains 
an inherent tension between bureau-
cracy/centralized policy making on 
the one hand and school autonomy/
professional discretion on the other 
(Cohen & Spillane, 1992).  A paradox 
is that the thrust of systemic reform 
requires schools to undergo dramatic 
transformation in content, pedagogy, 
and organization to achieve envi-
sioned changes in classroom instruc-
tion with limited capacities currently 
available to accomplish such a trans-
formation.  Moreover, a coordinated 
and aligned system of instructional 
guidance calls for greater central-
ized controls, thereby reducing 
local school autonomy. Yet we know 
that for school improvement to be 
sustained, it must grow organically 
and be owned by the local school. 
The “human factor” is part of this 
paradox, namely, that it is teachers 
who must change in order to realize 
the goals of new instructional poli-
cies.  Although teachers are the most 
important agents of instructional 
policy, ironically, they typically are 
the least invested in contemplated 
change (Cohen, 1991).    
In a decentralized school district 
undertaking systemic reform, the 
central ofﬁce must achieve a balance 
in providing appropriate instructional 
resources and tools, but not so much 
structure and oversight that schools 
hesitate to take the risks of innovation 
needed to develop a sound educa-
tional program. Efforts to provide a 
coherent system of instructional guid-
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ance may over-reach in attempting to 
support what schools do, especially if 
the resources are not sufﬁcient to the 
task. Well-meaning efforts to achieve 
instructional program coherence will 
then be implemented in ways that 
impose uniformity and standardiza-
tion on complex school environments. 
Teachers need to have opportunities 
to raise legitimate questions about the 
efﬁcacy of selected methods or pro-
grams so they are better prepared to 
meet the challenge of serving their stu-
dents’ diverse needs and interests.
In its third phase of reform, the 
Chicago Public Schools has provided 
a number of instructional tools and 
resources to schools.  However, the 
conformity observed in the ﬁeld raises 
questions about the extent to which 
these forms of support ultimately 
will help schools to help themselves.  
Teachers in the sample schools offered 
the following constructive suggestions 
for how the central ofﬁce can build 
needed capacity:
■ Provide student performance data 
in useful ways and help schools use 
data differently.
■ Facilitate school-to-school con-
nections that would include mak-
ing time for conversations about 
instruction.
■ Change the way student assessment 
is done so it is more of an aid to 
instruction.
■ See students’ special needs not as a 
stigma but as a resource for improv-
ing instruction.
■ Truly get input from teachers and 
actually use it. 
The Chicago Public Schools has taken 
important initial steps to support 
system-wide instructional improve-
ment, in line with the imperative 
for systemic reform. We suggest 
that further efforts to build instruc-
tional capacity system-wide could 
be facilitated by an interactive and 
dynamic relationship between the 
central ofﬁce and the schools. We 
encourage the development of 
reciprocal and mutually supportive 
approaches that afford schools the 
autonomy needed for the develop-
ment of instructionally responsive 
programs and that also meet the 
requirements of public account-
ability.
In particular, we would urge 
expanded central ofﬁce support 
for emerging school-based efforts 
to support teacher collaboration 
and coordination. To ensure that 
ongoing, deep conversations about 
instruction are facilitated on a sus-
tained basis, communities of profes-
sional practice should be embedded 
in the daily life of schools. This 
would require substantive changes 
in school organization and differ-
ent frameworks of accountability 
to allow teachers to build these 
professional relationships and to 
genuinely invest in instructional 
improvement. There would also 
need to be substantive changes in 
order for principals to provide the 
kinds of support and leadership 
needed to facilitate communities of 
professional practice at all Chicago 
Public Schools.  
Finally, a teacher offers this advice 
to central ofﬁce:  Learn from 
schools. Have the courage to let 
schools try new things when they 
are proposed. You never know  
what it will do for the system.
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A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
generally, without necessarily pro-
ducing higher achievement in any 
particular content domain. The sec-
ond strand of activities was viewed as 
a means to the ends codiﬁed in the 
ﬁrst strand. This report distinguishes 
between the two strands of reform 
activity in each subsection, noting 
where initiatives fall speciﬁcally 
into one or the other, or encompass 
aspects of both. 
An important piece of the puzzle in 
understanding the tension between 
direct and indirect initiatives and 
why the latter often took center stage 
pertains to the relationship between 
the state and the district. On one 
hand, the state created programs (P-
5 [preschool to grade 5] and SAGE 
[Student Achievement Guarantee in 
Education]) that provided extra ﬁnan-
cial support to MPS, especially for 
schools serving large proportions of 
low-income students. On the other 
hand, the state implemented the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
(MCPC), enabling thousands of stu-
dents from the MPS attendance area 
to enroll in non-MPS schools—taking 
with them the state aid that otherwise 
might well have ﬂowed to MPS. The 
MCPC only exacerbated MPS loss of 
student market share to suburban and 
private schools, including numer-
ous charter schools authorized by 
the state and operated by the City of 
Milwaukee and area institutions of 
higher education. 
The great importance district leader-
ship attached to stemming enrollment 
declines was reﬂected in the MPS stra-
tegic plan (March 28, 2000). As shown 
below, the plan’s mission statements 
placed maintaining students in the 
system on the same level as enabling 
students to achieve academically, to 
continue on to higher education, and 
to succeed in the workplace.
 
The Milwaukee Public Schools
by Eric Osthoff and Paula White
T
Introduction
 wo strands of activity were  
 evident in every aspect   
 of reform in Milwaukee 
Public Schools (MPS). The ﬁrst strand 
consisted of initiatives designed and 
deployed to directly impact instruc-
tion—what is taught, learned, and 
assessed. The second strand empha-
sized matters of organizational struc-
ture and capacity. Initiatives in the 
second strand were undertaken based 
on the expectation that they could 
ultimately lead to higher performance 
by schools, teachers, and students 
relative to academic achievement. 
However, their effects were under-
stood to be indirect and, typically, 
non-speciﬁc in nature. Non-speciﬁc 
refers to capacity-building reform ini-
tiatives that were expected to encour-
age good teaching and learning  
Mission
The Milwaukee Public Schools 
will ensure that maximum 
educational opportunities are 
provided for all students to 
reach their highest potential 
so that: 
1. Students achieve their edu-
cational and employment 
goals, and 
2. Parents choose the 
Milwaukee Public Schools 
to educate their children. 
Goals
The goals of the Milwaukee 
Public Schools are to improve: 
1. Student achievement.
2. Student success in further 
education and employ-
ment. 
3. Family satisfaction, as mea-
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T
Recent History of 
the District’s Role 
in Instructional 
Reform
 his study relies heavily on  
 interviews conducted from  
 spring 2001 to spring 2002 
with 21 central ofﬁce and 70 school 
staff at the elementary, middle, and 
high school levels. In addition, this 
study relies on observation data from 
district-level meetings, school-level 
meetings, as well as meetings involv-
ing both district and school level 
staff. Interview and observation data 
focused primarily on reform initia-
tives then underway in MPS. Past 
initiatives that were no longer active 
were occasionally explored since 
they were integral to veteran employ-
ees’ understanding of the relationship 
between central ofﬁce and schools 
and how this affected instruction. 
Throughout this report, we aim for 
balance in the amount of background 
information provided regarding dis-
trict policies and practices, to make 
the report as useful as possible to 
readers familiar, as well as those 
unfamiliar, with the district. 
Role of School Board and 
Superintendents
Most district and school staff viewed 
the MPS school board as the cen-
tral player in the policy and reform 
arena. Interviewees frequently cited 
additional parties (e.g., the teachers 
union, state government, business 
community, parents, and media) as 
having substantial effects on board 
decisions. However, the board was 
perceived as taking into account 
the disparate forces and formulating 
basic goals and strategies to guide 
district staff members. When relat-
ing prior developments in reform 
initiatives, interviewees routinely 
described the board as having played 
a strong role in selecting initiatives 
and making important design and 
implementation decisions.
Respondents often viewed superin-
tendents and their boards as having 
highly overlapping roles, objectives, 
and strategies for reform. The extent 
to which respondents distinguished 
between boards and superinten-
dents generally correlated with a 
respondent’s role in the system. 
Central ofﬁce staff frequently referred 
to boards and superintendents when 
describing reform initiatives, and 
central ofﬁce staff regularly noted 
policy differences among superinten-
dents and boards. Principals referred 
to boards and superintendents regu-
larly when discussing instructional 
policy and reform, though princi-
pals referred to such leaders far less 
often than did central ofﬁce staff. 
Principals were also less likely than 
central ofﬁce staff members to distin-
guish between superintendents and 
boards when characterizing central 
ofﬁce effects on instruction. Teachers 
referred to boards and superinten-
dents least often, and frequently 
made no distinction between the 
two. 
Below, we identify speciﬁc district 
initiatives that interviewees consid-
ered to have both direct and indirect 
effects on instruction. First, however, 
it is important to recognize an over-
all perception of district leadership 
encountered in interviews. From the 
perspective of most central ofﬁce 
and school staff respondents, local 
education politics had been highly 
contested for many years prior to our 
study. The general consensus was that 
the school board was deeply divided 
into two main factions, often locked 
in a 5-4 split in board seats held, 
with a slim margin of control mov-
ing periodically from one side to the 
other. According to interviewees, this 
ﬂuidity in board leadership led to a 
high turnover rate of district super-
intendents. Whenever board leader-
ship changed, the ascendant group 
often hired a new superintendent to 
advance an alternative vision or  
initiatives.
This ﬂuidity in board lead-
ership led to a high turn-
over rate of district super-
intendents. Whenever 
board leadership changed, 
the ascendant group often 
hired a new superinten-
dent to advance an alter-
native vision or initiatives.
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We do not attempt to review all the 
details of the boards and superin-
tendents here. However, we identify 
district and school respondents’ 
perceptions of how this environment 
shaped district efforts to implement 
activities expected to have both 
direct and indirect effects on instruc-
tion. Throughout this document, we 
provide comments from respondents 
that give ﬁrst-hand accounts of our 
ﬁndings.
A mid-level central ofﬁce manager 
provided a descriptive summary of 
the disruptions associated with ﬂuc-
tuating board leadership:
…a superintendent needs to have 
a vision and goals and objec-
tives and strategies to reach those 
[goals] that are very clearly laid 
out to central services people 
[and] to school administrators. 
Very clearly articulated. And then 
as we all together march forward 
to accomplish these [goals], that 
this communication continues so 
that everybody knows what's hap-
pening and they're on the same 
page. That vision of mine has 
not occurred to the degree that 
I would professionally like it to 
happen for several reasons. One 
is the turnover in superintendents 
and consequently the turnover in 
deputies who work with [a given 
superintendent]. So every time 
you get a new person in, you're 
spending time bringing that per-
son up to speed about all of the 
logistics of doing things.
A principal described the situation 
this way:
I think the last seven, eight, nine 
years we've had a very large 
amount of turnover on the board, 
and every instance has been a 
new superintendent to the point 
of less than the national average 
of three years. With every new 
superintendent, the new board's 
agenda has always been a major 
reshufﬂing and focus. Because of 
that, we just start on certain initia-
tives—and here's where I don't 
fault [central ofﬁce staff]—and 
they get rolling with it, about 
to implement it, and then bang, 
we've got another superintendent.
 
A learning coordinator gave his take:4
For a while, we were chang-
ing superintendents like people 
change socks. . . . They come 
in and they [say], ‘Well, this is 
the initiative, and this is the way 
we're going,’ and they run down 
that path for a while. Then, the 
board gets disenchanted with that, 
or they change board members.
A school implementer gave 
hers:
The staff has been through a 
lot of stuff in the last ﬁve to 10 
years, some people are burned 
out by it…. The reality is we just 
had new school board members 
elected and changes in account-
ability measures and standard-
ized tests. Once these two school 
board members were elected, 
we realized there would be a 
shift and we would have more 
changes. The teachers realized 
that they have to be careful as 
to how much they buy into the 
changes. The young teachers are 
real open to it because they’re 
new; they’re still naïve and open 
to getting involved.                  
And, from a teacher’s perspective:
But when we got the different 
school board members elected, 
then sometimes some of these 
things change. You know, you get 
another president of the school 
board or the whole direction of 
the school board changes, and 
then some of these initiatives get 
dropped and they go on, move 
on, to something else.
As observed by the individuals 
quoted above, continuous change 
prevailed in terms of district impact 
on schools. Veteran district employ-
ees easily cited major changes in 
their own roles as a result of changes 
associated with board and superin-
tendent turnover. In our study, we 
focused on instructional policy and 
practice in place at the time of our 
ﬁeldwork. For this reason, many 
accounts of district impact pertained 
to policies and practices persisting at 
that moment in time. Undoubtedly, 
many initiatives were not identiﬁed 
since they had been launched and/or  
abandoned before our study started. 
The accounts we received might give 
the impression that district instruc-
tional policy and practices were fairly 
stable. To be fully understood, such 
impressions need to be balanced 
with the perceptions conveyed in the 
preceding quotes.
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Direct Versus Indirect Impacts 
on Instructional Improvement
In surveying speciﬁc district initia-
tives identiﬁed by interviewees as 
affecting instruction, respondents 
made a clear distinction between 
direct and indirect impacts.
Direct Impacts. Initiatives often 
cited by MPS staff, and especially 
by school staff members, as hav-




■ District performance assessments
■ District standardized assessments
■ District balanced assessments
■ District literacy initiative (includ-
ing district-mandated literacy 
coaches for all schools)
■ Professional development and 
technical support services (espe-
cially from the Department of 
Educational Services varies widely 
by school)
Indirect Impacts. Initiatives often 
cited by MPS staff, and especially 
by school staff members, as having 
an indirect impact on teaching and 
learning included:
■ Controlled (i.e. within-district) 
school choice  
■ Neighborhood schools initia-
tive (including emphasis on K-8 
schools; community involvement)
■ Decentralization, including:
– Reorganization of central ofﬁce 
divisions such as Educational 
Services
– Buyback and chargeback 
initiatives, and increased 
emphasis on school site-based 
budgeting
■ Capacity-building for instructional 
leadership (including leadership 
specialists, Principal Academies, 
and Institutes)
■ Education Plans (i.e., guidance for 
school improvement planning)
■ Extension of authority to schools 
to interview and hire own staff 
in collaboration with Milwaukee 
Teachers’ Education Association 
(MTEA)
■ Teacher Evaluation and Mentoring 
Program (TEAM), in collaboration 
with MTEA
In addition, some state programs that 
MPS did not directly administer were 
nonetheless cited as having extensive 
impact on the district. Especially 
frequently-mentioned, state-adminis-
tered programs included:
■ SAGE (Student Achievement 
Guarantee in Education) program
■ P-5 (preschool to grade 5) pro-
gram 
■ Wisconsin State Assessment 
System: Wisconsin Knowledge 
and Concepts Exam 
(WKCE); Wisconsin Reading 
Comprehension Test (WRCT)
■ Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program (students may attend, at 
no charge, private sectarian and 
nonsectarian schools located in 
the city of Milwaukee)
A general view expressed promi-
nently in our interviews was that 
district leadership in recent years was 
more focused on the indirect than the 
direct realm. The following excerpts 
illustrate this perspective from central 
ofﬁce and school staff members: 
From a central ofﬁce staff 
member: 
When [name of a former superin-
tendent] was superintendent, we 
lost people. One of the things he 
did was downsize central services 
and the ﬁrst thing to go was all 
of the support staff in Curriculum 
and Instruction. And those were 
the people who were out in the 
schools working with the teach-
ers…. And as we have started to 
decentralize the budgets, it's just 
so interesting because one of the 
things the schools ask for from 
Curriculum and Instruction is 
the ability to have someone out 
working with them. And when 
you only have one curriculum 
specialist [per subject area]…we 
don't have the capacity to be out 
there in the schools like they're 
requesting and like we would 
want to. I think this is a holdover 
from 10 years ago and they've 
A general view expressed 
prominently in our inter-
views was that district 
leadership in recent years 
was more focused on the 
indirect than the direct 
realm.
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forgotten that these people aren't 
there anymore…. One person just 
can't physically service all of the 
schools. And [central ofﬁce staff] 
end up doing all of this central 
coordination and paperwork . . . 
and then running workshops and 
in-services. So that's the kind of 
interaction that they end up hav-
ing with the schools, more so than 
being directly out in the class-
rooms. . . . 
From a principal:
Principals don’t know where 
[the superintendent] stands…. 
The [superintendent] really cares 
about larger structural issues, 
and when you looked at him as a 
principal, he did a lot of innova-
tive things about restructuring. He 
didn’t have a real core academic 
agenda when he was principal, 
and he hasn’t had a core aca-
demic agenda as superintendent. 
In fact, his big thing is decentral-
ization…. There needs to be some 
kind of clear direction, some kind 
of philosophy of learning that 
informs the district. 
From a teacher whose comments rep-
resent many teachers’ views:
 I don’t have any quarrel with the 
way it’s organized at the central 
ofﬁce. I see a lack of quality and 
commitment for the right things. 
See, I see everything in terms of 
delivering instruction and making 
learning happen. And the further 
we get from my classroom, the 
less I see that they maintain that 
idea…. I think that at the level of 
the superintendent and his imme-
diate squadron, that they think 
they’re on a track to reorganize 
the neighborhood school sys-
tem…reorganize the places that 
learning is delivered. 
District Initiatives
School Choice. Though the pressure 
to maintain enrollment in MPS was 
intense during our study, it had been 
an emphasis in the district for many 
years. Interviewees perceived mani-
festations of such pressure in many 
district initiatives, past and present. 
For example, some years before our 
study, the district overhauled district 
attendance areas and rules. We did 
not collect detailed information on 
the original rules of the controlled 
choice initiative, but we did collect 
descriptions of the status of important 
district policies at the time of our 
ﬁeldwork. This included a system 
whereby the district was divided into 
six attendance regions—ﬁve in rela-
tively coherent geographic regions, 
and one that included geographically 
scattered specialty schools. 
Student Assignment. At the time of 
our data collection, student assign-
ment involved a complex process 
that gave students and parents con-
siderable input in choosing schools. 
Students were invited to apply to a 
limited number of specialty schools 
serving students citywide, or to iden-
tify up to three prioritized choices 
among the schools in their atten-
dance region. Schools would then 
choose among qualifying students by 
lottery, if demand exceeded capacity. 
Depending on the region, this gave 
elementary students a minimum of 
17 attendance area schools and 10 
citywide schools to choose from, 
knowing the district would provide 
transportation if admitted. Students 
were free to apply to any school if 
they could provide their own trans-
portation. According to respondents, 
the controlled choice initiative was 
a district response to competitive 
pressure for students then being 
generated by various actual and pro-
posed state choice programs, charter 
schools, and private school competi-
tion.
Decentralization. As part of broad 
reform, a former superintendent 
maintained controlled choice while 
also implementing a major decentral-
ization initiative. The decentralization 
initiative was based on the belief that 
MPS schools as a whole would com-
pete more effectively and provide 
students with higher-quality educa-
tion if school leaders were given 
greater decision-making authority 
and enhanced resources previously 
Though the pressure to 
maintain enrollment in 
MPS was intense during 
our study, it had been an 
emphasis in the district 
for many years.
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dedicated to central ofﬁce staff and 
functions. Earlier, we related how a 
central ofﬁce manager in Educational 
Services described the impact of the 
decentralization initiative overseen 
by the same former superintendent 
on the capacity of that department 
to work with schools individually. 
The quote below depicts a Finance 
Department mid-level manager’s 
understanding of how decentraliza-
tion under the same former super-
intendent shifted substantial budget 
authority from central ofﬁce to 
schools: 
1991 was the biggest change we 
had as far as decentralization [of 
the budget]. The schools were 
given an allocation and they were 
to determine their budget based 
on that allocation. Bottom-line 
control. Period…. After 1991, it 
was blown wide open. That would 
be the biggest change that hap-
pened on the budget side. 
The controlled choice initiative, cen-
tral ofﬁce restructuring, and transfer 
of budget authority to schools had 
many lasting effects that remained 
salient during our study. For example, 
at the time our study began, a dis-
trict administrator told us that well 
over 80 percent of all students in the 
district were being bused at district 
expense. This was largely a func-
tion of allowing students greater 
latitude to choose schools as a 
strategy for attracting and maintain-
ing enrollment. According to the 
district administrator, the ﬁnancial 
burden of busing large numbers of 
students contributed to a district 
decision in 1999 to introduce the 
Neighborhood Schools Initiative. This 
initiative was promoted on numer-
ous grounds, including enhancement 
of the instructional delivery system 
in schools district-wide and a sub-
stantial savings to be realized from 
reduced transportation costs.
The district borrowed approximately 
$100 million dollars in state-secured 
bonds to pay for capital costs of 
upgrading buildings to house the K-8 
neighborhood schools. The strategy 
for covering the bonds was to use 
the approximately $10-20 million a 
year in saved busing costs. The dis-
trict gave students living closest to 
neighborhood schools priority in the 
student assignment process and used 
enhanced funding and physical plant 
upgrades to make neighborhood 
schools as attractive as possible. 
The fact that the district contin-
ued to allow students to opt out of 
their neighborhood schools shows 
how important the choice idea had 
become in the community. To para-
phrase an upper-level district admin-
istrator we interviewed, “The district 
used to push bus rides as the ticket 
to equal educational opportunity. 
Now the district was going to push 
neighborhood schools as the way.” At 
every turn with the new initiative, the 
district encountered persisting effects 
of previous initiatives.
District Challenges
Persisting effects of previous initia-
tives were evident in all aspects of 
central ofﬁce and school staff mem-
bers’ roles and activities and served 
to shape interactions among staff at 
the two levels. With federal over-
sight, the state also used standard-
ized test scores to evaluate school 
performance relative to the require-
ments of Title I and other federal 
programs. Prior to the introduction 
of the federal No Child Left Behind 
legislation, which occurred late in 
active data collection for this study, 
the frequency and magnitude of Title 
I penalties for poor test performance 
was relatively low.
The federal government dramatically 
increased stakes around standardized 
test scores in No Child Left Behind, 
which elevated the emphasis on 
standardized test scores and reduced 
emphasis on performance assess-
ment, proﬁciencies, and grades in the 
Educational Plan Template.
“The district used to push 
bus rides as the ticket to 
equal educational oppor-
tunity. Now the district 
was going to push neigh-
borhood schools as the 
way.”
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The tacit logic of district reform is 
evident in the following illustrative 
list of rolling and interwoven district 
challenges and responses. This list of 
district challenges is neither exhaus-
tive nor chronological. Rather, it is a 
sampling of complex and interrelated 
challenges as viewed from the central 
ofﬁce perspective.
Table 1. District Challenges and Reform Responses
District Challenge
MPS faces market share pressure.
MPS faces increased market pres-
sure, coupled with rising pressure 
from community, state, and federal 
government to reduce achieve-
ment disparities between schools. 
School performance and attrac-
tiveness varies too widely.
School instructional quality and 
performance varies greatly, and 
schools too preoccupied with non-
instructional issues and functions.
Federal government dramatically 
increases stakes around standard-
ized test scores with No Child Left 
Behind legislation.
District Response
■ Create controlled choice, specialty and magnet schools, busing.
■ Foster exceptional schools through decentralization of budget and 
instructional programs.
■ Increase proportion of high-quality neighborhood schools in district, 
making more schools competitive in marketplace and equalizing oppor-
tunity.
■ Foster local school excellence through further decentralization.
■ Revise Education Plan (school improvement) template to increase stan-
dardization of school strategic planning, budgeting, and instructional 
goals.
■ Intensify principal monitoring, support, and guidance (leadership spe-
cialists and the Leadership Institutes).
■ Build district capacity to make a base level of services available to all 
schools though chargeback and buyback.
■ Roll out district-wide instructional initiatives (e.g., proﬁciencies, perfor-
mance assessment, and literacy).
■ Increase emphasis on measures of student performance (e.g., standard-
ized test scores, satisfaction of proﬁciencies, performance assessment 
scores, attendance, and grades). 
■ Elevate emphasis on standardized test scores and reduce emphasis on 
performance assessment, proﬁciencies, and grades in Education Plan 
Template.
■ Intensify emphasis on Literacy Initiative as strategy for increasing student 
success on reading-intensive standardized tests.
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 his section expands on the  
 major district initiatives, 
 including their key fea-
tures, perceived intended impacts 
on instruction, and the various staff 
members’ theories of change as 
to the processes and mechanisms 
through which the initiatives were 
expected to form new attitudes, 
beliefs, or practices. This section 
focuses primarily on the intended 
outcomes and the theory of change 
that the initiatives embodied. 
Additional information about initia-
tives as actually implemented and 
experienced by central ofﬁce and 
school staff follows in subsequent 
sections. Initiatives intended to have 
direct impacts on instruction are con-
sidered ﬁrst. 
District Initiatives Designed 
for Direct Effects on 
Instruction
District Standards. The man-
ner in which MPS district ofﬁcials 
approached creating district content 
standards demonstrates how the dis-
trict anticipated pending state policy 
initiatives and acted on matters in 
advance of the state, often going 
beyond what was eventually required 
by the state. 
MPS began drafting district standards 
in 1994, partly in anticipation of the 
development of state standards and 
a state mandate requiring districts 
to formulate local standards aligned 
to those of the state. MPS standards 
were ﬁrst produced in draft form 
in 1996 and adopted in January 
1997. The state developed its own 
model standards in December 1997, 
mandating that districts establish 
local standards aligned to the state 
standards. MPS commenced with 
appropriate revisions, culminating 
in the Milwaukee Public Schools K-
12 Academic Standards and Grade 
Level Expectations (November 1998). 
In addition to being aligned to the 
state standards, the MPS standards 
were designed to reﬂect then current 
standards of the National Council of 
Teachers of Mathematics. 
Whereas the Wisconsin state stan-
dards were anchored on benchmark 
grades 4, 8, and 12, MPS provided 
standards for all grade levels in all 
subject areas addressed in the local 
The manner in which 
MPS district ofﬁcials 
approached creating dis-
trict content standards 
demonstrates how the 
district anticipated pend-
ing state policy initiatives 
and acted on matters 
in advance of the state, 
often going beyond what 
was eventually required 
by the state. 
standards. The 1998 MPS content 
standards addressed Language Arts, 
Mathematics, Science, and Social 
Studies. For each subject, 55-70 
pages of text were provided, followed 
by hundreds of standards organized 
by grade level and subject area con-
tent strand.
For example, the MPS mathematics 
standards identiﬁed the objective of 
students to be able to make connec-
tions among mathematical ideas, 
solve problems, reason mathemati-
cally, communicate mathematically, 
and use technology in mathematics 
to succeed in math content strands 
related to mathematical processes, 
algebraic reasoning, geometry and 
measurement, numeracy, and prob-
ability and statistics.
As noted above, MPS grade-level 
content standards were numerous. 
For the mathematical processes 
strand, for example, a survey of the 
number of constituent standards 
ranged between 10 and 35 per grade 
level for kindergarten through 8th 
grade. The average number of stan-
dards per grade level for the math-
ematical processes strand was 18 or 
greater. The examples below convey 
the general format of the standards in 
the processes strand for 4th grade. 
By the end of Grade 4, students will 
be able to:
■ Distinguish between geometric 
patterns and random designs 
■ Make conjectures about factors of 
100 
■ Partition large numbers to multi-
ply them more easily (e.g., 24 x 8 
is thought of as 20 x 8 + 4 x 8)5
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Although the district standards were 
ﬁrst expected to be state-mandated, 
and eventually were, mid-level dis-
trict central ofﬁce staff expressed 
support for the standards, based on 
the belief that the standards would 
serve to improve teaching and learn-
ing. Central ofﬁce staff as well as 
school staff  expressed the view that 
in recent years, the district had very 
little central control of curriculum 
and instruction. This had led to a situ-
ation whereby teaching and learning 
varied greatly across schools. High 
teacher and student mobility rates 
exacerbated variation. Central ofﬁce 
staff members believed that standards 
could potentially be used as an effec-
tive strategy for clarifying the aims 
and content of instruction to provide 
all students with access to reasonably 
consistent instruction on a range of 
content.
Below, a quote from a central ofﬁce 
administrator in Educational Services 
characterized district efforts to use 
standards as a curriculum guidance 
tool to regain consistency in district 
instructional practices:
I’ve seen the curriculum pendu-
lum go from one end to the other 
to where everything’s totally dic-
tated and then we went to a point 
where you could do anything you 
wanted to do. Well, with a 25-30 
percent mobility rate, that’s not all 
that good for children. So we’re 
at a point now where we’re trying 
to at least align our curriculum, 
our standards and our goals, and 
expectations. We also want …
assessments that we feel are actu-
ally designed to actually assess 
certain standards.
The proﬁciencies, in 
theory, were to increase 
instructional quality  
and student learning by  
bringing greater clarity 
and consistency to  
academic expectations.
District Proﬁciencies. Through the 
years, state political leaders, com-
munity leaders, and the media have 
frequently characterized MPS as a 
system with low academic expecta-
tions and standards for students. 
Partly to counter this perception, 
the district board, in 1997, adopted 
a new set of high school gradua-
tion requirements and proﬁciency 
requirements for 8th grade promo-
tion.6 When implemented for the 8th 
grade class of 2000, the initiative 
speciﬁed curricular content on which 
students would be required to dem-
onstrate proﬁciency. The initiative 
also promised a district commitment 
to provide challenging and reliable 
rubrics for assessing student perfor-
mance. Upon implementation, the 
board adopted a policy dictating that 
no student would be promoted from 
8th grade to 9th grade without meeting 
the proﬁciencies. 
The proﬁciencies, in theory, were 
to increase instructional quality 
and student learning by bringing 
greater clarity and consistency to 
academic expectations. They would 
also increase teacher and student 
accountability for student perfor-
mance. This would ensure that stu-
dents would enter 9th grade better 
prepared to succeed with high school 
work and meet graduation require-
ments.
By 1999, the district identiﬁed pro-
ﬁciencies in four subject areas to 
hold the 8th grade class of 2000 
accountable: (1) Communications, 
(2) Mathematics, (3) Science, and (4) 
Research. The four areas were then 
divided into three sub-areas. The 
district created four-point rubrics for 
scoring student work in each area 
and stipulated that a score of “3” or 
higher would be needed for accept-
able performance on a given proﬁ-
ciency. Students would be required 
to perform acceptably on two of the 
three sub-areas in each subject to 
meet proﬁciency overall and qualify 
for 9th grade.
Though the district proﬁciencies were 
developed at about the same time 
that the district was working to devise 
new district standards, no evidence 
was available to identify whether 
these two sets of activities were 
directly coordinated or aligned (see 
Clune, Mason, Pohs, Theil, & White, 
April 2, 2002).
The decision by Milwaukee Public 
Schools to introduce proﬁciencies 
was another example of MPS ampli-
ﬁcation of state policy initiatives. 
The decision by MPS to develop and 
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implement the proﬁciencies came 
shortly after the state enacted a new 
law calling for a high-stakes gradua-
tion test, and a prohibition on auto-
matic promotion for 4th and 8th grade 
students, but well before scheduled 
implementation of the state law. The 
state graduation test initiative was 
subsequently postponed indeﬁnitely.
Performance, Standardized, and 
Balanced Assessments. MPS devel-
oped and implemented a system of 
performance assessments at about 
the same time as the proﬁciency 
system. Initially, the performance 
assessments were created and scored 
by the district. Budget cuts at central 
ofﬁce later resulted in the transfer of 
the responsibility of scoring the per-
formance assessments to the school 
level. Performance assessments 
represented an effort by the district 
to motivate teachers and students to 
pursue in-depth conceptual learn-
ing around academic content. The 
assessments consisted of constructed 
response items that required students 
to communicate their thinking in 
greater depth and detail than tradi-
tional multiple choice assessment 
items. Performance assessment items 
typically took the form of real-life 
problems that required students to 
apply their academic content knowl-
edge. The decision was made to score 
the assessments centrally to increase 
the chances for reliable and consis-
tent criteria to evaluate the success of 
students acquiring skills to solve com-
plex problems. Performance assess-
ments and the proﬁciencies were 
based on many of the same content 
standards and curricular objectives. 
Consequently, performance assess-
ments at 8th grade were added to 
portfolios and standardized tests as a 
method for students to demonstrate 
knowledge needed to satisfy district 
proﬁciencies.
Standardized assessments required 
by the state included the Wisconsin 
Knowledge and Concepts Exam 
(WKCE) and Wisconsin Reading 
Comprehension Test (WRCT). The state 
required districts to administer the 
WKCE, covering reading, mathemat-
ics, language, science, and social stud-
ies at grades 4, 8, and 10. The WRCT 
was required at grade 3. In 2000-01, 
MPS began administering an assess-
ment very similar to the WKCE in the 
subject areas of reading, English/lan-
guage arts, and mathematics in grades 
2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9. Administering the 
test for nine grades rather than three 
was another example of how the dis-
trict ampliﬁed state policy, in this case, 
testing policy.
Standardized assessments were used 
primarily for accountability purposes. 
The tests had different uses at differ-
ent grade levels, making it difﬁcult 
to identify a single, deﬁnitive theory 
of action related to the assessments 
in MPS. Standardized assessment 
results at grades 3, 4, 8, and 10 were 
reported by and used for state-level 
accountability purposes. Historically 
speaking, Wisconsin attached minimal 
consequences to school or district per-
formance on standardized assessment. 
Perhaps the most important step the 
state took in the past to induce pres-
sure to perform on the assessments 
was to release results to the media 
and public. MPS test scores were fre-
quently discussed in the media, espe-
cially in Milwaukee. We have already 
cited the importance of the perfor-
mance pressure placed on MPS by 
intense competition for students in the 
marketplace. Standardized assessment 
scores frequently entered into public 
discourse about the basis of problems 
and challenges facing the district. 
The MPS district used standardized 
test scores in multiple ways. Such 
measures were prominent in the dis-
trict accountability plan for schools. 
Standardized test scores were treated 
as an important indicator of school 
performance along with district per-
formance assessments, and measures 
such as attendance, promotion, and 
graduation rates. Standardized assess-
ment measures also became increas-
ingly central to district-required school 
improvement plans (referred to in MPS 
as Education Plans) in the years imme-
diately preceding our study. The new 
Education Plan template, rolled-out 
for the 2001-02 school year, placed 
greater emphasis on standardized 
achievement scores than ever before. 
The district also signaled its intention 
at the beginning of the 2001-02 school 
year to rely more heavily on school 
success, as measured against the new 
Education Plan target goals, to evalu-
ate school principals. 
Performance assessments 
represented an effort by the 
district to motivate teachers 
and students to pursue in-
depth conceptual learning 
around academic content. 
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In MPS, the term balanced assess-
ment referred to the idea of using 
several different types of assessment 
instruments to gain a well-rounded, 
overall impression of student, 
school, and district performance. 
This philosophy of utilizing mul-
tiple measures to evaluate schools 
was prominently embedded in the 
district accountability plan. In the 
1999-2000 Accountability Report 
for Milwaukee Public Schools, 
school measures were reported for 
three “tiers.” Tier 1 included dis-
trict standardized and performance 
assessment measures common to all 
schools, Tier 2 included quantitative 
measures deﬁned and affected at the 
school level, and Tier 3 measures 
consisted of a qualitative description 
of the school prepared by school 
staff. The following excerpt from the 
1999-2000 Accountability Report for 
Milwaukee Public Schools conveyed 
the basic rationale behind balanced 
assessment and the basic theory as 
to how this system was expected to 
guide teaching and learning.
Building upon the need to moni-
tor student achievement progress 
over time, the district overhauled 
its student promotion, graduation, 
testing, and assessment systems. 
Following considerable discus-
sion and careful study in 1999-
00 about the capacity of current 
district tests and assessments to 
measure progress and the kinds 
of data and support needed to 
advance higher student achieve-
ment, the Board approved a new 
testing and assessment system. 
Beginning in 2000-01, in addi-
tion to the state-required WKCE 
administered to 4th, 8th, and 10th 
graders, students in grades 2, 3,  
5, 6, 7, and 9 were be adminis- 
tered tests in reading, English/ 
language arts and mathematics. 
Data gathered from these annual 
tests provided schools, parents 
and students a clearer picture 
of each student’s educational 
strengths and weaknesses and 
allow for development of more 
targeted strategies for improving 
achievement.
Building upon district perfor-
mance assessments in writing, 
math and science, and balancing 
the standardized testing con-
ducted by the district, will be 
implementation of comprehensive 
classroom assessments in read-
ing, writing, mathematics, science 
and social studies—at every grade 
level, from Kindergarten to grade 
12. The MPS writing assessment 
will continue to be administered 
and scored centrally. However, 
schools can select from a menu of 
classroom assessments or design 
their own, with the administration 
and scoring done at the school 
level.
District Literacy Initiative. During 
data collection for this study, MPS 
announced a new district literacy 
initiative. The exact date of initia-
tive announcement and rollout was 
not identiﬁed in our interviews or in 
district documentation. A principal 
interview indicated the superinten-
dent had introduced the initiative 
to principals at a district meeting 
during the second half of July 2001. 
Interview data indicated district staff 
were familiar with the initiative in 
considerable detail by the end of 
school year 2001-02, that principals 
and implementers had a general 
understanding of the initiative, and 
that teachers were somewhat familiar 
with it. 
The MPS Literacy Initiative coincided 
with the launching of similar initia-
tives in many urban school districts 
nationally. Most similar initiatives 
emphasized reading and the teach-
ing of reading across the curriculum. 
MPS also included numeracy and 
mathematics in their initiative. Some 
central ofﬁce staff expressed the 
hope that this initiative would help 
the district reestablish teaching and 
learning as the central district focus. 
Some time after the literacy initiative 
was announced, near the conclu-
sion of the 2001-02 school year, the 
MPS school board approved a policy 
to house a literacy coach in every 
school. Literacy coaches, eventually 
In MPS, the term  
balanced assessment 
referred to the idea of  
using several different  
types of assessment  
instruments to gain a  
well-rounded, overall 
impression of student, 
school, and district   
performance. 
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paid for out of federal Title I funds, 
were to act as instructional leaders 
and on-site professional developers 
for literacy instruction in the schools.
Professional Development and 
Technical Support Services.
Professional development and techni-
cal support activities targeting vari-
ous subject areas or organizational 
practices (e.g., Education Plans) were 
numerous. We relied on interviews 
with school and central ofﬁce staff 
members to identify the initiatives 
they considered most signiﬁcant. 
We include this category in this sec-
tion on “District Initiatives Designed 
for Direct Effects on Instruction” 
primarily as a reminder of its impor-
tance in respondents’ overall views 
regarding relations and relationships 
among central ofﬁce and schools. 
Information about speciﬁc activities 
is included in subsequent sections of 
this report.
District Initiatives That 
Indirectly Affected Instruction
We turn now to district initiatives 
that indirectly affected teaching and 
learning. Several such initiatives—
controlled choice, neighborhood 
schools, and decentralization (related 
to downsizing of central ofﬁce, 
and devolution of budget author-
ity to schools)—have already been 
described in some detail, including 
how district staff members expected 
these initiatives to exert positive 
inﬂuence on teaching and learning. 
Several other initiatives of indirect 
impact are brieﬂy described here 
because they surfaced frequently in 
our interviews with central ofﬁce and 
school staff members and are refer-
enced in subsequent sections.
Buyback-Chargeback. Though the 
buyback and chargeback initiatives 
were inextricably joined from the 
perspective of many actors—espe-
cially school actors—noteworthy 
technical distinctions exist between 
the two. A chargeback service is one 
where the school must surrender 
its budgeted amount for a particu-
lar service  to the service provider 
in central ofﬁce, but can expect a 
level of service as outlined by the 
department. A buyback service is 
one whereby a school may decline 
to use a service or can decide to use 
a service provider other than the 
district’s central ofﬁce. A decision to 
buy or not buy back a service does 
not necessarily relieve the school of 
an activity, but it allows the school to 
seek providers other than the central 
ofﬁce. Ultimately, the chargeback 
system represented a way of spread-
ing costs associated with district ser-
vices (e.g., human resources, student 
services, maintenance) among all 
schools. 
Schools are allocated funds on a 
per pupil basis and site allocations 
(e.g. buildings operations). As part of 
preparing their budgets, the schools 
complete a buyback-chargeback 
form. In 2000-2001, buybacks and 
chargebacks represented an average 
of 32 percent of the schools’ alloca-
tions. In 2001-2002, they represented 
an average of 27 percent. (By 2004-
2005, buybacks and chargebacks  
represented an average of 23.7 per-
cent.) 
As central ofﬁce shifted services from 
the chargeback to the buyback cat-
egory, schools had the option of pur-
chasing or forgoing services removed 
from the chargeback category. This 
arrangement stimulated central ofﬁce 
departments to package, price, and 
market to schools many services that 
were previously taken for granted. 
For example, Educational Services 
offered schools professional devel-
opment services in various areas, 
at several levels and price points. 
Business services offered various 
levels of assistance to schools in mar-
keting their programs to students and 
families to reach enrollment targets. 
The departments that experienced 
reduced chargebacks, introduced 
buyback services in an effort to 
remain viable to the organization. 
This was the intended effect of the 
buyback initiative. The theory was 
that if central ofﬁce provided school 
staff with more control over budgets, 
schools would use that power to 
encourage central ofﬁce staff to be 
more responsive to school and staff 
needs. School staff were free to shop 
elsewhere if they believed the district 
did not offer a service that sufﬁciently 
addressed school and staff needs. 
The overall view expressed by central 
ofﬁce respondents was that that such 
power would beneﬁt school staff, 
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though central ofﬁce staff did not 
explicitly say how or to what extent 
school staff would focus on curricular 
or instructional needs when prioritiz-
ing discretionary expenditures.
Capacity-building for Instructional 
Leadership. District staff paraphrased 
the superintendent as having said, 
”Give me 160 excellent principals 
and I’ll give you a great school 
district.” This sentiment, to which 
teachers often took severe exception, 
demonstrated the kind of relationship 
many central ofﬁce leaders envi-
sioned between schools and central 
ofﬁce. It also signaled the extent to 
which district staff expected princi-
pals to perform multiple functions, 
including instructional leadership, 
student discipline, professional devel-
opment, budget decisions, marketing, 
personnel decisions, fundraising, 
and community relations. Principals 
frequently commented that it was 
difﬁcult to adequately perform all 
of these functions. However, in our 
sample of eight schools, the observa-
tion and interview data indicate that 
the majority of principals were per-
forming effectively, considering the 
multi-faceted demands on them. 
The central ofﬁce Department of 
Leadership Services (changed to 
Ofﬁce of Administrative Services in 
2003-04) was at the heart of district 
efforts to monitor, inform, and sup-
port principals in their own efforts to 
perform these multiple functions for 
teachers, staff, students, and fami-
lies. The core staff of the department 
consisted of six leadership specialists 
who worked closely with principals. 
Leadership specialists—sometimes 
referred to as “principals of princi-
pals”—were involved in all aspects 
of principal supervision. Each lead-
ership specialist had responsibility 
for a group of principals for a given 
grade range (e.g., K-5, K-8, 9-12), 
permitting specialists to become 
more deeply informed about issues 
of special importance to subsets of 
schools. Often principals turned to 
these specialists ﬁrst with questions 
about school matters. Specialists 
consequently advised principals on 
district policy, and acted as inter-
mediaries to pass along or retrieve 
information from staff in other central 
ofﬁce departments on principals’ 
behalf. Specialists oversaw principals 
in creating their Education Plans, and 
took a lead role in principals’ annual 
evaluations. 
Leadership Services housed addi-
tional staff besides leadership spe-
cialists. For example, one staff person 
provided enhanced technical assis-
tance and professional development 
to schools making the change from 
K-5 to K-8, and another assisted high 
schools with students who had not 
been formally admitted to 9th grade 
due to failure to satisfy 8th grade pro-
ﬁciency requirements.
Another initiative orchestrated by 
Leadership Services was MPS’s 
Leadership Institutes. We attended 
two institutes that brought principals 
together for three days of professional 
development and networking during 
the summer. The June 2001 Institute 
focused on leadership in all domains, 
with an emphasis on instructional 
leadership. Topics covered at the 
institute included leadership skills, 
data-driven decision-making, and 
deep knowledge about teaching and 
learning. The June 2002 institute 
focused heavily on the implications 
of the federal No Child Left Behind 
legislation for school and district 
accountability.7
Education Plans. The district deﬁned 
the format for Education Plans in a 
template used by all schools. Every 
plan began with an outline of the dis-
trict mission and goals statement (see 
page 36), followed by 11 sections. 
The major sections were devoted to: 
1) data analysis and  needs assess-
ment and 2) goals, including school 
subject-area achievement targets for 
literacy (reading, language arts, writ-
ing); mathematics; literacy across the 
curriculum (e.g. science, social stud-
ies); school climate; and parent and 
community involvement.
In our sample of eight 
schools, the observation 
and interview data indi-
cate that the majority of 
principals were performing 
effectively, considering the 
multi-faceted demands on 
them. 
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District instructions were emphatic 
that plans focus primarily on state 
and district standardized tests in ana-
lyzing past school performance and 
to identify future needs and goals. 
For each goal identiﬁed in the plan, 
schools were required to specify: 1) 
strategies and activities to be under-
taken to pursue the goal; 2) profes-
sional development needed at the 
school to support progress; 3) per-
sons responsible for carrying out the 
activities; and 4) funding sources for 
activities (e.g., Title I, Title VII, SAGE, 
P-5, grants and gifts, and discretion-
ary district funds).
The Education Plans represented a 
key tool for structuring communica-
tion, guidance, and accountability 
between central ofﬁce and schools 
as the district increasingly devolved 
operational and instructional author-
ity to schools. A strong argument 
could be made for placing the 
Education Plan in the category of 
initiatives having direct impact on 
instruction, based on the fact that 
the plan speciﬁed subject areas to be 
emphasized and required articulation 
of goals, achievement targets, strate-
gies, and action items. We placed the 
Education Plan in the indirect cate-
gory due to its non-speciﬁcity regard-
ing required or desired instructional 
content and practices.
As a result of the relatively high 
degree of decentralization in MPS, 
much variability among schools was 
evident when examining each area 
of school operations. Although many 
factors contributed to variability in 
school practices, principals played an 
important role. The role of principals 
in determining how other school staff 
members perceived and participated 
in school operations was evident 
in teachers’ reports of involvement 
in Education Plan formulation and 
implementation.
The principal at School A (schools 
in our study were given pseudonyms 
for purposes of conﬁdentiality) was 
perceived by teachers as being good 
at obtaining outside funding to sup-
port special school programs and 
projecting a positive school image 
to the community and district ofﬁce. 
However, he/she was viewed as hav-
ing a top-down administrative style 
and as limiting extensive teacher 
involvement in school planning and 
decision-making to a small group of 
staff. In the excerpt below, a depart-
ment chair at School A indicated the 
Education Plan was not something 
teachers felt closely connected to:
Interviewer: As far as the school’s 
Education Plan, are you involved 
at all in developing that?
Teacher: I haven’t been, no.
Interviewer: Does that—the plan 
that’s developed each year, does 
that inﬂuence at all what you do 
in your department?
Teacher: Honestly, no. We usu-
ally get the plan in December, by 
the time they’ve printed it. So it 
truly doesn’t have an effect. It’s 
something that is done because 
somebody is requiring it to be 
done, but it’s not truly being 
implemented.
Interviewer: So teachers don’t 
really look at it, follow it?
Teacher:  No, and honestly, I 
don’t think that the average class-
room teacher is looking at ‘Am I 
meeting the 12 goals of the dis-
trict?’ They are trying to get to the 
curriculum of their course to the 
best of their ability and what they 
think the kids are going to need 
for college.
A sharp contrast to the role of the 
Education Plan at School A was 
evident at School D. In this school, 
the principal was widely regarded 
by teachers as seeking broad staff 
participation in school planning and 
improvement. The Education Plan 
was considered a living document 
to a greater degree than the other 
schools in our Milwaukee sample. 
The staff at School D used their 
Education Plan to articulate any spe-
ciﬁc statement of desirable instruc-
tional practices in relation to the 
academic achievement goals speci-
ﬁed in the plan. Below is a teacher’s 
response when asked if the school’s 
Education Plan had any direct con-
nection to classroom instruction:
Teacher: Yes. We talked a lot 
about—what happened is at the 
beginning of the school year. We 
got into different groups—math, 
reading, writing. I was in the math 
group and we looked over the 
goals we had for last year, and 
then we had to revise or improve 
them for this year.
Interviewer: Who asked you to 
do this?
Teacher: This was from the dis-
trict. Every year you have to 
make changes for your school’s 
Education Plan. 
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Interviewer: So throughout the 
year you will go back and look at 
that plan? 
Teacher: Yes.
Interviewer: What changes would 
you say that you and your col-
leagues have made in the last 
few years in strategies for school 
improvement?
Teacher: One I think is the read-
ing, changing to the SRA method 
of teaching. Also, our math pro-
gram has changed to use the new 
Math Investigations. 
A second teacher at School D pro-
vided a more detailed description 
of how the school’s Education Plan 
and expectations and goals for class-
room instructional practice were tied 
together.
Interviewer: Are there particu-
lar approaches that teachers are 
being encouraged to use, espe-
cially in math and reading?
Teacher: We have time blocks 
that we use. And it’s written in our 
Education Plan that we have to 
devote a certain amount of time 
to, let’s say, reading and math, for 
example. And then in the regular 
classrooms they’re using pure 
phonics and they’re supposed to 
do a certain amount of that every-
day. And so, I think that it’s the 
time factor, you know, and then of 
course, there’s the method that we 
use for teaching and reading, as 
well as math. And you know, we 
spend a certain amount of time, 
within the block, if it’s math, for 
example, working on basic facts. 
Doing the 5-minute drills. We do 
those a certain number of times 
per semester, for example. We 
pretty much set things that we are 
required to do.
Interviewer: If you went into the 
various classrooms in the school, 
would you say the majority of 
teachers are using these methods?   
Teacher: Yes. And, you know, for 
children, for example, in reading, 
[who] are on grade level, those 
children might be doing more lit-
erature-based reading. Whereas, 
the students who are below 
grade level, would be doing 
direct instruction with decod-
ing…whether it’s reading mastery, 
or corrective reading, or horizons, 
these are all SRA programs. And 
so it depends on the grade level of 
the instructional level of your stu-
dents. But I would say that we’re 
pretty consistent. You know, we 
don’t have one classroom where 
they’re using one series, and the 
next classroom is using a different 
series. Pretty much everybody is 
using the same things.
Compared to other schools in our 
Milwaukee Sample, staff at School D 
had especially high levels of within- 
and across-grade articulation of 
curricular content and pedagogical 
practices. Interviews with teachers 
at School D demonstrated that the 
school staff believed they would have 
had high levels of professional dia-
logue and communication even if the 
district did not require an Education 
Plan. However, in preparing their 
annual Education Plan, the teach-
ers viewed the exercise as another 
vehicle for encouraging school-wide 
articulation of instructional goals and 
strategies.
Whereas staff at School A tended to 
ignore the Education Plan, and staff 
at School D dedicated a high level of 
effort and attention to it, most school 
staff took an approach to the plan 
somewhere in between these two 
ends of the spectrum. Teachers at all 
schools in our study were aware of 
the district requirement to prepare 
an Education Plan. Some teachers 
reported being involved in develop-
ing their plan, but no other school 
staff in our sample exhibited the 
level of staff involvement observed at 
School D.
Teachers at all schools in our study 
varied in terms of how important they 
perceived the Education Plans to be 
to daily school operations and class-
room instructional practice. Some 
teachers at School B believed the 
Education Plan was important and 
adhered to it in a general manner. 
Teachers at School F also reported 
that staff members were attentive to 
their Education Plan and that they 
considered it as a general guide 
to instructional goals though not a 
source of speciﬁc statements regard-
ing desired content. Teachers at 
School G indicated they had taken 
Teachers at all schools in 
our study varied in terms 
of how important they 
perceived the Education 
Plans to be to daily school 
operations and classroom 
instructional practice. 
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a similar view of their Education 
Plan in the years before their school 
became a charter school. After that, 
the school charter document became 
the central statement of school goals 
and strategies and the school ceased 
writing an Education Plan per se. At 
School H, teachers reported they put 
signiﬁcant effort into producing plans 
because the principal viewed it as 
a useful exercise. One teacher told 
us the school always fell short of the 
academic achievement goals con-
tributed to the plan by the district. 
However, this teacher also indicated 
the district did not follow up on the 
low performance results, so teachers 
did not attach much importance to 
the plan. 
Interview Authority. The relation-
ship between the district and the 
teachers’ union was characterized as 
highly contentious in the years lead-
ing up to our study. One indicator of 
this conﬂict was the previously noted 
contest for school board control, 
perceived by many respondents to be 
primarily a struggle between forces 
sympathetic, versus those opposed 
to the union. Some former superin-
tendents were also characterized as 
having been at odds with the union. 
However, two district/union initia-
tives cited as having on-going impor-
tance were mentioned repeatedly by 
school level respondents. 
Three years before we began our 
ﬁeldwork for this study, the union 
and the MPS district negotiated an 
agreement departing from the tradi-
tional practice of total central ofﬁce 
control over interviewing, hiring, 
and assigning teachers to schools. 
The agreement allowed school staff 
to assume a lead role in these areas, 
as long as a majority of teachers in 
the building voted to adopt the new 
arrangement. Almost all schools in 
the district moved immediately to 
adopt the new approach.
We encountered little evidence 
that the transfer of interview and 
hiring authority to schools was ini-
tially expected to exert inﬂuence on 
instruction (with the exception of the 
expected increase in the ability of 
every school to shape its staff with 
reference to local priorities). Still, 
principals and school staff frequently 
cited the acquisition of interview and 
hiring authority as the single most 
important tool they had gained in 
recent years to increase their ability 
to improve their schools.
 Teacher Evaluation and  
Mentoring Program. The second 
cooperative district-union initiative 
identiﬁed by respondents was the 
Teacher Evaluation and Mentoring 
Program (TEAM). Several former 
superintendents and other central 
ofﬁce respondents complained 
about the difﬁculties of taking cor-
rective action with the small propor-
tions of tenured teachers who were 
performing inadequately. Teachers 
with seniority, when not renewed 
at one school, typically had ﬁrst 
rights to a position elsewhere. The 
reasons for non-renewal generally 
remained moot because the process 
for terminating tenured teachers was 
time-consuming, costly, and uncer-
tain to be utilized by administrators. 
Consequently, ineffective teachers 
were shufﬂed from school to school, 
some as frequent as annually. One 
respondent indicated a former super-
intendent referred to this phenom-
enon as “the dance of the lemons.”
TEAM, established in 1995, gave 
the district, principals, and teach-
ers another option. Upon referral by 
one’s principal, peers, or through 
self-referral, a teacher agreeing to 
the TEAM process would gain access 
to structured professional support. 
The support included mentoring by 
master teachers. According to a pub-
lication of the Milwaukee Teachers’ 
Education Association (MTEA, 
September 26, 2001), 186 teachers 
were referred during the ﬁrst ﬁve 
years. Of those deemed to qualify 
for TEAM participation (i.e., teach-
ers with three years of experience 
who had been properly observed 
and evaluated), at least 47 resigned, 
10 refused assistance, and 36 
accepted; 31 of the 36 who received 
two semesters of TEAM mentoring 
improved and continued teaching 
in MPS. None of the teachers we 
interviewed had received assistance 
from TEAM. Principals reported 
the program worked well to either 
improve the performance of ineffec-
tive teachers or to remove them from 
the system. 
The TEAM initiative was categorized 
here as an indirect inﬂuence on 
instruction because we have no evi-
dence to show the extent to which 
teaching and learning may have 
changed in the classrooms of teach-
ers who participated in the program. 
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 n this section, we consider the  
 extent and nature of interaction  
 between central ofﬁce and 
school staff members in formulating 
policy tools that shape instruction, as 
well as the on-going interaction on 
instructional matters. We identiﬁed 
ﬁve areas of action and communica-
tion that were prominent in district 
administrators’ efforts to communi-
cate and interact with school staff 
members around policies related to 
instructional reform. The ﬁve areas 
are: 
1) Ad hoc committees—especially 
for the purpose of producing 
foundational instructional guid-
ance documents (e.g., standards, 
proﬁciencies, education plans)
2) Standing committees with regular 
meetings
3) Standing technical assistance 
structures (including leadership 
specialists)
4) Professional development
5) Devolution of resources and deci-
sion-making authority to schools 
(including decentralization and 
other initiatives having primarily 
indirect effects on instruction) 
These areas of action and commu-
nication varied in the manner and 
degree to which they allowed school 
staff members to engage in co-con-
struction of district initiatives shaping 
instructional reform. We consider 
each in order below.
Ad Hoc Committees
School board actions periodically 
called for signiﬁcant change or fur-
ther speciﬁcation of district-wide 
instructional guidance. This was typi-
cally followed by the formation of a 
committee to produce one or more 
documents to articulate the relevant 
aspects of the district instructional 
vision. Several such documents were 
described earlier (e.g., district stan-
dards, district proﬁciencies, and the 
district’s Education Plan). In most 
cases, school staff members were 
included on the committees that 
designed and produced such basic 
instructional guidance documents. 
For example, the 1998 district stan-
dards document indicates that seven 
central ofﬁce staff, two principals, 
and 37 teachers served on the com-
mittee that designed and drafted the 
standards for English/Language Arts/
Reading/Writing. During our ﬁeld-
work, we encountered one resource 
teacher who was deeply involved in 
a district committee working to ﬂesh 
out the literacy initiative recently 
adopted the board. Likewise, the dis-
trict committee that had developed 
the district proﬁciencies included 
teachers and principals as well as 
central ofﬁce staff. Teachers also 
reported intense interaction with cen-
tral ofﬁce staff in textbook adoption 
committees. 
Typically, this kind of committee 
work would bring district and school 
staff into relatively intense interaction 
over one or two semesters, but with-
out any follow-up. It is difﬁcult to 
assess the overall level of interaction 
between school and central ofﬁce 
staff as a result of teacher participa-
tion in district committees. Half or 
more of our teacher interviewees 
were considered by principals or 
other teachers to be teacher leaders. 
Teacher leaders were more involved 
in district committee work than other 
teachers. It was difﬁcult to generalize 
about teacher involvement in district 
committees because activity at the 
level of individual teachers ﬂuctuated 
over time. Some teachers would par-
ticipate intensively in committees to 
accomplish a speciﬁc task—select a 
textbook, write standards, design per-
formance assessments—for a limited 
period of time, followed by a period 
of up to several years with little or no 
committee work, followed by another 
intensive period of committee work.
As one example, we encoun-
tered numerous references to, and 
descriptions of, a group called 
the Middle School Principals’ 
Collaborative, including the role of 
the Collaborative in the formulation 
of district proﬁciencies. Respondents 
indicated the Collaborative served 
as a key district policy initiative, 
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which was consistent with informa-
tion from the previously cited paper 
on the proﬁciencies (Clune, Mason, 
Pohs, Thiel, & White, April 2, 2002). 
The Collaborative was founded in 
1997—at about the same time that 
the board initiated development of 
the proﬁciencies system.
The idea behind the initiative was to 
provide leadership around issues of 
special import for the district’s 17,000 
middle school students. Given the 
potential impact upon middle school 
instruction and accountability, a top 
priority of the Collaborative was to be 
highly involved in the proﬁciencies. 
As one principal explained, middle 
school principals decided that if the 
proﬁciencies were going to be imple-
mented, then they might as well take 
a proactive approach and try to make 
the proﬁciencies as productive as 
possible for schools and students. The 
following quote from this principal 
conveys this perspective:
…the proﬁciency [initiative] was 
a different thing in that it no lon-
ger was a central ofﬁce-driven 
thing. What was interesting about 
that was that the Middle School 
[Principals’] Collaborative was 
formed around that same time. 
They [the principals] had just 
decided to come together as a 
collaborative and then this pro-
ﬁciency thing came down on 
them, and they [the principals] 
had to decide to resist it as a new 
accountability measure that was 
going to kill them, or to embrace 
it. They chose to embrace it 
because they felt that there wasn’t 
enough structure to the curricu-
lum in middle schools. They [cen-
tral ofﬁce administrators] said it 
would give us structure and goals. 
When the middle school princi-
pals decided they were going to 
make sure their kids made proﬁ-
ciency, they involved their staff, 
the learning coordinators, and 
they became involved in redeﬁn-
ing the assessments and what the 
proﬁciencies looked like. They 
took control of it. Then they mobi-
lized their own staff…. That was 
where reform ended up being 
driven by the schools. When some 
people came to the board and 
tried to remove the requirement, 
the middle school principals 
actually stood up and said they 
wanted it. Politically, it could have 
easily gone down when it looked 
like some kids were going to fail.
With funding from the Danforth 
Foundation, the Middle School 
Principals’ Collaborative put exten-
sive time and energy into meeting 
to plan proﬁciency implementation, 
creating tools to monitor and guide 
the process, and participating in pro-
fessional development to enhance 
their own instructional leadership 
capabilities. Clune, Mason, Pohs, 
Thiel, &White (April 2, 2002) indi-
cate that the Collaborative suc-
cessfully petitioned central ofﬁce 
for increased funding for tutoring 
programs to be held after-school 
and Saturdays. They developed their 
own database to help teachers track 
individual student progress toward 
proﬁciencies. The Collaborative 
worked with the district to move per-
formance assessment scoring from 
central ofﬁce to the schools. When 
the district began showing concern 
about a potentially large number 
of students not passing proﬁciency 
by the end of the school year, the 
Collaborative worked with the district 
to create an intensive, extensive unit 
students could complete during sum-
mer school to meet proﬁciency. In 
these and many other ways, middle 
school principals and their staffs 
worked with central ofﬁce to make 
implementation of the proﬁciencies 
proceed in a manner that gave school 
staff a method to coordinate instruc-
tional practices and establish a more 
interactive approach to working with 
central ofﬁce.
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2Despite the proactive approach taken by the Collaborative, substantial 
problems arose around the proﬁcien-
cies, and central ofﬁce eventually 
stepped in to impose a strategy for 
managing these problems. In May 
2000, the district was faced with 
approximately 1,200 students who 
were at risk of being retained in 8th 
grade due to not meeting proﬁciency 
requirements. This represented a 
major logistical problem, since the 
middle schools did not have the 
space or the staff to accommodate 
these students. Below is a quote from 
a high school principal describing 
ramiﬁcations of central ofﬁce deci-
sions around non-proﬁcient students 
for the principal’s own school.
Let me give you a typical example 
of how [central ofﬁce] operates. 
Eighth graders that didn't meet 
proﬁciencies are called 8Ts. 
They're supposed to remain in the 
middle schools. Last minute, cen-
tral ofﬁce calls us and says we're 
inheriting the 8Ts. That's 170 
for us. A couple of classrooms 
for us…. District-wide they had 
over 1,200 8th grade transition…. 
We don't know what to do with 
them…. They say, ‘Don't worry, 
we're going to perfect this’ So 
we call the kids in and it turns 
out that the problem is atten-
dance. Then [central ofﬁce] said 
that anyone who doesn't make it 
would be housed at the alterna-
tive school. Guess what they told 
us May 30 at our central ofﬁce 
meeting? They don't have enough 
seats anywhere. We're going 
to have them as 9Ts. Over four 
years, and my question to them 
was who do the dropout rates go 
to? Do they go back to the middle 
school or do I inherit the dropout 
rate? That's signiﬁcant. That's their 
mentality. Nobody has the vision 
to think things out ahead of time.
As will be discussed below, middle 
school principals and staff in our 
sample (including middle grade 
teachers in K-8 schools) treated the 
proﬁciencies as a high instructional 
priority throughout the year of our 
data collection. However, by the 
end of the school year, numerous 
teachers reported that the board and 
central ofﬁce were considering low-
ering the stakes for proﬁciencies or 
possibly doing away with them alto-
gether. Although the long-term con-
sequences of high levels of central 
ofﬁce/school collaboration around 
the proﬁciencies were uncertain, 
for a signiﬁcant period of time, the 
proﬁciencies represented the best 
example of concrete coordination of 
central ofﬁce/school staff members 
on an initiative with direct instruc-
tional impacts.
Standing Committees with 
Regular Meetings
Milwaukee Public Schools relied 
heavily on meetings of standing com-
mittees to work out potential and 
actual district policies and to convey 
district policies and information 
related to instruction. Central ofﬁce 
staff  believed school staff attending 
these meetings would relay important 
information back to principals and 
teachers. While many school staff 
attended these meetings, in some 
cases, school staff exercised discre-
tion by discontinuing participation 
on committees they deemed to be of 
insufﬁcient value to justify the time 
and effort expected.
The type of school staff identiﬁed for 
participation in central ofﬁce com-
mittees and meetings varied. For 
example, each central ofﬁce depart-
ment had its own advisory committee 
comprised of school principals, in 
addition to senior department staff. 
The committees met regularly to give 
principals a chance to help central 
ofﬁce departments explore potential 
and actual district policies involving 
the department and ultimately affect-
ing schools.
We observed one of the Finance 
Department meetings. The group 
vigorously discussed aspects of the 
district buyback initiative. District 
and school ofﬁcials attending the 
meeting did not attempt to make ﬁnal 
policy decisions on any given issue 
at that meeting. Rather, the focus was 
For a signiﬁcant period 
of time, the proﬁcien-
cies represented the best 
example of concrete 
coordination of cen-
tral ofﬁce/school staff 
members on an initiative 
with direct instructional 
impacts.
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on exploration of options and poten-
tial consequences. Communication 
among central ofﬁce and school staff 
members appeared constructive and 
substantive and the group appeared 
to have a common understanding 
that it was important for them to have 
sustained conversations around core 
issues. School staff spoke at least as 
much as, if not more than, central 
ofﬁce staff. Central ofﬁce staff did 
not attempt to control the ﬂow of 
information or dictate the agenda. 
Observing this meeting gave us the 
impression of balanced interaction 
and collaboration among central 
ofﬁce and school staff. However, 
we do not know if this meeting was 
representative or the extent to which 
such committees ultimately affected 
district policy and practice. 
Other central ofﬁce committees 
included additional teachers (regular 
classroom and instructional support 
staff). These committees functioned 
to disseminate district policies 
already formulated, as well as seek 
some school feedback and input on 
implementation considerations. For 
example, high school subject area 
department chairs met regularly as a 
group. According to several respon-
dents, these meeting varied widely in 
terms of how useful or relevant they 
were to the members. Mid- to low-
level central ofﬁce staff were typi-
cally given primary responsibility for 
providing leadership to these com-
mittees. One high school department 
chair we interviewed reported that 
the person responsible for the district 
meetings for department chairs in 
his/her subject area was not effective. 
Consequently, the department chair 
reported receiving permission from 
his/her school principal to skip regu-
lar district subject area meetings.
In addition to principals and depart-
ment chairs, teachers working in the 
role of instructional implementers 
and learning coordinators met regu-
larly with central ofﬁce staff. Our 
data indicates that implementers and 
coordinators were second only to 
principals in terms of the amount of 
interaction with central ofﬁce staff. 
Below is a quote from a learning 
coordinator providing an overview of 
his/her monthly meetings with his/her 
colleagues:
Learning Coordinator: Once a 
month, I have a learning coor-
dinators’ meeting. So, it's all 
the learning coordinators from 
the middle school and some of 
the implementers from the K-
8—whoever has 6th, 7th, and 8th 
graders in their school. We meet 
monthly. [The mid-level central 
ofﬁce manager] who's also in 
charge of [subject area], is our 
leader…. [Teachers] know that I 
go to the monthly meetings, and 
so through department minutes, 
they write any questions that 
they have for me, and if I don't 
know it, I ﬁnd out at this meeting. 
And [central ofﬁce manager] will 
bring in all the different depart-
ment leaders at Central Ofﬁce, 
if we have questions. You know, 
we wanted to know about the 
music…. Like, [name], from the 
music department, wanted to get 
us some information about spring 
concerts that are coming up. At 
our last meeting, [she] was there, 
because [she] knows that [she] 
can disperse all this information. 
[She] can come to one meet-
ing, disperse it to all the learning 
coordinators, and the learning 
coordinators will make sure they 
get it back to the teachers as they 
need to. Which ﬁnally, this year…
they’re they're getting smarter 
in how they can disperse this 
information. You know, they're 
working smarter, not necessarily 
harder.
Interviewer: So, you think it's 
improving.
Learning Coordinator: It is 
improving. That's deﬁnitely 
improved.
In addition to principals 
and department chairs, 
teachers working in the 
role of instructional imple-
menters and learning 
coordinators met regularly 
with central ofﬁce staff. 
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3The preceding quote demonstrates the important role the implement-
ers and coordinators played in the 
district’s broader strategy for main-
taining an organizational infrastruc-
ture to ensure a level of consistency 
in disseminating district instructional 
policy and guiding school level 
implementation. This is important 
when considered in the context 
of earlier evidence regarding the 
degree to which budget cuts and 
decentralization initiatives over the 
years reduced the capacity of central 
ofﬁce staff, especially in Educational 
Services, to work directly with, and 
in, every school. Our data on imple-
menters and coordinators indicates 
that these school staff had emerged 
as important intermediaries to convey 
information from central ofﬁce to 
schools, and back. In doing this, they 
compensated for reduced opportuni-
ties for communication related to 
changes such as reductions in num-
bers of central ofﬁce subject area 
specialists.
Standing Technical Assistance 
Structures
Various central ofﬁce departments 
offered on-going technical assistance 
that school staff were eligible to 
seek through various means. A lim-
ited amount of technical assistance 
activities, which had traditionally 
been offered to all schools, were 
moved into the buyback category. 
These activities served as a nexus of 
central ofﬁce/school interaction in 
those schools where principals made 
a conscious decision to purchase the 
services.
For example, a signiﬁcant number 
of schools in our sample purchased 
marketing assistance from the 
Business Services Department of 
central ofﬁce. Such assistance was 
offered at several levels, with the 
most expensive package costing less 
than $3,000. One principal said he/
she had bought this deluxe package, 
stating that he/she thought it was a 
“no-brainer”. From this principal’s 
perspective, the expenditure would 
pay for itself in the form of additional 
per-pupil funding if the investment 
brought just one more student into 
the school. Reportedly, principals 
who had substantial waiting lists 
for their schools often passed up 
the service. One of the principals 
in our sample expressed the belief 
that his/her school had an extensive 
and effective marketing strategy that 
included all Business Services offered 
and more.
The leadership specialists in 
Leadership Services were considered 
by many to be an on-going source 
of technical assistance dedicated 
to helping principals fulﬁll their 
multi-faceted roles. The technical 
assistance function was recognized 
as an important part of the leader-
ship specialist’s role by specialists 
themselves and principals. Principals 
reported collegial, productive inter-
actions with specialists, indicating 
that they were comfortable turning to 
specialists with questions, concerns, 
and problems. 
Principals praised the interactions 
they had with their leadership spe-
cialists. Specialists worked with 
groups of principals in schools 
serving the same grade levels. One 
specialist focused on schools that 
were switching from K-5 regional 
schools to K-8 neighborhood schools. 
Working with clusters of schools 
undergoing similar processes led to 
specialists acquiring information of 
special importance to the schools 
they served. Due to this exposure, 
specialists were equipped with 
substantial information whenever 
a principal called with questions. 
Specialists routinely assumed respon-
sibility for obtaining the information 
they did not have from other central 
ofﬁce staff members.
The leadership specialists 
in Leadership Services 
were considered by many 
to be an on-going source 
of technical assistance 
dedicated to helping 
principals fulﬁll their 
multi-faceted roles.
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54Professional Development
Interaction between school staff 
and central ofﬁce around profes-
sional development was complex, 
partly because of ﬂuidity in district 
policy and the district’s vision for 
Educational Services. This vision 
included reducing the size of 
Educational Services to the point 
where it was no longer possible 
to deliver intensive professional 
development or technical assistance 
on a school-by-school basis. As 
Educational Services became smaller, 
the division focused increasingly 
on district-level curricular guidance 
policy (e.g., standards and assess-
ments), and centralized meetings 
with a top-down information ﬂow 
as primary strategies for affecting 
instruction. However, simultane-
ously, individual mid- to low- level 
staff in Educational Services with 
strong subject area backgrounds had 
a reputation for effective service to 
schools. Individual staff members in 
Educational Services were widely 
respected and sought out by schools 
for the support and guidance they 
offered schools in instructional plan-
ning and improvement. However, as 
discussed earlier, other staff members 
in Educational Services were viewed 
by school staff as ineffective.
The limited capacity of Educational 
Services on instructional practice at 
the school or classroom level was 
demonstrated, according to responses 
from school staff, by what happened 
when central ofﬁce tried to move a 
much larger portion of Educational 
Services’ activities into the buyback 
category. Principals responded by 
buying very little of what was offered 
by Educational Services, to the point 
of threatening the basic funding base 
needed to maintain the department 
in its downsized form. The board, 
however, was not prepared to see 
the department dwindle so they 
intervened by pulling the funding 
back from schools in order to sustain 
Educational Services. 
Principals cited this as an example 
of confusion created by board 
changes in policy. Few school staff 
attributed extensive impact to pro-
fessional development delivered by 
Educational Services on classroom 
instructional practice. Some school 
staff identiﬁed district in-services 
that had been useful, but most teach-
ers received relatively little profes-
sional development directly from 
Educational Services. The exceptions 
were the teachers who were most 
highly engaged professionally. These 
teachers were more likely to interact 
with, and report feeling supported by, 
central ofﬁce.
Devolution of Resources and 
Decision-making Authority
The decision by the MPS school 
board to intervene to recoup 
resources for Educational Services 
did not eliminate discretionary funds 
for schools. Some schools also pur-
sued entrepreneurial activities to 
secure independent funding sources. 
Such schools were able to utilize 
these resources to procure intensive, 
sustained professional development 
from providers outside central ofﬁce 
and the district. We tried to clarify 
the extent to which professional 
development at the school or sample 
level was delivered by the district or 
paid for with district funds. We also 
tried to get detailed descriptions of 
district professional development. 
However, retrospective descrip-
tions of professional development 
were difﬁcult to obtain. Questions 
remained regarding the degree to 
which school staff relied on the dis-
trict directly versus other providers 
for professional development.
Toward the end of our ﬁeldwork, we 
observed increasingly frequent refer-
ences by central ofﬁce staff members 
to the concept of “embedded profes-
sional development.” District lead-
ers were moving toward a vision of 
professional development in which 
teacher professional development 
would be interwoven into teachers’ 
on-going curricular planning, deliv-
ery, self-evaluation, and continuous 
improvement.
Few school staff attrib-
uted extensive impact to 
professional development 
delivered by Educational 
Services on classroom 
instructional practice.
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 chool staff members per-  
 ceived the main focus of  
 central ofﬁce to be organiza-
tional reforms that exerted only indi-
rect effects on instructional practice.
As noted earlier, principals appreci-
ated having more discretionary fund-
ing, but believed the amount of time 
they were investing in budget matters 
was problematic. Most principals 
indicated they had little experience 
with school budget decisions before 
decentralization and invested much 
time learning about this new aspect 
of their role.
Principals expressed the belief that 
educational leadership specialists 
were very effective in carrying out 
their responsibilities. Teachers recog-
nized the importance of leadership 
specialists to principals, but did not 
have a detailed understanding of 
interactions among specialists and 
principals.
Teachers and principals alike were 
supportive of the devolution of inter-
view authority to schools. Many 
believed it gave them more control 
to build a strong faculty—one made 
up of staff with more compatible phi-
losophies, values, and instructional 
goals. This may have been especially 
valued by school staff members in 
Milwaukee, due to the consider-
able autonomy the district had given 
schools to develop a clear and mar-
ketable school vision, identity, and 
instructional program. School staff 
members expressed the belief that 
the new hiring system optimized 
their ability to ﬁnd new teachers who 
ﬁt well with existing staff. 
To the extent that teachers perceived 
a district focus on instruction, they 
reported student achievement as a 
key district concern. Emphasis on 
state standardized tests had report-
edly always been present, as evi-
denced by the district expanding 
the same assessment to more grade 
levels than required. Simultaneously, 
the district developed and invested 
heavily in other forms of assessment 
and student performance measures, 
such as performance assessments and 
proﬁciencies. In the excerpt below, a 
teacher from School A discussed the 
belief expressed by many teachers 
that the district testing program was 
extensive, to the point of infringing 
on time available for instruction.
Interviewer: We talked a bit about 
testing. Would you say the district 
is moving in any speciﬁc direction 
as far as encouraging or pressing 
for certain kinds of testing?
Teacher: Oh yeah. They have 
gone overboard with testing. Any 
more testing and you won’t be 
teaching. We have the WKCE. 
We have the Terra Nova. We have 
the high school graduation test. 
We’ve got supposedly the built-in 
tests in the four major curriculum 
areas…. Next year we’re losing 
four mornings to the high school 
graduation test…losing two more 
mornings to both the 10th and 9th 
grade testing…two mornings for 
math and English proﬁciency test-
ing in the spring. A morning for 
seniors for math testing in the fall, 
and a morning for seniors for test-
ing English in the fall. You know, 
that’s a lot of time to be taking 
out. 
Teachers varied in their views on 
being judged by standardized test 
scores, but most recognized the 
emphasis on scores as a reality not 
likely to go away. In the excerpt 
below, a teacher from School H 
explained that much attention was 
given to test scores by a variety of 
people. The teacher went on to note 
ways in which he/she perceived the 
reporting of test scores to exclude 
much information about inﬂuences 
on student achievement beyond 
the control of schools, and to focus 
Teachers and principals 
alike were supportive of 
the devolution of inter-
view authority to schools. 
Many believed it gave 
them more control to 
build a strong faculty.
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on absolute scores as opposed to 
improvement. The majority of teacher 
respondents indicated they wanted 
to be judged on improvement, not on 
absolute scores.
Interviewer: Who pays attention 
to the reading scores?  Who cares 
about them?
Teacher: Who cares about them? 
The State cares about them. 
Central ofﬁce cares about them. 
Oh, yeah! I mean, they must…. 
When I say care, they are very 
quick to publicize that…this is the 
scores and show that you're here 
and somebody else is there. So, I 
think everybody is looking at it. I 
think the community looks at it. 
And maybe even say—well, use 
it as a measure of whether you're 
being successful with the kids, or 
not.
Interviewer: How do you develop 
a sense of why or in what way 
test scores matter, as a teacher? Is 
it real direct information, or is it 
just kind of just ﬂoating around in 
your environment…?  
Teacher: I think it's pretty direct. 
When it's in the newspaper, it's 
usually with a big headline that 
smacks us again-in-the-face type 
of thing. 
Interviewer: Usually it's critical? 
Teacher: Yes. Very much so. 
Interviewer: Like?
Teacher: Like, for example, we 
have a high population of students 
who maybe have only been in 
this country for some months, in 
some cases. With the Star test, it's 
in English…. They know very little 
English, but they still take that test. 
The Gates test is also in English. 
It's kind of like a vocabulary-type 
thing. They won't do well on it, 
even if they can read very well in 
their own language. They do pro-
vide another test that's in Spanish, 
I think…. When they publish that 
score, they don't show where the 
child was when they came to you, 
in the ﬁrst place.
Teachers varied in their views as 
to whether the state test was based 
on valid and appropriate measures. 
Some thought the test was challeng-
ing and focused on appropriate con-
tent. Below, a teacher from School 
D expressed the legitimacy of test 
scores and formulated much of his/
her role as a teacher accordingly.
Interviewer: What are the core 
instructional issues or goals that 
your school has been focusing on? 
Teacher: We want to raise the test 
scores, especially for Milwaukee 
public schools.
Interviewer: Is there any area 
where the test scores are getting 
most attention in your school?
Teacher: In our school, all of our 
scores are some of the highest if 
not the very highest in the district, 
but I would think that the two 
things that we are really focusing 
on right now are reading and writ-
ing scores, followed by math and 
science. 
Interviewer: Is that because read-
ing and writing scores were abso-
lutely lower or because reading 
and writing is so important in the 
primary grades . . .?
Teacher: I think that my principal 
expressed the fact that if you can 
read, you can probably do most 
anything else because you can get 
the directions and the instructions 
and teach yourself or learn on 
your own. Writing because people 
still have to know how to commu-
nicate and get their ideas across. 
There’s a lot more verbal type stuff 
going on, but you also have to be 
able to put things down on paper 
and express yourself.
Interviewer: Does your school 
have any core goals that are not 
formulated in terms of test scores 
or test performance?
Teacher: Yes, we have a lot of 
them that we have different com-
mittees. I think we talked about 
this last time. And each commit-
tee has reviewed the standards 
within our own school. And 
although our scores are some of 
the…they are the highest in the 
district and have been for the last 
ﬁve years. We still want to raise 
them two, three and four percent 
over the next three years. We’re 
not going to be satisﬁed with the 
status quo. Go higher yet ‘cause 
we see that the kids can do this or 
that level so we are putting them 
a little bit higher.
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Other teacher respondents, including 
the School D teacher quoted below, 
expressed the belief that standardized 
tests were often biased against urban 
children, who are the majority of 
MPS students.
Teacher:…I think that having all 
of this testing, I think the jury is 
still out on that, whether all of this 
testing is a good thing. I think that 
it’s difﬁcult for kids to sit down 
and take a test that is going to go 
on over a course of a couple of 
days, and they’re going to have to 
sit for an hour at a time working 
on this test.
Interviewer: What evidence will 
you have to show that it is work-
ing or isn’t working? 
Teacher: I think that when we get 
our results back from the test and 
we ﬁnd that we’ve got a lot of 
kids who are proﬁcient or above. 
Or at least basic. You know, that 
we don’t have a lot of kids that 
are below the basic level, the 
minimal. We don’t want a lot of 
kids to be on the minimal level. I 
think that it helps us to know that 
we are headed in the right direc-
tion. But I’m not so sure, some 
of these tests, you know…there’s 
always going to be bias. There’s 
always going to be things that…
for instance, you talk about the 
mountains and some of our kids 
have never seen the mountains. 
They’ve never seen the ocean. 
They’ve barely even seen the lake.
 
Teachers were much more supportive 
of, and committed to, performance 
assessments the district had devel-
oped and implemented. However, 
teachers perceived the district to be 
pulling back from investing in per-
formance assessments and giving 
them sufﬁcient weight in the district 
accountability system. Teachers and 
implementers felt proﬁciencies ini-
tially held potential to guide instruc-
tion and motivate student perfor-
mance, but school staff expressed the 
belief that the school board’s reversal 
on 8Ts undermined the value of the 
proﬁciencies as an accountability 
tool.
Teachers’ and principals’ perceptions 
of other central ofﬁce instructional 
guidance policies ranged from indif-
ferent to moderately positive. School 
staff believed that the standards 
were educationally sound and well-
aligned to state and national stan-
dards. However, the standards speci-
ﬁed only content and did not address 
pedagogy. Furthermore, the central 
ofﬁce did little monitoring of teacher 
adherence to standards. The district 
was very non-prescriptive regarding 
curricular materials and program-
ming and liberal in the range of text-
books and other materials supplied to 
schools. In rare cases where district 
choice of curricular materials did not 
include what school staff wanted, 
school staff had the power to spend 
discretionary funds to buy what they 
wanted anyway. This contributed to 
considerable diversity of instructional 
approaches among schools.
Central ofﬁce/school relations around 
professional development were 
characterized as undergoing change. 
Individually and collectively, teach-
ers viewed themselves as becoming 
increasingly self-sufﬁcient. Where 
school staff members found value 
in extensive interaction with central 
ofﬁce staff, interaction levels were 
signiﬁcant. Where relationships were 
not seen as productive, school staff 
members invested as little as possible 
in maintaining relationships. On bal-
ance, school staff were reported as 
more proactive in seeking out appro-
priate professional development from 
non-district providers. Many teach-
ers who were recognized as local 
school experts sought professional 
development, and then brought the 
knowledge they gained back to dis-
seminate to other staff. Some school 
staff became very efﬁcient at this. 
The trend increased the complexity 
and time demands of many teachers 
as professionals, but most teach-
ers viewed this as a necessary and 
important aspect of their work. As 
a result of the trend toward self-suf-
ﬁciency in procuring professional 
Many teachers who were 
recognized as local school 
experts sought profes-
sional development, and 
then brought the knowl-
edge they gained back to 
disseminate to other staff.
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R
development, teachers and princi-
pals accepted increasingly greater 
personal responsibility for their own 
professional learning. 
Most principals and teachers per-
ceived the district Education Plan 
template and planning process as 
beneﬁcial. Some principals noted 
they had been complimented by 
central ofﬁce staff, such as leader-
ship specialists, on the quality of 
their plans. A principal at one school 
reported having pointed out to cen-
tral ofﬁce that coherent and well-
presented plans were effective, but 
even better would be plans backed 
by a level of resources and organiza-
tional capacity commensurate with 
the level of effort indicated by good 
plans. This principal expressed con-
cern about being able to implement 
aspects of the Education Plan submit-
ted by his/her school.
Teachers were generally support-
ive of the Education Plans. Some 
schools involved the bulk of teach-
ers in creating their plans, whereas 
others delegated the work to small 
groups. The extent to which teachers 
were involved in the process affected 
teachers’ perceptions of the qual-
ity and legitimacy of the plan. One 
aspect of the Education Plan that 
school staff members often disagreed 
on was district control of target 
scores for student achievement tests. 
This district policy made many teach-
ers feel as though they were being 
judged against absolute achievement 
criteria rather than growth in perfor-
mance over time. 
Based on teachers’ responses, the 
central ofﬁce had modest impact 
on instruction due to low speciﬁcity 
in curriculum guidance, and lim-
ited direct interaction with schools 
around instruction. Principals and 
implementers reportedly had the 
most contact with district staff mem-
bers. Principals and implementers 
also had a more detailed understand-
ing than teachers of how district 
decisions and strategies affecting 
instructional content and delivery 
were ﬁltered down into classrooms. 
Teachers relied heavily on imple-
menters and principals for guidance 
about instructional matters and did 
not necessarily know when local 
guidance provided by principals and 
implementers represented district 
priorities, principal or implementer 
priorities, or a complex combination 
of both. This uncertainty was a func-
tion of limited direct contact between 
teachers and central ofﬁce adminis-
trators and their consequent heavy 
reliance on principals and imple-
menters as intermediaries.
School Instructional 
Leadership Roles  
 
 espondents described school  
 leadership as being shared  
 by principals, coordinators, 
resource teachers, and classroom 
teachers. These individuals var-
ied in their areas of involvement. 
The emphasis of a given individual 
also varied throughout the year as 
demands from central ofﬁce to focus 
on one or another task changed (e.g., 
Education Plans, budgets, student 
enrollment/recruitment, teacher hir-
ing, proﬁciency accounting, and 
standardized testing). Staff members 
in each category had responsibilities 
in all areas, but varied in terms of 
degree of emphasis on a given area. 
For example, some principals were 
effective at budgeting, while other 
principals allocated as much budget 
work as possible to other administra-
tors. However, all principals had to 
give signiﬁcant attention to the full 
range of operational and instructional 
issues. 
With teachers too, many reported 
engagement in a broad range of 
school functions and roles. For 
example, most schools had numer-
ous standing committees, in addition 
to grade-level teams, and required 
teachers to be on at least one com-
mittee. Based on interview data, 
shared leadership was broader 
and deeper in elementary and K-8 
schools than in high schools. Smaller 
schools may have required a greater 
proportion of staff to perform the 
roles. The sheer size of many high 
Respondents described 
school leadership as 
being shared by prin-
cipals, coordinators, 
resource teachers, and 
classroom teachers. 
61
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
schools permited greater specialization 
than could be achieved in most ele-
mentary schools. Even if some schools 
were large enough to permit a smaller 
proportion of teachers to assume sub-
stantial leadership roles, teachers in 
most schools supplied considerable 
leadership in most areas. 
Leadership roles, as reﬂected in the 
interviews, addressed four areas or 
imperatives: operational, instructional, 
professional, and moral. Leaders at all 
levels appeared to take on leadership 
in all four areas. However, insofar as 
direct interaction with central ofﬁce 
was concerned, principals and, to 
some degree, implementers, generally 
represented the school. For this reason, 
the involvement of teachers in contrib-
uting leadership in each domain was 
not always direct and visible in the 
interactions themselves. Nonetheless, 
based on respondents’ accounts, each 
category of respondent provided lead-
ership in each area, even if the exact 
source of leadership became unclear 
when interactions were conducted 
through intermediaries. 
Teachers viewed the district as provid-
ing the most speciﬁc guidance in the 
operational area, with instructional 
and professional guidance—which 
were highly intertwined—being sec-
ond. Principals and teachers alike 
often posited or strongly implied an 
imperative for moral leadership. This 
had various dimensions, but equality 
of educational opportunity for tradi-
tionally underserved student popula-
tions was an especially prominent 
concern. The following series of state-
ments were taken from sections of an 
interview with a school principal. The 
interview passages show how moral 
leadership was integral to this princi-
pal’s understanding of his/her role.
Principal:…Assuming the prin-
cipalship of this school was a 
calling, a passionate call from my 
heart. This school is very much 
like the schools I attended…. My 
passion is with teaching, learn-
ing, and giving children some 
sense of G.O.D.—Good Orderly 
Direction—and a will to learn, to 
be of substance to your commu-
nity…. Why did I come to School 
C? Why should I not? This is the 
school of ‘Don’t expect much,’ 
but the kids and the staff and the 
community expect much. This is 
the school of ‘Oh, who believes 
in them?’ I happen to love that 
people call us the underdog…. 
Why not come here? School C 
has everything every other school 
has. It has the greatest students 
in the world. It has people who 
are asked to work with these chil-
dren in these communities, and 
therefore I believe they have the 
capacity to deliver sound, engag-
ing, rigorous instruction if given 
the support and the sense of belief 
they need. My job, quite frankly, 
is to support teachers. 
The principal went on to express an 
idea also related by many teachers—
the idea that poor urban students 
were capable of succeeding aca-
demically if teachers acquired new 
pedagogical knowledge to approach 
instruction in non-traditional ways.
Principal: I don’t know if teach-
ers know how to teach today’s 
student. It requires a whole lot 
of different approaches. Do we 
understand whom we’re teaching 
and from where they’re coming? 
Just because they live in a poor 
neighborhood doesn’t mean that 
their brain capacity is less. I want 
to do brain-based learning. I want 
to learn about the physiology 
of learning. I want to talk more 
about how student grouping and 
working with community groups 
and universities and then just 
searching. In the end, we know 
the district’s issue to have x num-
ber of credits in certain subjects. 
But what is learning? I want them 
to learn classical information.
Attention to the moral dimensions of 
leadership was consistently evident 
among principals and teachers. Such 
imperatives were also observed by 
managers in central ofﬁce, though 
not by as great a proportion of central 
ofﬁce as school staff. Relative to this 
observation, it is important to remem-
ber that the teachers we sampled, 
including implementers/coordinators, 
were selected because they were rec-
ognized as instructional leaders. This 
may have affected our understanding 
of the prevalence and importance 
of a given type of leadership at the 
school level. However, as far as cen-
tral ofﬁce was concerned, teachers 
did not perceive clear, steady signals 
regarding the organization’s moral 
obligation and commitment to stu-
dents and the community. 
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M
ity to interact intensively with schools 
around the intricacies of instructional 
delivery.
The general perception was that 
school staff, especially principals, 
had assumed a greater leadership 
role in all aspects of school opera-
tions, including instruction, and that 
local school capacity for instructional 
improvement had increased.
We identiﬁed ﬁve areas that central 
ofﬁce emphasized in interactions 
with school staff members to com-
municate district policy and give 
school staff opportunities for input. 
The guidance provided to principals 
by leadership specialists, and the role 
of middle school principals in imple-
menting the proﬁciencies were noted 
as two areas where collaboration 
among central ofﬁce and school staff 
members was reportedly strong. The 
Department of Educational Services 
was viewed as relying heavily on 
centralized committee work and one-
way information ﬂows. The impact of 
school board decisions and decen-
tralization was consistently evident in 
interaction among school and central 
ofﬁce staff members.
School staff generally perceived the 
district as focused on organizational 
reform as compared with instruc-
tional reform. Principals were appre-
ciative of the support provided by 
leadership specialists. Most school 
staff members were supportive of 
assuming greater responsibility for 
teacher hiring. In the instructional 
realm, student achievement was 
perceived as a strong emphasis. 
Teachers accepted the emphasis, but 
believed it would be more education-
ally productive to focus on student 
growth over time than upon absolute 
achievement levels. The proﬁcien-
cies were viewed as successful in 
many ways, but as having lost some 
of their potential power as account-
ability mechanisms. Education Plans 
were viewed as beneﬁcial. Teachers 
reported modest effects by district 
instructional guidance tools such as 
standards and curricular materials 
due to low speciﬁcity of such policies 
about desired actual classroom prac-
tices. Professional development sup-
port was viewed as quite limited due 
to teachers’ tendencies to compare 
current to historical district capac-
ity for professional development. 
The heavy and increasing reliance 
of teachers on principals and imple-
menters to act as intermediaries in 
interactions with central ofﬁce served 
to change teachers’ perceptions of 
the scope and depth of central ofﬁce 
support for schools.
Summary
 ilwaukee Public Schools  
 had numerous initia- 
 tives designed to affect 
instruction directly or indirectly. In 
many cases, district efforts exceeded 
or ampliﬁed the relatively sparse 
and non-speciﬁc instructional guid-
ance conveyed by the state. District 
staff provided at least a basic theory 
of change as to how initiatives 
were intended to affect schools and 
instruction. Theories of change some-
times included an understanding of, 
or expectations about, possible inter-
action among multiple initiatives.
On balance, central ofﬁce admin-
istrators were more focused on 
non-instructional than instructional 
matters. Where the focus was on 
instruction, policies and signals were 
non-speciﬁc regarding intended 
effects on classroom teaching and 
learning. Many mid-level central 
ofﬁce managers perceived that the 
district was striving to recover an 
emphasis on teaching and learning. 
However, these managers acknowl-
edged severe limits on district capac-
The general perception 
was that school staff, 
especially principals, had 
assumed a greater leader-
ship role in all aspects of 
school operations, includ-
ing instruction, and that 




Many mid-level central 
ofﬁce managers per-
ceived that the district 
was striving to recover 
an emphasis on teaching 
and learning. 
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
All school staff members provided 
signiﬁcant leadership in each of four 
key areas: operational, instructional, 
professional, and moral leadership 
roles, though the relative emphasis 
on a given area of leadership varied 
this would require deepening school 
capacity for leadership and action in 
all aspects of school operations and 
instruction.
State programs provided both addi-
tional resources as well as loss of 
resources through the state-imple-
mented Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program. This and other choice 
options put pressure on district lead-
ers and elevated the importance of 
the district’s Neighborhood School 
Plan. Standardized test scores played 
an increasingly important role in an 
environment of school choice and 
federal No Child Left Behind require-
ments.
Standardized test scores 
played an increasingly 
important role in an envi-
ronment of school choice 
and federal No Child Left 
Behind requirements.
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according to the staff member’s role 
as teacher, implementer, or principal. 
We observed a connection between 
school size and the proportion of 
teachers involved in leadership roles, 
with teachers in smaller schools 
having more involvement. Of the 
four areas of leadership, school staff  
more consistently expressed concern 
regarding equality of educational 
opportunity than central ofﬁce staff 
members. Exceptions existed in both 
directions among school and district 
at the school and district levels. A 
general pattern noted among school 
staff members was the perception 
that schools needed to become 
increasingly self-sufﬁcient and that 
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■ Guidance provided to principals 
by leadership specialists and the 
role of middle school principals 
in implementing the proﬁciencies 
were two areas where collabora-
tion among central ofﬁce and 
school staff was reportedly strong.
■ Educational Services were viewed 
as relying heavily on centralized 
committee work and one-way 
information ﬂows.
■ The impact of school board deci-
sions and decentralization was 
consistently evident in interaction 
among school and central ofﬁce 
administrators.
School staff members’ perceptions 
of district instructional priorities and 
strategies for reform:
■ The district focused on organiza-
tional reform rather than instruc-
tional reform.
■ Principals were appreciative of 
the support provided by leader-
ship specialists.
■ School staff were supportive of 
assuming greater responsibility for 
teacher hiring.
■ Teachers believed it was more 
educationally productive to focus 
on student growth than on abso-
lute achievement levels.
■ The proﬁciencies were viewed as 
successful but as having lost some 
of their potential as accountability 
mechanisms.
■ The Education Plans were viewed 
as beneﬁcial.
■ Professional development was 
viewed as quite limited.
■ The heavy reliance of teachers on 
principals and implementers to 
act as intermediaries in interac-
tions with central ofﬁce served 
to change teachers’ perceptions 
of the scope and depth of central 
ofﬁce support for schools.
 
School Leadership roles adopted to 
implement district policies:
■ School staff members provided 
signiﬁcant leadership in four 
areas: operational, instructional, 
imperative, and moral, with the 
relative emphasis on a given area 
varying according to the staff 
member’s role as teacher, imple-
menter, or principal.
■ School size and the proportion of 
teachers involved in leadership 
roles were related.
■ School staff members expressed 
more concern regarding equality 
of educational opportunity than 
central ofﬁce staff.
■ School staff members perceived 
that schools needed to become 
increasingly self-sufﬁcient and 
that this would require deepen-
ing school capacity for leadership 






 ajor district initiatives  
 that inﬂuenced instruc- 
 tion both directly and  
indirectly:
■ District initiatives exceeded or 
ampliﬁed the non-speciﬁc instruc-
tional guidance conveyed by the 
state.
■ Central ofﬁce staff members were 
more focused on non-instruc-
tional than instructional matters.
■ Where the focus was on instruc-
tion, policies and signals were 
non-speciﬁc regarding intended 
effects on classroom teaching and 
learning.
■ School staff, especially principals, 
assumed a greater leadership role 
in all aspects of school operations, 
including instruction.
■ School capacity for instructional 
improvement increased.
How district administrators com-
municated instructional reform to 
schools:
■ Five areas of action and com-
munication were prominent in 
central ofﬁce efforts to commu-
nicate with school staff regarding 
instructional reform:
 (1) ad hoc committees
 (2) standing committees with 
regular meetings
 (3) standing technical assistance 
structures (including leadership 
specialists)
 (4) professional development  
(5) devolution of resources and 
decision-making authority to 
schools
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A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
T
Introduction 
 he goal of this study was to    
 understand the ways in   
 which central ofﬁce and 
school staff interacted around district 
and school-level policies to improve 
student performance. Seattle Public 
Schools (SPS) provided an interesting 
case example in which to investigate 
the complex relationship between 
central policies for standards-based 
reform and improving instruction at 
the school and classroom levels.
Standards and accountability seem to 
imply centralized control, an uncom-
fortable notion in a decentralized 
district like Seattle where site-based 
control was expected. Some of that 
discomfort was tempered because 
the district, during the time of this 
study (school years 2001 and 2002), 
providing the overarching guide for 
schools to raise student achievement. 
While the standards identiﬁed the 
targets, the district’s Transformational 
Academic Achievement Planning 
process was designed as the vehicle 
for helping schools develop their 
own strategy for reaching the goals 
of: 1) helping all students meet 
standards, and 2) eliminating the 
achievement gap between white stu-
dents and students of color.
Toward that end, some of the dis-
trict’s multifaceted efforts involved 
initiatives that directly targeted 
improving instruction, while others 
were designed to build organiza-
tional capacity. According to central 
ofﬁce leaders, initiatives that focused 
on school structures and capacity 
were intended to support instruc-
tional improvements but their focus 
and effects appeared to be more 
indirect. At the same time, schools 
were shaping their own plans for 
improving teaching and learning. The 
extent to which the district initiatives 
supported or reinforced school-level 
reforms affected the quality of the 
relationship between the central 
ofﬁce and schools. The goal was to 
understand how that relationship 
shaped district and school interac-
tions in the efforts to improve student 
learning.
was in the enviable position of hav-
ing over $35 million in external funds 
to support reform efforts. To some 
extent, these external funders even 
shaped the direction of the district’s 
reform by exposing district leaders to 
reform ideas and a vision of effective 
schools. Regardless of the direction, 
they certainly provided the impetus 
for the pace and scope of the reform 
by supplying resources to fund it. 
While the design and approach of the 
reform efforts were controlled by the 
district, expertise provided by exter-
nal agents helped individual schools 
make sense of what were often per-
ceived by school staff to be vague 
and sometimes conﬂicting policy 
mandates for the reform agenda. 
According to central ofﬁce staff, stan-
dards deﬁned what students should 
know and be able to do, thereby 
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The Seattle Public Schools
By Dr. Judy Swanson
Case Study
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T
Recent History of 
the District’s Role 
in Instructional 
Reform 
 o understand the reform  
agenda during our ﬁeld
research, a brief introduction 
to the context is needed. The history 
of reform efforts in the district is an 
important aspect of the context that 
shapes educators’ attitudes toward 
new district initiatives. At the same 
time, the district must operate under 
increasing accountability pressures 
from local, state, and federal require-
ments. (For a complete time line, 
see Seattle Appendix C in this case 
study.)
State and District Context  
In 1993, the passage of the Education 
Reform Act in the state of Washington 
marked the beginning of a standards-
based system with the development 
of the Essential Academic Learning 
Requirements (EALRs). Since then, 
Washington’s slow and deliber-
ate process in designing a rigorous 
assessment system attempted to stim-
ulate good teaching practices.
In 1997, a state performance assess-
ment based on the EALRs at grades 4, 
7, and 10 was instituted. The test, the 
Washington Assessment of Student 
Learning (WASL), was a standards-
based performance test that provided 
the benchmark for districts, and 
initially focused on math, reading, 
writing, and listening. To give districts 
time to align their curriculum with 
these requirements, no high-stakes 
consequences were to be instituted 
until 2008. At the same time that 
districts were expected to align their 
curriculum and assessments with 
the learning requirements, the state 
also required a standardized norm-
referenced test, the ITBS (Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills) in the non-WASL grades 
(3, 5, 6, 8, and 9). This test implied a 
different vision of teaching, one that 
concentrated on discrete, basic skills.
Within this inconsistent state policy 
environment, Seattle Public Schools 
(SPS) developed its own reform 
agenda to increase student achieve-
ment. Seattle, the largest and most 
diverse school district in the state 
of Washington, struggled to address 
signiﬁcant achievement disparities 
among different racial groups. Many 
of Seattle’s major reforms had not 
been directly targeted to instruction, 
although it was hoped that changes 
in structures and policies would 
ultimately produce higher student 
achievement by creating school envi-
ronments where educators had the 
freedom and resources required to 
address student needs. 
Recent Reforms 
Three of the most signiﬁcant reforms 
were a mix of authoritative and  
collaborative-centered efforts:  
1) numerous attempts in the last 30 
years to increase racial integration;  
2) reorganization of the district to 




Within this inconsistent 
state policy environment, 
Seattle Public Schools 
(SPS) developed its own 
reform agenda to increase 
student achievement.
Increase Racial Integration. 
Consistent with the reasoning behind 
the Brown decision (Brown vs. 
Topeka Board of Education, 1954) 
that separate is inherently unequal, 
Seattle Public Schools has histori-
cally taken voluntary steps to reduce 
the isolation of minority students. 
Compared to other large urban dis-
tricts, Seattle generally has lower 
poverty levels, with only 40 percent 
of students qualifying for free or 
reduced lunch. However, substan-
tial residential segregation exists, 
resulting in a clear division between 
north-end and south-end schools. 
This division runs along racial, 
socio-economic, and achievement 
lines and schools’ reputations are 
shaped by these divisions. Schools 
in the south-end have predominantly 
students of color, low achievement, 
and very high poverty rates. In 1978, 
the district began busing, based on 
the “Seattle Plan” for desegrega-
tion. A number of court challenges 
ensued and the policy was eventually 
replaced with alternative strategies to 
encourage integration.
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
Seattle’s experiment with busing in 
the 1970s through the mid-1990s 
resulted in signiﬁcant white ﬂight.8 
While whites make up over 70 per-
cent of the city’s population (2000 
Census), 60 percent of the students 
in SPS are students of color. Two 
different task forces, representing 
a broad spectrum of community 
groups, called for closer monitoring 
of student achievement of different 
racial groups and teacher training 
in cultural diversity. The district and 
Seattle Education Association (SEA) 
held many conversations to help 
staff rethink their practice in ways 
that were culturally sensitive. The 
decision to end busing and institute 
a choice plan was an acknowledge-
ment that segregation and achieve-
ment disparities had not changed. 
The new approach was to encourage 
integration by enticing whites to 
return to the district. At ﬁrst, the dis-
trict placed special programs, such 
as magnets, Spectrum (for mildly/
moderately gifted students) and APP 
(Accelerated Progress Program, for 
highly gifted students) in predomi-
nantly minority (south-end) schools 
to attract white students. 
At the time of the research, SPS 
prided itself on being a “choice” 
district, meaning that parents could 
choose the school they wanted their 
children to attend. This plan was 
implemented as an alternative to 
busing and to create neighborhood 
schools. Seattle’s choice plan was 
based on a detailed process where 
race was used as a tie-breaker, giv-
ing priority to under-represented 
racial groups in a school. Since the 
implementation of the choice policy, 
racial segregation in the district has 
increased. According to the Civil 
Rights Project at Harvard, in 2002, 
SPS experienced the ninth largest 
decline since 1986 in whites’ expo-
sure to blacks in urban districts and 
the ﬁfth lowest exposure to Latinos—
both strong indicators of increased 
segregation. In addition, court chal-
lenges questioning the constitutional-
ity of the use of race as a tie-breaker 
may make it more difﬁcult for the 
district to address racial integration  
in the future. 
District Reorganization to Support 
Site-based Management.  Another 
reform developed in response to 
community concerns was to reor-
ganize the district by signiﬁcantly 
reducing the central ofﬁce staff. A 
commonly held view was that the 
Peter Principle was entrenched in 
the district.9 One veteran teacher 
explained the perception:
All a person had to do was bomb 
in a school and they got a job 
downtown. And it was played out 
time and again, and there was a 
great deal of resentment because 
of that…and a lot of people felt 
that people had these little ﬁef-
doms downtown where they hung 
on to dollars and the program; 
the dollars were not following the 
programs. 
During the late 1980s, what became 
known as the Cresip report docu-
mented that huge overhead costs 
were incurred by the district because 
of the size of the central ofﬁce staff.10 
Although the reorganization was 
not directly instructional, the teach-
ers’ union, the Seattle Education 
Association, took a leadership role 
in pushing the district to put more 
dollars into instructional programs in 
the schools, such as more Title I ser-
vices and instructional aides, rather 
than into administration. The district 
reorganization severely cut central 
ofﬁce staff in curriculum, instruc-
tion, and professional development.11 
By making schools responsible for 
these areas, in theory, decisions 
could be made by those who knew 
the children and their needs best. It 
also assumed that each school had 
the capacity to make informed deci-
sions and the expertise to design and 
implement instructional programs 
tailored to its student population. 
However, with limited professional 
development and support for cur-
riculum and instruction at the district 
level, there was little improvement in 
student achievement.
School-based Budgeting.  To 
increase equity, to make the budget 
process more transparent, and to 
allow schools to design instructional 
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“All a person had to do 
was bomb in a school 
and they got a job 
downtown. And it was 
played out time and 
again, and there was a 
great deal of resentment 
because of that…”
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programs to best meet the needs of 
their students, the district moved to 
school-based budgeting. They uti-
lized a weighted student formula: 
high-needs students—Title I, Special 
Education, ESL (English as a Second 
Language)—required more services 
and thus cost more. In this new bud-
geting scheme, the dollars followed 
the student, so schools with a higher 
proportion of high-needs students 
received larger per-pupil allocations. 
While it was the district’s intent that 
increased funds would help close the 
achievement gap, the relationship to 
improve achievement was not direct.
Occasional Experiments with 
Instruction.  During the last 20 
years, the district invested in a num-
ber of instructional programs such 
as Prescriptive Reading Instruction 
(PRI )—a computer-based read-
ing program, Proﬁciency in English 
Program (PEP), and Acceleration 
2000, a computer-aided instruc-
tional program. These pilot programs 
were implemented in only a small 
number of elementary schools, with 
minimal support from resource staff, 
and were short-lived once temporary 
grant funding ran out. District profes-
sional development to support these 
initiatives was also limited. As one 
veteran teacher described, “For years, 
decades, it was ‘Do this’ and then 
they left you on your own to sink or 
swim.” Some of the district programs 
elicited an even more hostile reac-
tion:
Basically we boycotted [the dis-
trict program] and said we’re not 
going to do that. It didn’t make 
sense; it was a waste of time and 
money…And so that situation was 
one where we were done to rather 
than done with, and it didn’t ﬂy. 
Overcoming History  
 
The recent effort to become a stan-
dards-based district was one of the 
ﬁrst sustained instructional reform 
efforts with direct attention to teach-
ing and learning. However, the con-
versations district leaders had about 
standards were rarely connected 
to changes in instruction. Rather, 
standards were generally discussed 
in terms of students “meeting stan-
dards,” as deﬁned by test scores. 
While the focus on standards pro-
vided a unifying theme, the district’s 
history of ﬁts and starts left principals 
and teachers skeptical of the district’s 
commitment and capacity to bring 
about real change. One central ofﬁce 
administrator with a long history in 
the district explained the challenge:
Standards [are a turning point for 
the district.] And the real truth 
of the matter is, that we are not 
anywhere near bringing students 
up to standards. That we have 
not managed to do much with 
achievement gaps—little bits and 
pieces, but overall not. And we 
can’t keep doing that. We need to 
pay serious attention to it. I think 
this is different, and I hope it’s 
different, in that we will stay the 
course. We absolutely must stay 
the course. Because the general 
impression is sort of, some of 
that 60 percent in the middle and 
deﬁnitely the 20 percent naysay-
ers think that this too shall pass—
because it always has.
Similarly, teachers had trouble trust-
ing that things would be different this 
time: 
You have to ﬁght constantly not 
to be dumped on. I see it as an 
adversarial thing in many ways, 
not as a support thing. I feel like 
they also do the Lucy and the 
football thing from Charlie Brown. 
That reminds me of the district 
where they say, ‘Oh yeah, this 
time we really mean it, this time 
we're really going to do this.’ And 
then, everyone gets charged up 
and I think not so much for me 
but for a lot of the teachers who 
are veteran teachers, that's one 
of the main problems is getting 
beyond that thing of ‘Oh, this time 
we really mean it.’ And people 
don't believe that. So getting peo-
ple going on stuff is really difﬁcult 
sometimes because of that kind of 
a relationship that we've had with 
the district. 
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While the focus on stan-
dards provided a unifying 
theme, the district’s his-
tory of ﬁts and starts left 
principals and teachers 
skeptical of the district’s 
commitment and capac-
ity to bring about real 
change.
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A
Some of those responsible for profes-
sional development in the content 
areas saw a need to provide more 
sustained attention to teaching 
and learning. One way to focus on 
instruction was to move beyond the 
“one-shot workshop” model:
I’m really pushing for us not just 
offering classes. I think we only 
reach a very limited number of 
our staff and I don’t think there’s 
enough follow-through. So I’m 
really pushing this year that what-
ever writing instruction classes we 
offer, that we offer them in build-
ings to a whole staff and do fol-
low-up within the building. 
In addition to the years of mistrust 
between the central ofﬁce and 
schools, high turnover at the cen-
tral ofﬁce level made it difﬁcult to 
build working relationships and 
consistent approaches. One central 
ofﬁce administrator noted, “I think 
we’ve re-organized every year I’ve 
been down here…. My job title has 
changed four times, ﬁve times in 
seven years.” She went on to explain 
that there was a lack of histori-
cal memory of what has happened 
before and how difﬁcult it was to 
adjust to a constantly changing 
vision: 
We’ve had a tremendous turnover 
in top leadership. We’ve had three 
superintendents, four chief aca-
demic ofﬁcers, and a while when 
no one was there. So it’s been 
challenging. And they come in 
and they want to have their proj-
ect, so it’s been very challenging. 
Each time somebody new comes 
in, we have to re-educate them on 
what this is about. 
 
Turnover in leadership made it dif-
ﬁcult to maintain a consistent focus; 
new people brought in their own 
programs with little attempt to con-
nect with and build upon earlier 
reform efforts. With this history of 
mistrust and inconsistent leadership 
and direction, Seattle Public Schools 
had to change not only instructional 
practices and learning outcomes, but 
also the attitudes of skeptical educa-
tors who were asked to carry out the 
reforms. While teachers and adminis-
trators supported the new direction of 
helping all students meet standards, 
they wondered whether the district 
focus and support would last long 
enough to achieve visible results. 
The one recent district strategy that 
gave schools optimism that they 
could actually determine what the 
reform looked like in their own 
building was the Transformational 
Academic Achievement Planning 
process. This was the major district 
strategy for helping students meet 
standards, which we discuss in detail 




 fter years of mistrust between  
   the district and schools,   
     new district policies were 
beginning to change the relationship 
between the central ofﬁce and school 
sites. Since the late 1990s, the district 
had responded to increased state 
and local accountability pressures to 
raise student achievement by trying 
to use central ofﬁce policies to affect 
improvements in instruction using 
three major initiatives:
1) First, was the drive to become 
a standards-based district—an 
effort that could potentially have 
a direct focus on instruction, but 
lacked depth and speciﬁcity. 
2) The second major policy strat-
egy was the Transformational 
Academic Achievement Planning 
Process, which indirectly focused 
on instruction by specifying the 
goals to be met, and requir-
ing schools to develop plans to 
achieve them. 
3) The third policy effort, with the 
most direct focus on instruction, 
was through professional develop-
ment. 
Standards-based Reform
During the time of this study, SPS was 
engaged in an intense reform effort 
that worked on many different fronts 
simultaneously. The district’s mission 
statement clearly stated the objective: 
“Academic achievement for every 
student in every school.” The strategy 
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With this history of mis-
trust and inconsistent 
leadership and direction, 
Seattle Public Schools had 
to change not only instruc-
tional practices and learn-
ing outcomes, but also the 
attitudes of skeptical edu-
cators who were asked to 
carry out the reforms. 
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for achieving that goal was described 
by the superintendent, borrowing 
from health care reform, as a “tight-
loose model.” The model is abso-
lutely clear on the outcomes—every 
student meeting standards—but the 
district is loose on “how to get there.” 
In this very site-based district, schools 
had almost complete freedom to 
design the curriculum and instruc-
tional program to meet the needs of 
their student population. According 
to the superintendent, the standards 
were the target:
I think the standards drive  
everything…. I would talk about 
academic standards, our account-
ability system, our value-added 
model, our professional develop-
ment approaches, our technol-
ogy system. Those pieces that are 
embedded within the major  
institutional infrastructure we’re 
trying to put in place to support 
this very outcome-oriented,  
performance-driven, tight piece.
Within this brief description, the 
superintendent identiﬁed many ini-
tiatives— accountability, standards, 
value-added data analyses, technol-
ogy—all of which initially required 
new learning on the part of teachers 
and administrators to understand the 
ideas and then to learn to integrate 
and implement them within their 
schools and classrooms. Professional 
development is listed as one of many 
components, rather than a consistent 
process needed to ensure that each 
initiative could be fully realized. 
Standards-based education is a com-
plex reform effort requiring a new 
vision of teaching and learning, in-
depth content knowledge, and an 
understanding of the relationship 
between curriculum, instruction, 
and assessment. However, a lack of 
understanding of this complexity of 
standards-based reform was reﬂected 
in the policies and practices across 
the district. When the superintendent 
established the goal of becoming a 
standards-based district by September 
1, 2001, no criteria were identiﬁed to 
determine what it meant to be “stan-
dards-based.” (Once the deadline 
had passed, the language changed 
to Seattle has “deﬁned” itself as a 
standards-based district.) As a result, 
the implications for transforming 
teaching and learning were rarely 
discussed.  
As the ﬁrst step in developing the 
standards, district leaders recruited 
teachers to help identify the con-
tent standards that deﬁned what to 
teach. Their charge was to ensure 
that district standards were consistent 
with the state standards in order to 
prepare students to perform on the 
Washington Assessment of Student 
Learning (WASL). At the time of our 
data collection, the establishment 
of content standards was uneven: at 
the elementary level, standards were 
identiﬁed in all content areas except 
social studies; at the middle level, 
there were no standards in science 
or social studies; at the high school 
level, they were in place only in writ-
ing and math. 
Corresponding performance tasks, 
or classroom-based assessments 
(CBAs), based on the standards, were 
developed in writing and math at the 
elementary and middle levels. These 
instruments were designed to help 
teachers monitor student progress 
toward the standards throughout the 
year. Although the district strongly 
recommended that teachers use 
the CBAs for that purpose, this was 
not required because of site-based 
autonomy. We found more consistent 
use of these performance tasks at 
the elementary level, but limited use 
at both the middle and high school 
level. Even so, Seattle Public Schools 
set 2004 as the target date by which 
80 percent of all students would be 
meeting standards. In all district com-
munications, “meeting standards” 
was deﬁned by test scores. On the 
WASL, the standard for passing was 
deﬁned by the state. The “standard” 
identiﬁed by the district on the norm-
referenced Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
(ITBS) test was the 61st percentile. In 
terms of the “tight-loose” model, the 
district established the targets, over-
saw the development of some tools 
(the standards and the CBAs), but left 
it up to the schools to ﬁgure out how 
to use them.
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In this very site-based dis-
trict, schools had almost 
complete freedom to 
design the curriculum and 
instructional program to 
meet the needs of their 
student population.
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
The district consistently communi-
cated that standards provided the 
target, yet the ability to articulate 
what standards involved varied even 
among the central ofﬁce staff over-
seeing their implementation. After 
enumerating the district’s priorities as 
academic achievement, eliminating 
the achievement gap, safe and clean 
schools, and each school functioning 
from a viable academic achievement 
plan, one central ofﬁce administrator 
added to the end of the list, “and the 
other systems—you know—we have 
our standards-based learning sys-
tem…it guides what we do here…just 
having the standards in place.”
Others at the district ofﬁce clearly 
articulated the connection between 
standards, instructional approaches, 
and assessments, as the following 
quote demonstrates:
Overarching the whole thing is 
getting every kid to standards, 
every kid in every classroom. 
The actual initiatives are getting 
teachers to teach the standards 
and having assessments to match 
those.  
A few central ofﬁce staff seemed to 
understand that standards required 
more than just having speciﬁc con-
tent goals. One even avoided using 
the phrase, “standards-based district,” 
because, she explained:
I’m trying not to use jargon. 
That’s said so much that people 
don’t understand what it means. 
Standards-based, but not uni-
form…. I think this is confusing to 
many people because they hear 
about standards and they think 
everyone is going to look and act 
the same way, and it’s entirely 
not the case. The case is, and the 
big, big, big function right now 
is to look at the kids who are 
left behind. And to ﬁnd out why 
and how to serve them better. 
Because we recognize that we’re 
not there…. We have a very large 
group that’s way below, and in the 
past that group that’s way below 
basically stayed there. And it starts 
in kindergarten and it basically 
gets wider. [Standards make that] 
no longer acceptable. 
 
Although teacher leaders helped 
develop the district standards, we 
found a wide range of understanding 
about what it meant to teach to the 
standards. A district specialist, who 
spent a substantial amount of time in 
the schools, acknowledged:
Just because the documents exist 
doesn’t necessarily mean that 
that’s where we are. And I think 
that’s a critical issue here. There 
hasn’t been a turning point yet…. 
Any amount of posters or publi-
cations doesn’t make the system 
change. 
Another administrator concurred:
We rolled out our standards-based 
learning system last year. Teachers 
began working with standards 
in reading, writing, math, and 
communications. We have class-
room-based assessments. And 
so teachers were really focused 
on managing the stuff, and what 
it is…but they weren’t focused 
on how to do it, and what are 
the best ways to do it. That ques-
tion, that piece had not been put 
together. 
 
These comments underscore a recur-
ring theme. The district succeeded in 
communicating that standards were 
the goal, but teachers in the schools 
remained confused about translating 
these ideas into practice. The district 
policy assumed that teachers would 
know how to do this, while teachers 
looked to the district for direction. 
At the school level, ﬁnding teach-
ers who understood the implications 
of standards for their teaching was 
difﬁcult. Some did not like the idea 
of standards, saying that “teachers 
have always had standards.” Some 
were not familiar with the standards 
for their content area, but most felt 
the standards were relatively easy to 
address, like this teacher:
People complain about the stan-
dards. I like the standards; I think 
they are ﬁne. When you look at 
them, they’re not hard to ﬁt into 
anything. I mean they’re perfectly 
reasonable as far as I’m con-
cerned…. I don’t see what the big 
deal is (emphasis added). 
The standards were so general that 
it was easy to construe their mean-
ing to ﬁt a range of interpretations. 
With only limited explanation to 
help teachers recognize how the 
new expectations might affect their 
work, few teachers were challenged 
to rethink their practice. Although 
standards were mentioned frequently 
in terms of what to teach, there was 
little discussion about standards in 
relation to how to teach to them. 
One teacher shared her observations 
of the introduction of standards in the 
district: 
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2It was so funny, because for a cou-ple of years the rallying cry was, 
‘The standards are coming! The 
standards are coming!’ And there 
really was not good PR in terms of 
what a standard was, or what that 
meant. Then all of the sudden it 
was, ‘The standards are here. Get 
your act together or get out,’ was 
basically it. That’s basically what 
the district said to principals and 
that your school could become a 
focus of concern. To a principal, 
that meant, ‘Well, I am not tak-
ing the rap for my staff.’ So then 
the teachers get the news that if 
we become a focus of concern, 
you’re—you know. And that’s 
basically what it was like, and the 
ﬁrst year or two nobody really had 
a sense of—it was not clear I think 
to a whole lot of people. What is 
a standard? What’s it for? What 
does it really mean? To them it 
was simply, ‘I’ve got to do it or 
I’m out of here,’ instead of, ‘Okay, 
now this is why this is a standard 
and this is what a standard is.’ You 
know? That was not communi-
cated well at all. 
 
After the standards had been in place 
for a few years, there was general 
acceptance of them, but not neces-
sarily any changes in practices at the 
school level. There were, however, 
a number of changes at the district 
level. A standards-based report card 
was implemented in 2002 at the ele-
mentary level after two years of ﬁeld-
testing. At the same time, the district 
developed a standards-based evalu-
ation system for principals, based 
on eight standards, one of which 
was academic achievement. This 
standard carried as much weight as 
the other seven combined, account-
ing for 50 percent of the total score. 
In 2002, a group of teachers and 
central ofﬁce staff, in collaboration 
with the union, drafted Professional 
Practice Standards (PPS) for teach-
ers. Designed as a reﬂective tool for 
teachers to use to improve their prac-
tice, this instrument was not intended 
to be used for evaluation. Finally, 
the district’s strategy for addressing 
the goal of standards was for each 
school to create a transformation 
plan. These plans spelled out each 
school’s strategies for reaching district 
goals. However, as of 2003, none of 
these steps produced results in terms 
of outcomes or “meeting standards.” 
Based on 2002 achievement levels, 
which fell far below the standards, 
the district goals for students were 
extremely ambitious. (See Seattle 
Appendix A for 2002 achievement 
data for the district.)
The Transformational Aca-
demic Achievement Planning 
Process
To guide the standards-based 
reform, the district designed a 
Transformational Academic 
Achievement Planning process to 
create “reinvented” schools that 
would help all students meet stan-
dards and eliminate the achievement 
gap between white students and stu-
dents of color. School transformation 
was seen as the vehicle for achieving 
the district’s goals. According to the 
superintendent:
The transformation effort, in many 
ways, is sort of mandating that 
they look with a very critical eye 
at the school structure that they've 
inherited, and say, ‘You inherited 
a structure that served some kids. 
How are you going to change it 
to a structure that serves every 
child?’ 
Guidelines for developing the 
Transformational Academic 
Achievement Plans required schools 
to analyze all available data about 
their schools. This eight-step process 
is outlined in Figure 1 on page 74. 
The plan followed a similar format 
used in previous years. Nonetheless, 
this time, both central ofﬁce and 
school staff believed that there may 
be a chance to implement the plans 
because they had a ﬁve-year timeline 
and resources to support it.
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The district consistently 
communicated that 
standards provided the 
target, yet the ability to 
articulate what standards 
involved varied even 
among the central ofﬁce 
staff overseeing their 
implementation.
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
Much of this work was propelled 
by a $26 million grant from the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
According to many school leaders, 
what made this plan different was the 
money from Gates to actually do it. 
One school leader stated:
I guess the biggest concern I have, 
people have, is that we’re going 
to do the Transformation, and all 
of a sudden next year we have to 
write another one, and next year 
another one. Every year you write 
a new one and you never get one 
done. That’s what’s happened to 
me ever since I got in this district. 
I’ve written more of those things 
and I’ve never even seen one 
ﬁnished. This actually has some 
teeth in it in because we have 
Gates money supporting it.
Although the foundation encour-
aged the district to develop its own 
approach, the Gates Foundation 
provided exposure to reform ideas, 
such as the seven attributes of high 
achievement schools (See Figure 2 
on page 75). In response, the district 
developed a self-evaluation tool for 
schools to assess their current status 
on each of the attributes. Schools 
were then expected to address their 
weakest areas. In addition, in their 
transformation plans, schools had 
to develop speciﬁc strategies for 
addressing the district’s top two 
goals: raising academic achievement 
so that all students meet standards, 
and eliminating the achievement gap. 
Schools also had to identify profes-
sional development needed to help 
staff acquire the knowledge and skills 
to carry out the strategies. 
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  Figure 1: Guide for Academic Achievement Plans for
Accelerated Learning
1) Develop a school transformation vision. (Describe the kind of school 
you want to have in the future.)
2) Develop a whole school transformation analysis.
 ■ Utilize questions, rubrics, and facilitators.
 ■ Analyze your school status on the attributes of quality, high  
 achievement schools.
 ■ Describe the barriers that might impede your progress.
3) Analyze achievement data. (Effective plans are based on an array of 
data, both school and classroom.)
 ■ Use “School Effectiveness Proﬁle Data” (provided by district).
 ■ Consider “Recommendation for Developing the Summary of Data”   
 (provided by district).
 ■ Provide a School Summary of Data.
4) Review the six district priorities. Plans should support the district  
priorities (goals).
5) Set 3-5 Accelerated Improvement Goals that are speciﬁc, signiﬁcant, 
measurable, achievable, and include a clear target date. Three goals 
were required:
 ■ One goal related to accelerated academic achievement
 ■ One goal related to eliminating the achievement gap
 ■ One goal related to the implementation of attributes of quality  
 high achievement schools
6) Select strategies to achieve each goal.
 ■ State the supporting data and rationale/research that support  
 selection of each strategy.
7) Decide on action steps to implement strategies. Each action step needs:
 ■ A timeline 
 ■ Person(s) responsible
 ■ Evidence of periodic monitoring of progress
 ■ Professional Development Needs
 ■ Costs and funding resources
8) Identify system-wide changes needed to support your plan.
Source: SPS
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The ﬁve-year timeline and annual 
reviews forced schools to remain 
focused on the goal of 80 percent 
of all students meeting standards 
by 2004. Toward that end, Seattle 
Public Schools created a process 
and a set of tools to help the schools 
develop comprehensive plans for 
raising student achievement. These 
tools included rubrics to assess their 
school’s standing on each attribute, 
data analysis workshops, templates 
for the plan format, and “Look-Fors” 
in the review process. Although the 
district policies for the transforma-
tion planning process did not directly 
address instruction in any speciﬁc 
way, they were clearly intended to 
push schools to focus on improving 
teaching and learning. 
The review process was established 
to ensure that school budgets and 
professional development plans 
were aligned with their stated goals 
and strategies. The review teams, 
led by the director responsible for 
that school, included representa-
tives from key departments such as 
special education, bilingual/ESL, 
Title I, and curriculum specialists. In 
this way, each district representative 
could monitor that the needs of their 
constituent group were addressed in 
the school’s plan. This “authoritative-
centered” approach was for the most 
part characterized by one-way com-
munication from the central ofﬁce to 
schools.
Schools were expected to iden-
tify areas of need, an instructional 
focus—usually math or literacy, and 
to commit to professional develop-
ment to strengthen instruction in that 
targeted area. One of the “Look-Fors” 
in the review process was to look for 
an alignment between the profes-
sional development plans and the 
academic achievement goals. This 
demonstrated district recognition of 
the need for specialized professional 
development to support the trans-
formation process, but the schools 
were responsible for identifying or 
designing their own program. And 
for the ﬁrst time, the schools had the 
resources to pay for that professional 
development from the Gates grant. In 
some cases, the schools were able to 
take advantage of district professional 
development offerings, such as the 
Literacy Initiative, to advance their 
site-based plans. 
Professional Development:  
A Major District Tool for 
Implementing Reform
One of the major ways in which the 
district provided support for instruc-
tional improvement was through pro-
fessional development. The district 
arranged professional development 
in several formats for different con-
stituent groups. A new professional 
development director was hired 
during the course of the study and a 
district approach or strategic plan for 
professional development had not yet 
been developed. However, a number 
of individual initiatives were already 
in place. Some of these initiatives 
focused directly on instruction in 
content areas, while others had only 
an indirect inﬂuence. 
Schools were expected 
to identify areas of 
need, an instructional 
focus—usually math or 
literacy, and to commit 
to professional devel-
opment to strengthen 
instruction in that  
targeted area. 
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■ Respect and Responsibility
■ Time to Collaborate
■ Performance Based
■ Technology as a Tool
Source: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
A Delicate Balance: District Policies and Classroom Practice
Table 1 lists the most prominent 
professional development efforts in 
the district, their instructional focus, 
the provider, funding source, and 
target audience. Brief descriptions of 
each initiative are included in Seattle 
Appendix B. As the table indicates, 
most of the initiatives were designed 
and taught by external providers with 
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grant funds. The elementary science 
program, begun in 1997, provided a 
new model of in-depth professional 
development that included inten-
sive study of content, modeling and 
opportunities to experience as well 
as practice inquiry-based science. 
There was also ongoing support for 
teachers as they tried to implement 
what they had learned back in their 
classrooms. During the period of this 
study, the Literacy Initiative was the 
top district priority. It was also the 
ﬁrst K-12 initiative targeted to teach-
ers in all content areas. Although not 
as in-depth as the science initiative, 
this represented a new level of com-
mitment to instruction and profes-
sional development in the district.
Table 1. Major Professional Development Initiatives
Initiative Instructional Focus Provider Funding Source Target Audience Duration
Literacy  Reading and National  Grant from All K-12 teachers 72 hours 
Initiative writing strategies Urban the Alliance
  Alliance 
Elementary  Hands-on, inquiry University of NSF grant Elementary 100 hours 
NSF Science -based science  Washington  teachers 
Mathematics Leadership for math  University of  NSF grant Elementary, middle,  Variable
 reform and constructi- Washington   and high school in
 vist math instruction   two-year cycles 
New Teacher  Teaching basics, District and the State Teacher First-year teachers One year
Academy and  management, teachers’ union Assistance  and veterans who
STAR Mentor  introduce Professional  Program seek this out or
Program Practice Standards    are referred to it
 
Teacher  Standards, literacy, District State, levy Building-based Variable 
Consultants and math  funds, district support 
Summer  Varied menu; District District Open to all, One week   
Institute most content areas,    mostly elementary of 2-3 hour 
 diversity   attend classes
Building  Not instructional; Adaptive Broad grant Building Leader- 3-4 sessions 
Leadership  decision-making Schools  ship Teams 
Team Training process
     
Principal  Usually indirectly  The Alliance: The Alliance Principals 4 days/year 
Leadership  related to instruction guest speakers 
Institute      








 he three initiatives  
 discussed previously  
 (standards-based reform, 
the Transformational Academic 
Achievement Planning process, and 
professional development) repre-
sented signiﬁcant investments and 
changes in the ways the district 
worked with schools. As the district 
negotiated new relationships with 
schools, how the new policies were 
interpreted varied, depending on 
one’s position. This analysis looks 
ﬁrst at the district’s perspective of its 
reform policies and then examines 
the same policies from the schools’ 
point of view.
From the district’s perspective, they 
set the goals and developed an 
infrastructure, including the develop-
ment of grade-level standards and 
accompanying classroom-based 
assessments. They provided schools 
with the raw materials (data) to 
make informed decisions. Further, 
district administrators provided sup-
port, often in the form of tools to 
facilitate the school’s transformation, 
but schools maintained substantial 
autonomy because they controlled 
their own budgets and professional 
development decisions. The major 
vehicle for communicating the dis-
trict’s position and policies for reform 
was through principals or district-
sponsored professional development, 
and as a result, did not necessar-
ily reach all teachers. Further, the 
emphasis on test scores as a synonym 
for standards contributed to a super-
ﬁcial understanding of standards 
reform. This did, however, provide a 
consistent message, create a sense of 
urgency, and put considerable pres-
sure on principals and teachers.
Communication of District 
Policies
In a site-based district, tensions inevi-
tably arise over district requirements 
and which decisions schools can 
make for themselves. Whether district 
policies are viewed as pressure or 
support is often determined by the 
nature and direction of the commu-
nication. In Seattle, district policies 
may have originated from different 
units within the central ofﬁce but 
they were usually communicated to 
the schools through the principals. 
On the other hand, teachers rarely 
saw central ofﬁce personnel, other 
than occasional teacher consultants. 
Principals had the most contact with 
central ofﬁce staff, mainly because 
they attended a number of meetings. 
District policies were communicated 
at these meetings, either by distribut-
ing memos or by explaining guide-
lines and tools to facilitate the local 
school planning process. 
Examples of such policy instruments 
include the standards-based princi-
pal evaluation, the transformation 
plan guidelines, templates, and self-
assessment rubrics. Schools had little 
or no input into the design of these 
instruments. Indeed, we learned that 
some schools were strongly discour-
aged from deviating at all from the 
district’s format.
Principal/Central Ofﬁce 
Director Relations in the 
Transformation Process
The principals’ primary contact per-
son was the “director”—a district 
staff member who was also their 
evaluator. The amount of contact was 
limited. Directors had two primary 
roles: one was to coach principals 
in learning to run an efﬁcient school 
and providing instructional lead-
ership; and the other role was to 
supervise and evaluate the principals’ 
performance. One director explained 
her role as “the principal of the prin-
cipals.” Directors also conducted 
cluster administrative meetings and, 
as members of the senior manage-
ment team, the directors met weekly 
with the district’s teaching and learn-
ing division.
All of the directors indicated their 
workloads were so great that they 
couldn’t be in schools as much as 
they would like. The number of 
schools each director supervised var-
ied by level: at the elementary level, 
directors supervised approximately 
The emphasis on test 
scores as a synonym for 
standards contributed 
to a superﬁcial under-
standing of standards 
reform. 
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18 schools, and approximately 10 
at both the middle and high school 
levels. Directors were required to 
formally observe each school twice 
per-year. Only one of these visits had 
to include classroom observations; 
the other was to observe a principal 
conducting a staff meeting. When 
asked how much time they spent in 
schools, directors ranged from two-
and-a-half days to less than one day 
a week. One director admitted that 
she could not get into classrooms at 
every school because of the work-
load, and often she had to rely on 
the principal’s word for most of the 
school’s observation. She told us, “I 
have to admit I don’t know the teach-
ers in my schools.”
Only one of the ﬁve directors we 
interviewed spent a signiﬁcant 
amount of her time in schools (50 
percent), and even then, not in all 
schools. This director found she had 
to prioritize and she admittedly only 
spent a signiﬁcant amount of time in 
the neediest schools. Not only were 
the directors’ two roles sometimes in 
conﬂict, their work was further com-
plicated by the wide range of needs 
across the principal population. She 
found that some principals could 
ﬁgure it out for themselves and some 
needed step-by-step instruction. As 
a result, she lamented, “We don’t 
get very much in-depth. Sometimes 
I worry is it really superﬁcial, will 
some of them get it or will it just kind 
of go in a pile?”
This same director was the only one 
who described her interaction with 
schools to be at least in part around 
instruction. She noted that her 
most important coaching role was 
around analyzing data. Her focus 
was making sure that they didn’t 
run away from their data, but rather 
look closely at all segments of their 
population. But as far as curriculum 
and instruction were concerned, she 
acknowledged that her role was less 
pronounced. What she did provide to 
principals was a framework to help 
them assess their literacy program, 
identifying the key components:
I see myself giving them the struc-
ture or the framework or resources 
for them to evaluate but not to 
provide the instruction. So if they 
need help—say if they don’t know 
if they can go in and observe a 
reading lesson and know whether 
it is good—I would then pair 
them up with one of the reading 
specialists that works on my team 
and say go out and coach this 
principal as to what they should 
look for. 
The conﬂict between the director’s 
two roles (coaching and supervision) 
was exacerbated by time constraints. 
Teachers and administrators needed 
time to learn new practices and they 
needed assistance from someone 
more expert to provide feedback and 
suggestions as they experimented. 
Without those critical resources, one 
director indicated her greatest chal-
lenge was changing adult behavior 
quickly enough:
We need to accelerate our adult 
learning. And we’re trying to keep 
school running while we’re doing 
all of this transforming. So a par-
ent who has a 6th grader might 
say, ‘By the time you all get trans-
formed, my kid won’t be there 
any more.’ And they are right. It’s 
impossible to change fast enough. 
At the same time, we know peo-
ple have to have some time for 
making change and so it’s a real 
tension. 
All central ofﬁce staff recognized that 
the district must provide principal 
and instructional supports. However, 
not all in the central ofﬁce recog-
nized that the district lacked the 
capacity to provide the level of sup-
port needed to help teachers in every 
school and every classroom improve 
their practice. The principals’ train-
ing included only limited attention to 
focused instructional coaching. Some 
in the central ofﬁce did not recog-
nize the need for additional support, 
believing that it was already in place:
In this district, there is a real effort 
to provide the support to meet 
those standards that we’re asking 
people to attain. So they’re not 
just being hung out there. We’re 
going to ask you to do it, we’re 
going to test you on it, but we’re 
also going to support you to get 
there. 
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Not all in the central 
ofﬁce recognized that the 
district lacked the capac-
ity to provide the level of 
support needed to help 
teachers in every school 
and every classroom 
improve their practice. 
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And in return for that support and ﬂex-
ibility, this district leader felt school 
staff should be held accountable:
That really gets to the crux of the 
problem. This is a site-based dis-
trict. This is something that build-
ings and teachers have wanted; 
they want control of the dollars 
that come to their building. But 
with that comes responsibility. The 
assessments are tied to the stan-
dards. And we’ll actually be look-
ing at whether schools are teaching 
to the standards. And that responsi-
bility part, it’s really the only thing 
that’s causing change at this point. 
And it’s making people nervous. 
Principals were nervous because their 
evaluation was based almost exclu-
sively on test scores, rather than the 
total culture of the school. We learned 
that the “looking” that this district 
leader mentioned rarely involved 
actual observations of classrooms. 
One principal described the level of 
involvement from her director:
[My director has] come in a few 
times. I think the intent was to 
come in more often, watch our staff 
meetings, looking at classrooms, 
make sure everyone is doing stan-
dards-based, very professional 
practices. I don’t think it’s really 
happened, because if it were hap-
pening they wouldn’t have to 
require us to do this horrendous 
amount of work on our portfolio. 
And now we have to summarize all 
the standards two through seven. 
It’s like a principal knows a good 
classroom—you can see within 
20 minutes, are there structures in 
place, are there routines in place, 
are kids being challenged. I mean 
you would see that. But I just 
think that’s missing. I think they’re 
[central ofﬁce] out of touch…. So 
connection with downtown?—I 
think there is a disconnect. 
In this results-oriented district, the 
rationale for most reform policies 
revolved around raising student 
achievement and/or eliminating the 
achievement gap; the bottom line 
for most accountability measures 
was framed in terms of test scores. 
Whether perceived as pressure or 
support depended in part on the 
strength of the relationship between 
individual principals and directors. 
These relations were generally quite 
distant, with limited working rela-
tionships or face-to-face interaction, 
other than formal meetings where 
directors set the agenda. The most 
prominent message was that schools 
would be held accountable for rais-
ing test scores, but very few of the 
district policies were targeted directly 
at improving teaching and learning. 
The district provided each school 
with a compilation of data that added 
up to their “Effectiveness Proﬁle.” 
The “Effectiveness Proﬁle” was seven 
pages of easy-to-read bar graphs and 
charts that summarized the school’s 
test scores, staff survey, student and 
staff attendance, and discipline. The 
charts also provided comparisons 
between this year’s performance to 
previous years and to the district 
standard. Five of the seven pages 
were based on test scores. Moreover, 
in only 10 of 30 central ofﬁce inter-
views did any of the district staff dis-
cuss accountability in broader terms 
than test scores. 
Before one can expect test scores to 
improve, teachers need opportuni-
ties to acquire the knowledge and 
skills to change their instruction. Few 
in the central ofﬁce focused on that 
important step in addressing student 
achievement. For example, one 
director recounted what she thought 
about when evaluating a principal:
Has the school made satisfactory 
progress towards the district’s 
standards on the school effective-
ness proﬁle? Have they made sat-
isfactory progress on the school’s 
establishing goals in their aca-
demic achievement plan? Have 
they made progress in terms of 
value-added assessment? Have 
they reduced disproportionality? 
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The most prominent 
message was that schools 
would be held account-
able for raising test 
scores, but very few 
of the district policies 
were targeted directly at 
improving teaching and 
learning. 
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This focus on test scores contrasted 
with some central ofﬁce administra-
tors who felt there had been a shift 
in the central ofﬁce in the last three 
years from compliance monitoring 
to more of a coaching role. Whether 
schools or principals experienced 
any shift depended on individual 
relationships with speciﬁc people 
in the central ofﬁce—namely, their 
director or the skills of consultants 
who worked in their school. Some 
directors seemed to understand the 
perspectives of principals who strug-
gled to be instructional leaders while 
managing a host of other responsi-
bilities. A few in the central ofﬁce 
acknowledged that the central ofﬁce 
transformation was not complete and 
that there were growing pains as they 
tried to move to this new model:
We're steeply challenged in our 
central leadership now just with 
the newness of the team. There's 
a whole lot of team-building and 
chemistry-ﬁnding and resolution 
of personal styles and communi-
cation structures that we're  
having to make up on the ﬂy. 
 
Even though the most emphatic mes-
sage was that schools would be held 
accountable for raising test scores, 
very few of the district policies had 
a signiﬁcant impact on improving 
teaching and learning.  The notable 
exception was some of the district’s 
professional development programs, 
especially those that had a long-term, 
district-wide focus.
 
Professional Development as  
a Tool for Transformation
Professional development was one 
area where most schools felt the 
district was doing a much better job, 
both in terms of the quality of its 
major initiatives and in the additional 
support from teacher consultants. 
Secondary teachers were less satis-
ﬁed with both the content and the 
amount of district support, but the 
grant money allowed them to secure 
outside assistance. Schools cited the 
quality of the Literacy Initiative and 
the National Science Foundation 
science training as examples of 
how professional development had 
improved in recent years. Moreover, 
the district used professional devel-
opment as a major forum to com-
municate policy messages in-depth, 
directly to teachers.
Although the expectations articulated 
in the standards were compiled in a 
notebook, few teachers studied them 
unless they were highlighted as a tool 
in professional development sessions. 
For example, in the case of the writ-
ing standards, workshops on six-trait 
writing introduced teachers to the cri-
teria that would be used to grade stu-
dent performance on the Washington 
Assessment of Student Learning. The 
district’s Direct Writing Assessment 
(DWA) modeled a similar process, 
providing teachers and students with 
opportunities to practice the skills 
assessed on the state test. In schools, 
teacher consultants provided addi-
tional modeling and reinforcement 
for implementing standards-based 
instruction in writing. Through these 
sources of support, district expecta-
tions were brought to life.
The strength of the individual profes-
sional development offerings was 
sometimes quite high, but there was 
no overarching umbrella to integrate 
them. As one district leader indi-
cated, there was a lack of leadership 
and vision at the district level:
They have a lot of really good 
ideas. But they lack coordina-
tion and organization. And so 
you have a million different ideas 
with no follow-through. And you 
have many different schools doing 
many different things and there’s 
no focus. Hopefully the transfor-
mation initiative will help in that 
respect. But there’s not enough 
leadership and focus. And we take 
on too many things. But the ideas 
are good ideas and well-inten-
tioned. There’s just no follow-
through. 
This leadership confusion resulted 
from Seattle’s professional develop-
ment being either subject-speciﬁc 
and/or site-based. As a result, the 
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major initiatives were not all coor-
dinated under the director of profes-
sional development, even within the 
central ofﬁce. Major grant-funded ini-
tiatives had their own directors and 
were housed in different units. The 
Reading Curriculum Coordinator and 
the National Urban Alliance (NUA) 
coordinated the Literacy Initiative. 
The University of Washington 
coordinated the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) science initiative 
and the NSF math initiative as part of 
a ﬁve-district collaborative venture. 
The standards consultants worked 
under the director of professional 
development, as did the teacher 
development coordinator and the 
leadership development coordina-
tor. Content-area consultants, on the 
other hand, worked under their cur-
riculum areas.12 Consequently, even 
those responsible for professional 
development recognized that there 
was no overall strategic plan for pro-
fessional learning:
I think there’s a lot of interest in 
trying to form one. I don’t think 
we have a plan. The problem I see 
is that everybody’s got their own 
plan. The literacy people have 
their own plan. The math people 
have their plan. The diversity 
people have their plan. And what 
we keep saying, this is a recurring 
theme I’ve heard for six years now 
‘We need to focus.’ Ha! We’ve got 
people who say ‘We need to have 
curriculum mapping; we need to 
have standards training. We need 
to have this and we need to have 
this.…’ But until somebody says, 
‘We don’t have to do this’—we 
won’t have that focus. 
For a professional development 
administrator, this fragmentation 
remained a constant challenge:
It's an accepted frustration and 
challenge, both in terms of every 
externally-funded initiative 
comes with its own conceptions, 
strengths, and objectives (and that 
those never mesh seamlessly with 
institutional direction) and with 
the organizational byproduct of 
there being independent coor-
dinators or project managers or 
whatever else—depending upon 
those people it'll be more or less a 
ﬁefdom kind of thing. 
Because the professional develop-
ment was not coordinated, not 
all offerings reinforced the district 
content or professional practice 
standards. Since participation was 
almost always voluntary, there was 
a lack of consistency from one 
teacher’s understanding to the next, 
and because the district was trying 
to move so fast on so many fronts, 
teachers rarely had the opportunity 
to develop sufﬁcient expertise in 
any one area. One administrator 
acknowledged that the district was 
asking a great deal from teachers:
Schools have a lot of things to 
learn about. A year ago [1999] 
they were spending their learn-
ing time on how to implement 
standards. Now we want them 
to spend learning time on how 
do we implement standards and 
really get to a point of administer-
ing the CBAs [Classroom Based 
Assessments] and having common 
planning time where teachers talk 
about student work. And then on 
top of that we’re asking them to 
learn about ‘highly capable,’ what 
do you do for kids who are three 
years behind, how do you accel-
erate learning. And so it’s like 
there’s this huge list of things our 
people need to learn about and, 
with full-time jobs, there’s just so 
many hours you can give to that. 
The lack of coordination and focus 
in professional development also led 
to some confusion as to just what the 
district’s priorities were. Perspectives 
within the central ofﬁce ranged from 
a belief that there was no “single uni-
ﬁed priority” to some district admin-
istrators who understood the ultimate 
objectives and were able to make 
connections between all the district 
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initiatives to help the school lead-
ers and teachers see the connective 
thread. For example, one administra-
tor said: 
The thing about all of this is 
there’s just one thing that we’re 
doing, and that’s academic 
achievement for all students. 
That’s the one thing we’re doing. 
But everything, what we need to 
be able to articulate, is how all of 
those things, all the things we’re 
doing in the district, all those 
arrows are pointing toward aca-
demic achievement. 
In addition, the district’s capacity to 
provide sufﬁcient support for all of 
these efforts was limited:
What we’re ﬁnding is we have 
to build some infrastructure to 
be able to support the schools’ 
transformation…because we don’t 
have enough people. The idea 
would be to have a curriculum 
person in each building that could 
service their own building and 
teachers. But quite frankly, we 
don’t have that capacity that we 
can do that yet.
 
A small number of teacher consul-
tants were one of the major “tools” 
the district used to support instruc-
tional improvement in these areas. 
The number of consultants was 
quite limited and the quality of the 
consultants varied considerably. We 
observed that the “good” ones were 
valued help in schools, but not all of 
them were considered good. When 
a school had a bad experience with 
their assigned consultant, teachers 
tended to withdraw from the project 
and the school had trouble recruiting 
new teachers to participate the fol-
lowing year.  Some consultants were 
rarely called on for assistance, while 
others were spread too thin, because 
they had to serve too many schools. 
Elementary literacy specialists each 
had to support 23 schools. Thus, they 
could not provide the consistent level 
of support needed to help teachers 
change their practice. For example, a 
literacy specialist stated:
With 23 schools, it was, I would 
say, impossible to be effective. I 
was effective in some, and I feel 
really good about it. But there are 
some I just feel frustrated. 
A professional development admin-
istrator understood the limitations of 
the current system, but knew that his 
vision for a quality program would 
require many more resources:
I'm biased that professional 
development is under-resourced. 
I think that's one of our biggest 
challenges in schools is to ﬁnd the 
time—most especially the time, 
but also the money, the ﬁnancial 
resource, to really take it seri-
ously. I continue to maintain that 
until we've got roughly 20 percent 
of a teacher's professional life 
dedicated to reﬂection, strategic 
thinking, collegial collaboration, 
and ongoing learning, we're not 
there. We're just not there. We 
can't be the kind of high-perfor-
mance organization we need to 
be. That's what it's going to take, 
in my mind. So we've got a long 
ways to go, and we're not even 
close as far as resources go. 
The issues surrounding professional 
development were similar to per-
sisting challenges in central ofﬁce/
school relations. There were positive 
signs that the district was aware of 
the need to be more responsive in 
their approach to supporting schools. 
One signiﬁcant development during 
the district’s transformation process 
was the establishment of a central 
ofﬁce transformation task force. This 
group came about largely because of 
the Gates Foundation presentation of 
indicators of high-achieving districts, 
including distributed leadership, 
shared values, effective governance, 
quality staff development, and per-
formance accountability. Some initial 
discussions among senior staff about 
these attributes, coupled with a bar-
rage of complaints from principals 
around workload issues, led to the 
creation of a forum to address those 
concerns. 
Every department in the central ofﬁce 
called the school’s point person—the 
principal—with questions: every-
thing from discipline data, to bus 
schedules, to budget ﬁgures for spe-
cial education, to human resources 
requests for payroll questions. Some 
of the directors, who saw themselves 
as advocates for the principals and 
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who were in a position to see the 
demands of the job, asked that the 
ﬁrst task force issue be how the cen-
tral ofﬁce could streamline requests 
and coordinate management dead-
lines so that principals could devote 
more time to instruction. This task 
force lasted only a few months and 
their deliberations were not made 
public. Although participants in the 
central ofﬁce felt a great deal had 
been accomplished, a principal on 
the task force felt little had changed. 
Certainly principals in the schools 
indicated they experienced little 
relief from central ofﬁce demands.
Again, how district professional 
development policies were com-
municated played a critical role in 
shaping the relationships between 
the central ofﬁce and schools. 
Policy directives delivered as man-
dates might stimulate compliance 
if perceived as a threat, such as the 
principal’s evaluation. However, 
when schools were given the 
resources  to implement directives 
and some choice in shaping their 
own approach, they were usually 
willing to comply. When professional 
development gave teachers tools 
(instructional strategies) they could 
use, they were pleased. Thus, how 
central ofﬁce policies were relayed 
often inﬂuenced their enactment at 
the school level. A number of factors 
contributed to schools’ interpretation 
of the policies, including: the source 
of the message (person or ofﬁce), the 
substance of the message, the timing, 
and the opportunity for interpretation 






 rincipals indicated that   
 there was very little sub- 
 stantive conversation from 
district administrators about teaching 
and learning. In fact, most princi-
pals felt their directors did not really 
“know” the character and culture of 
their schools. They knew their data, 
but did not spend enough time in 
the schools to see what happened in 
classrooms. Consequently, schools 
interpreted many of the district poli-
cies as shallow and uninformed. The 
notable exception was the district’s 
professional development programs, 
especially those with a long-term 
district-wide focus. Schools were less 
concerned about the “top-down” 
direction of reform policies when 
they experienced quality support for 
implementing new practices; without 
support, some policies were ignored. 
When district directives were confus-
ing or viewed as an unfunded man-
date, schools complained about their 
lack of input. Overall, the predomi-
nance of the “authoritative centered” 
one-way communication limited 
the schools’ opportunity to have a 
voice in shaping district policy. As 
a result, the perspectives of those at 
the school level differed signiﬁcantly 
from those at the district ofﬁce.
The Transformation Process in 
the Context of Standards 
Beginning in November 2000, 
schools were charged with reinvent-
ing themselves. The major vehicle 
for creating a “new” school was 
the Transformational Academic 
Achievement Planning Process. Each 
school was given a planning budget 
funded by a generous grant from the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
The district provided a three-page 
guide to developing Academic 
Achievement Plans for Accelerated 
Learning. To help all students meet 
standards, the district asked schools 
to design “a carefully crafted school 
academic achievement plan for 
accelerated learning to help school 
staff focus their knowledge, creativ-
ity, energy and resources of time and 
budget toward speciﬁc goals for stu-
dent success.” The plan was intended 
to be comprehensive, including 
strategies for targeted populations, 
extended learning opportunities, 
professional development, parent 
involvement, technology, budget, and 
stafﬁng. 
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The district gave schools guidelines 
or a road map outlined in Figure 1, 
page 74, to help them through the 
transformation process. The seven 
attributes for high achievement 
schools, as identiﬁed by the Gates 
Foundation, became the focus of a 
self-assessment tool (see Figure 2, 
page 75). To further assist schools, the 
district put out a list of “approved” 
consultants whom the schools 
could hire for help with the process. 
However, the only training the dis-
trict provided the consultants was 
an overview of the seven attributes. 
Some schools either had the internal 
capacity or their own resource peo-
ple to assist them.
Throughout the process, the one 
consistent message was that the plans 
had to address the district’s top two 
goals: raising academic achievement 
and eliminating the achievement gap. 
The criteria for both were test score 
improvement. To school administra-
tors, the district message rarely went 
beyond the mantras, “Every child 
meeting standards in every school,” 
and “We are very clear about the 
what—the goal that everyone has 
to meet, but we leave it up to the 
schools to ﬁgure out the ‘how.’” 
Principals indicated there was very 
little substantive conversation about 
teaching and learning. Most princi-
pals felt their directors did not spend 
enough time in the schools to know 
what was happening in classrooms. 
The one notable exception was in 
a school where the principal was 
proactive in showcasing the good 
things that were happening in her 
school. In that case, the principal 
readily acknowledged that her direc-
tor thought the school was further 
along than they really were, because 
of what the principal selectively 
“showed off.” This principal was well 
aware that the good practices were 
not as widespread as she would like.
School Capacity and Support 
from External Partners. Given the 
distance between the central ofﬁce 
and schools, the schools’ capacity to 
develop a coherent transformation 
plan usually depended on whether or 
not the school had existing structures 
in place that fostered a “community 
of practice” (Wenger, 1998) or if the 
school was part of another project 
that provided technical assistance. 
Communities of practice, according 
to Wenger, are “places” where par-
ticipants are committed to changing 
their practice and possess a:
…combination of three funda-
mental elements: a domain of 
knowledge, which deﬁnes a set 
of issues; a community of people 
who care about this domain; and 
the shared practice that they are 
developing to be effective in  
their domain (p. 27, emphasis  
in original). 
Schools in the district quite often 
looked to outsiders to provide leader-
ship, professional development, and 
technical assistance. Astute school 
leaders, concerned that there was no 
strategic plan connecting all of the 
district initiatives, provided leader-
ship by ﬁnding a way for teachers 
to shape a coherent path for profes-
sional learning at the school level.
One principal in our sample 
explained how she tried to make 
sure that everything she asked teach-
ers to do would count for at least 
four things. This school was part of 
the ATLAS project, and study groups 
had been part of the school’s cul-
ture for many years.13 When the 
Professional Practice Standards were 
introduced in the district, she found 
a way to embed this new element 
into the ongoing work at the school. 
For example, she encouraged the 
focus of study groups to be based 
on a group of teachers’ shared pro-
fessional growth needs that could 
also be used for their ofﬁcial evalu-
ation. They could use one of the 
Professional Practice Standards as a 
reﬂection tool to further their work. 
Then any additional professional 
development they participated in 
should support the same objectives. 
That way, teachers wouldn’t feel so 
overloaded and they would be able 
to have an in-depth focus in one 
area.
As demonstrated in this example, the 
strength of leadership in the school 
was an important factor in determin-
ing the school’s ability to use district 
policies to further school goals and to 
mobilize the resources (human and 
ﬁscal) needed to build communities 
of practice and create a vision that 
motivated the community to engage 
in new ideas about instructional 
practice.
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One of the schools in our sample 
was part of two different initiatives 
that already had the school moving 
toward transforming instructional 
practices before the introduction of 
the district’s transforming program. 
The external project facilitator pro-
vided leadership by adjusting their 
process to incorporate all of the 
district’s requirements so that the 
boundaries were blurred between 
district and project objectives. The 
school’s transformation plan blended 
together multiple efforts into one 
uniﬁed vision around literacy. Study 
groups, which had been in place 
for several years through the ATLAS 
project, became one more vehicle 
for strengthening literacy practices 
across the curriculum. They used 
their transformation grant money to 
support a literacy specialist to assist 
in classrooms, and the Nesholm 
grant provided the time and technical 
assistance needed to “do the work” 
outlined in their plan.14
The other ATLAS school in our 
sample also had an established 
tradition of collaboration and an 
effective decision-making structure 
with a strong Building Leadership 
Team (BLT). When the transformation 
policy was instituted, the principal 
recruited her district director to guide 
them through the process. In this 
school, where staff had a commit-
ment to ongoing improvement, they 
were able to build the transforma-
tion process into the structures they 
already had in place. The principal 
entrusted the transformation process 
to the BLT. The strength of com-
munity within this school enabled 
the staff to ﬁnd ways to interpret the 
district requirements that ﬁt into their 
school’s culture:
The fact that we’ve kind of got this 
critical mass of teachers that are 
real serious about what they do 
and really care about what they’re 
doing and put in the time and 
put in the effort. New staff comes 
in and you get sucked into that 
vortex of really caring and really 
being professional, the same way 
that new kids that come in third 
grade are sucked into this vortex 
of actually showing respect for all 
the people around you and help-
ing each other at recess and so 
on. . . . And, I mean, a lot of this 
has to do with structures that  
are organized to support the 
teachers from the top down in  
our building. 
Although it required a signiﬁcant 
amount of work, the transformation 
planning process at this school was 
viewed as productive and not overly 
burdensome, despite the lack of dis-
trict support.
At schools that lacked a collaborative 
community, the transformation pro-
cess was overwhelming. Although the 
tools provided by the district were 
sometimes helpful, they were rarely 
timely. Schools that were already 
moving along with their plans found 
that the district tools usually arrived 
too late to be helpful, as they had 
already developed their own pro-
cedure and completed much of the 
process. For schools that looked to 
the district for guidance, the constant 
revisions in the tools created frustra-
tion. Others became discouraged 
with the amount of confusion that 
surrounded the entire process:
The transformation process was 
rolled out without clear direc-
tions from the beginning. And the 
forms keep changing. We didn’t 
have the expertise and support 
like the Nesholm schools to know 
what to do with it. I don’t know 
why it was that confusing. I guess 
because I thought there was going 
to be new information they were 
going to be giving us, and it never 
came. 
Another principal ﬁnally decided not 
to worry about the district’s inability 
to make up its mind:
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I’m just going to sit out until the 
district has ﬁgured out what its 
focus for the schools really is. 
Because you’re asking us to be 
budget professionals, budget for 
hiring, for instructional leader-
ship, and you can’t do it all. 
There’s just no way. 
Rather than respond to each new 
district priority, this principal chose 
to stay focused on the school’s goals. 
Once the district ﬁnally determined 
which of the many policy mandates 
was the top priority, then she would 
review the school’s plan to ensure 
there was alignment. Another princi-
pal assumed a similar stance saying, 
“We didn’t let the district ‘look-fors‘ 
dictate our work. We looked at our 
own needs ﬁrst.”
In the end, the review of schools’ 
transformation plans focused on the 
district’s top two goals and align-
ing their professional development 
plans with the school’s strategies for 
achieving those goals. Because this 
focus was “required,” some felt that 
they did not really have complete 
control of their own plans. One 
teacher consultant summarized the 
problem created by inconsistent 
or conﬂicting policy messages that 
undermined leadership at the school 
level:
If you’re telling schools, ‘You need 
to look at your data, you need to 
determine what you need to do,’ 
and then you turn around and 
say, ‘But we’re going to impose 
on that some other district things 
that you must do,’ we’re not let-
ting the process do it. And so I 
think the best thing we could do 
is continue to be out there mak-
ing schools aware of the resources 
that are available. But really the 
whole point of transformation is a 
self-reﬂection at a school on what 
do they need to do. And if they 
don’t know what they need to do 
then we need to have someone 
come in and help them come to 
an awareness of the issues within 
the school.
One of the principals had a similar 
take on the contradictions in district 
policy:
At the same time that they ask you 
to think out of the box, they are 
also becoming more and more 
prescriptive. Now they are com-
ing up with a list of ‘look-fors’ so 
that when we turn in our plans, 
they want to make sure that every 
school has a goal on this and a 
goal on that.
Moreover, the historical legacy of 
mistrust and skepticism seemed to 
predispose schools to question the 
district’s motivation and capacity to 
see this reform through. Because of 
the Gates funds and Gates’ inﬂu-
ence, many in the schools viewed 
this reform as coming from outside 
the district. They wondered who was 
really in charge. Some assumed that 
the Foundation was leading the dis-
trict:
Thank heavens for Bill Gates and 
not just for giving the district the 
money, but for being on top of 
how that money was going to be 
used and for taking a real active 
part in making sure that this plan 
was going to happen. And hav-
ing the insight to know that real 
reform cannot happen in one or 
two or even three years—that it’s 
a ﬁve-year process. 
Further, they were concerned that 
because the district had predeter-
mined goals (raising student achieve-
ment and eliminating the achieve-
ment gap), the school’s autonomy 
would be undermined. This was par-
ticularly true at the high school level, 
where every school was compelled 
to focus on creating small schools to 
make the student’s educational expe-
rience more personalized (one of the 
Gate’s attributes). Those suspicions 
challenged the principal’s leadership 
skills. For instance, one principal had 
to cajole teachers to trust that this 
plan was truly their own:
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There was some controversy 
about why we're doing it, and I 
had to reinforce, ‘No, we don't 
have to do this. We're doing this 
for our beneﬁt. It's not because 
of the Gates money we're doing 
this.’ You know, some people 
said, ‘Well, this is another thing 
it's making us do, isn't it?’ I said, 
‘No, it's not from the district.’ You 
know, that's why some teach-
ers feel that way, especially your 
more senior teachers, because 
they've been through this so many 
times. Every time they turn around 
the district says, ‘You need to do 
this, this, and this if you want 
to do this,’ and so they feel like 
they're being mandated to. And, 
‘No, this is not a mandate. This is 
something we're choosing to do 
ourselves,’ and so it gives it a little 
different feel to it.
Once that was clear, the staff agreed: 
"Oh, okay. That's different.”
Principals had to exert consider-
able leadership to integrate multiple 
agendas to create coherence for their 
staff and to build ownership at the 
school level, which was often difﬁ-
cult to accomplish on a broad scale. 
Overall, we found mixed reactions to 
the entire Transformational Academic 
Achievement Planning Process. 
Besides the bureaucratic issues, most 
felt test scores were all that mattered. 
School leaders felt that no one cared 
how you got there if your test scores 
were good—if you were teaching to 
standards, using the adopted curricu-
lum or the classroom-based assess-
ments, or anything else. Those who 
held this perspective cited the way 
the district’s policies were relayed 
to the schools and the district’s fail-
ure to model what they are asking 
the schools to do. The entire school 
was required to be involved in the 
process of creating a vision of the 
school they wanted to become and 
then developing a plan to get there. 
At the same time, the district had not 
allowed the schools to be included in 
determining the goals or the process 
for the transformation. 
While many remained skeptical, 
especially at the high school level, 
others believed that the purpose of 
the transformation process was to 
require schools to be thoughtful and 
systematic about analyzing problems, 
and to be intentional about address-
ing them. These people generally 
believed that if you focus on the 
areas of greatest need, test scores will 
go up. 
The Positives of the Transformation 
Process. In the end, even though 
many questioned the district’s com-
mitment, they acknowledged that the 
process was good for their school. 
In most cases, it involved a larger 
number of teachers in the develop-
ment of the academic achievement 
plans than in the past and created 
an instructional focus. A number of 
teacher leaders who truly embraced 
the effort emerged at several schools. 
In those cases, leadership at the 
school site was able to generate own-
ership and commitment to carrying 
out their plans. The following teacher 
expressed this new optimism:
That’s what I see as the difference; 
I think we’re moving somewhere. 
Whether we get there or not is 
another question, but I feel the 
movement, which I never thought. 
Before, I wasn’t thinking that the 
school was going to change. I 
was thinking that my curriculum 
might improve and that my teach-
ing might get better, but I never 
thought that what was around me 
would change that much. Now I 
think there’s some possibility that 
what’s around me will change. 
I never saw that as a possibility 
before. 
One principal agreed that the process 
had built ownership of their school’s 
plan, “It has really gotten things 
focused on academics and, particu-
larly, literacy.” 
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In the end, even though 
many questioned the 
district’s commitment, 
they acknowledged that 
the process was good for 
their school. 
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Professional Development 
as a Vehicle for Improving 
Instruction: A High Point
From the schools’ point of view, pro-
fessional development was one of the 
high points in the district’s reform. 
Even as the central ofﬁce was strug-
gling to develop a coherent plan to 
support professional learning, for the 
most part, schools agreed with the 
central ofﬁce that professional devel-
opment was a positive strategy for 
improving student achievement. Most 
agreed that professional development 
had improved signiﬁcantly in recent 
years. Some attributed these improve-
ments to the example set by the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) 
science grant, where the University 
of Washington designed an intensive 
program for elementary teachers:
I think the district is getting better 
at providing the kind of assistance 
that we want. And the quality of 
people is good, getting better. The 
trick is that the model, which I 
think when you look back, it all 
kind of stems from the National 
Science Foundation model. You 
know, you pay teachers to get 
trained, you give them ongoing 
training throughout the year, no 
one-shot deals, and you provide 
technical assistance. People to 
come and check in with you. And 
it works. And that’s basically, with 
a few minor alterations here and 
there, the same model that’s being 
used now for literacy. 
Once again, this points to the impor-
tance of external partners in help-
ing to shape the reform agenda. The 
change in approach was welcomed, 
especially among veteran teachers 
who had suffered through years with 
either bad or no staff development at 
all:
I think they’re ﬁnally (and I do 
mean ﬁnally), ﬁnally starting to 
support in a more comprehensive 
way. For years, decades, it was 
‘Do this,’ and then left you on 
your own, sink or swim. The last 
few years they have been offering 
more support than ever in areas 
of professional development…. I 
think they’re hiring more quality 
people to come out and be avail-
able to schools. 
In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, 
when Seattle provided minimal sup-
port for curriculum and instruction, 
as Table 1 (page 76) illustrates, the 
professional learning opportunities 
were expanding. Two initiatives, in 
particular, seemed to be both well-
received and making a signiﬁcant 
difference in instructional practices. 
Both had the important qualities of 
being long-term investments with 
a team of colleagues who also pro-
vided ongoing support to help teach-
ers internalize new approaches. The 
ﬁrst was the NSF science program; 
the other was the Literacy Initiative. 
At the elementary level, the science 
program was particularly noteworthy. 
Many schools went from teaching 
almost no science to a full-year of 
inquiry-based science instruction. 
One lead teacher noticed the differ-
ence:
I think the largest impact has been 
with NSF Science, because it 
really changed how people teach 
science and that’s been positive…. 
The content has been wonderful. 
Another teacher observed, “I think 
kids have more hands-on opportuni-
ties, they also have an opportunity 
to demonstrate what they know and 
how they know it, which is a critical 
piece for learning and for assess-
ment.” 
Similarly, the Literacy Initiative 
seemed to ﬁll a major need in the 
district. Although the connection to 
standards was not explicit, it cer-
tainly ﬁt under the district’s broad 
standards, such as “Students will 
understand and use different skills 
and strategies to read,” or “Students 
understand the meaning of what is 
read.” Most teachers found the lit-
eracy strategies to be very effective 
in helping students in all the content 
areas. Principals, central ofﬁce staff, 
and teachers commented on how 
the conversations continued back in 
schools after Saturday workshops:
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Once again, this points to 
the importance of exter-
nal partners in helping to 
shape the reform agenda.
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I just hear it informally, people 
saying, ‘Wow, I tried such-and-
such thinking map and it really 
worked.’ You really do hear it. But 
I’m not surprised because my own 
experience has been at second-
ary level. That was always an area 
that teachers wanted the most 
help with. And when they got it, 
they were so thrilled to be able 
to have some techniques to try. 
And I thought it was only because 
they were secondary teachers, but 
what I’m ﬁnding is it’s the same 
with elementary. We all think that 
elementary teachers have all of 
this through their teacher train-
ing, and the reality is that they 
don’t…. And they’re as excited as 
my middle school teachers used 
to be about it. Because it’s such 
little things that make such a big 
difference in teaching a lesson— 
I think it’s been good. 
 
Teachers agreed that the literacy 
strategies were permeating schools, 
especially when a majority of staff 
participated. Students were beneﬁt-
ing from the consistency of using the 
same strategies in a number of differ-
ent subject areas:
I think this Literacy Initiative 
has been hugely powerful in 
the classroom in the curriculum 
areas, plus the training, the way 
the training has been. Yes, it's a 
Saturday, but they're usually so 
darn valuable you don't mind 
giving up a Saturday at all. And 
you're paid for that time. 
Even though the workshops were 
held on Saturdays, teachers were 
paid for their time. They participated 
in school teams and so they had 
colleagues to share the experience. 
This made it easier to come back 
to the schools and help each other 
experiment with the new approaches. 
Although the response to the Literacy 
Initiative was overwhelmingly 
positive, it did not meet everyone’s 
needs. Not all of the National Urban 
Alliance (NUA) consultants were 
well-received, so the response 
depended on the speaker. Opinions 
also varied depending on the experi-
ence level of teachers and their level 
of expertise in literacy. For teach-
ers with extensive experience, the 
Literacy Initiative did not stand out:
I’ve been around long enough to 
have had lots of suitcases of tricks 
that sit in my closet. And while 
the literacy strategies are worth-
while, they weren’t particularly 
more exceptional than the other 
good workshops I’ve been to. It 
was certainly in the group of well-
done workshops but it wasn’t at 
the pinnacle of my experience. So 
I don’t know why Seattle was so 
sold on this and why we were all 
getting paid. 
Like all the district’s professional 
development programs, teachers’ 
reactions to district-sponsored pro-
fessional development opportunities 
were subject-speciﬁc. Since all of the 
major initiatives were grant funded, 
areas without support from external 
grants received little or no attention 
from the district. This was especially 
true in social studies and math. 
In 2003, the district became part 
of a collaborative grant, designed 
and administered by the University 
of Washington, for Developing 
Mathematical Ideas (DMI) at the 
elementary level. Participation was 
voluntary and not widespread. 
Unlike the Literacy Initiative, which 
attempted to institute a common set 
of strategies district-wide, there was 
no comparable program for math. If 
schools decided to focus on math, 
they could “buy back” a DMI facilita-
tor, who could help the school work 
on a particular topic. According to 
one teacher consultant, what usually 
happened was that teachers discov-
ered how poorly prepared they were 
to teach the topic. Reform mathemat-
ics called for a radically different 
approach and required more in-
depth knowledge of math concepts. 
Consequently, the need for profes-
sional development in mathematics 
was great, but without a large district 
grant, one math leader acknowl-
edged that the district’s math efforts 
to date have been more “patches” 
than programs.
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Teachers agreed that the 
literacy strategies were 
permeating schools, espe-
cially when a majority of 
staff participated. Students 
were beneﬁting from the 
consistency of using the 
same strategies in a num-
ber of different subject 
areas.
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In the last ﬁve years, the district had 
the opportunity to learn about quality 
professional development from exter-
nal providers, and when funding was 
available, the district tried to incor-
porate the essential components that 
tend to produce results. In the STAR 
mentor program (joint effort between 
the Seattle Teachers Association and 
the district that focused on support-
ing new and veteran teachers through 
mentoring) and Building Leadership 
Team (BLT) training, the professional 
development occurred over an 
extended period of time with col-
leagues. However, existing resources 
did not allow the district to extend 
this quality of support to all areas.
While the district’s record for pro-
fessional development for teachers 
was improving, support for principal 
learning was much more mixed. 
Although the district often brought in 
prominent national speakers, princi-
pals characterized their Leadership 
Institutes as “all over the map.” 
Principals noted that the training 
was “top-down” and provided little 
opportunity to interact with peers. 
One principal summarized the expe-
rience this way:
I have not had an opportunity to 
provide any input or participate 
in the planning…. This one com-
ing up happens to have some 
promise, I think. There have been 
others in the past which I thought 
were a major waste of time. If 
you’re asking what they were, 
I probably wouldn’t remember. 
Mostly because they were pretty 
much discarded. 
Summary  
 he structure for commu-  
 nicating policies to  
 Seattle schools signiﬁcantly 
inﬂuenced the school’s response 
to requirements. The three major 
policies intended to have a direct 
or indirect effect on instruction 
were: standards, the transformation 
planning process, and professional 
development. Although the district 
identiﬁed standards as the umbrella 
shaping everything they do, and 
despite the increased focus on stan-
dards at the state and district levels, 
teachers received little guidance 
about what to teach or how to teach 
it, except in science. The district stan-
dards provided only general topics 
and there was rarely an explicit con-
nection between the standards and 
the content of professional develop-
ment initiatives. Even with signiﬁcant 
improvement in professional devel-
opment in recent years, teachers did 
not have the training to diagnose stu-
dent needs or to differentiate instruc-
tion to ensure that all students would 
meet the standards. The absence of 
a coherent curriculum at the middle 
and high school levels added to the 
demands and teacher frustration. 
The transformation process did pro-
vide schools with an opportunity 
to work on some of these gaps at 
the school level. Central ofﬁce pro-
vided a number of tools to assist 
school leaders in transforming their 
schools. Funding from an external 
grant bought some crucial resource 
support. The response from schools 
varied considerably, depending on 
the school’s capacity, determined 
by whether structures were in place 
and whether the school had a strong 
community of practice to handle 
the change process. School leader-
ship was also crucial. Principals 
tended to mediate the district policy 
mandates to make sure that this rare 
opportunity did not go to waste. 
Skilled principals were able to use 
existing structures and to motivate 
teacher leaders to spearhead the 
effort at the school level. While the 
district’s transformation guidelines 
focused almost entirely on test scores 
and only indirectly on instruction, 
the schools, for the most part, used 
the process to build an instructional 
focus. 
Two telling observations about the 
data collected on the transformation 
process characterized the schools’ 
views of the district’s policies. First, 
overwhelmingly, when schools 
identiﬁed key players in the reform, 
central ofﬁce staff were rarely men-
tioned. Instead, the credit was given 
to the availability of money, from 
the Gates Foundation, the Nesholm 
Family Foundation, the Alliance for 
Education, or the National Science 
Foundation. Even more surpris-
ing, none of the communications 
between central ofﬁce and schools 
in our database were about instruc-
tion.15 It was only through profes-
sional development, which was 
improving, that schools were learning 
to focus on teaching.
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For the most part, the central ofﬁce 
did not recognize the level or kind 
of support schools needed to imple-
ment the transformation process. 
Generally, the district overestimated 
individual schools’ capacity to make 
sense of guidelines and their abil-
ity to design programs that might 
lead to improvements in teaching 
and learning. The central ofﬁce staff 
was spread too thin and spent too 
little time in the schools to assess the 
needs of individual schools. Further, 
the district had only limited staff that 
could help address needs even when 
they were identiﬁed. Savvy principals 
did ﬁnd resources to support their 
work, often from outside the district. 
Most of the schools that were able 
to utilize this process to further their 
own school goals had the support 
of external partners in terms of both 
money and intellectual input from 
coaches and facilitators. Schools 
without existing structures already in 
place really struggled with the trans-
formation process and the district 
tools did not help. Recognition of 
the gap between the needs and the 
supports led one district administra-
tor to conclude, “We are not as wise 
and informed by school knowledge 
as seems prudent in our central ofﬁce 
transformation.” 
Without adequate professional devel-
opment and the resources, especially 
expertise, to address instructional 
needs, the schools saw the district’s 
demands for accountability as an 
unfunded mandate. 
The experience in Seattle Public 
Schools is consistent with previ-
ous research that has demonstrated 
that policies cannot mandate 
what or how much teachers learn 
(McLaughlin, 1987). They can, how-
ever, provide incentives and supports 
for teachers to work together in com-
munities of practice. For example, 
when a critical mass of teachers 
from one school participated in the 
Literacy Initiative, they were able to 
rely on each other to support their 
experimentation with new practices. 
District policies can also focus atten-
tion and resources (time and money) 
on activities that engage teachers in 
collaborative communities. In some 
schools with existing structures and 
strong leadership, the transformation 
process was able to stimulate profes-
sional discourse because staff had 
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Seattle Appendix A: 2002 WASL Achievement Data
Target District Standard is 80 Percent Meeting Standard on the Washington Assessment of Student Learning (WASL)
Seattle Public Schools 
2002 WASL Data
Percent Meeting Standards
Subject HS Grade 10 MS Grade 7 Elementary Grade 4
Math 35 30 51
Reading 52 31 64
Writing 47 44 51
Listening 75 77 64
 
Seattle Public Schools
Achievement Gap 2002 WASL Data
Percent Meeting Standards
10th Grade 
Subject Native Asian African Latino White
 American  American
Math 32 38 8 20 54
Reading 55 55 23 42 71
Writing 43 50 23 33 64
Listening 73 80 59 65 87
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Seattle Public Schools
Achievement Gap 2002 WASL Data
Percent Meeting Standards
4th Grade
Subject Native Asian African Latino White
 American  American
Math 38 57 22 38 70
Reading 55 67 43 51 81
Writing 30 59 32 40 63
Listening 67 66 49 58 76
 
Seattle Public Schools
Achievement Gap 2002 WASL Data
Percent Meeting Standards
7th Grade
Subject Native Asian African Latino White
 American  American
Math 32 38 8 20 54
Reading 55 55 23 42 71
Writing 32 54 32 40 62
Listening 70 75 66 66 88
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The Literacy Initiative
As the ﬁrst district-wide K-12 ini-
tiative in anyone’s memory, the 
Literacy Initiative represented a level 
of commitment to instruction and 
professional development that was 
new for Seattle. At the conclusion 
of our data collection, the Literacy 
Initiative was in its third year. The 
district contracted with the National 
Urban Alliance (NUA) to provide 72 
hours of training for each teacher 
through a two-year program that 
consisted of ﬁve Saturday classes 
spaced throughout each year. There 
was also limited support from consul-
tants at the school level (four or ﬁve 
days per year). The training consisted 
of 25 literacy strategies to enhance 
reading and writing skills. For the 
most part, the strategies were simple, 
high-success tools that helped stu-
dents think about what they read and 
write. Teams of teachers from schools 
participated together so they could 
support each other in implementing 
the strategies learned. The goal was 
to train every teacher in the district 
within ﬁve years. 
Elementary Science
The other major district-wide initia-
tive, which began in 1997, was a 
National Science Foundation (NSF) 
elementary science initiative. The 
ﬁve-year grant was jointly funded 
by NSF and the district, supported 
by the Seattle Education Association 
(SEA), and led by the University of 
Washington. The focus was to pro-
vide K-5 teachers opportunities to 
learn about teaching inquiry-based 
science. Teachers strengthened their 
science background through courses 
at the UW, work with consultants, 
and site-based work with other teach-
ers. Although the stipend for teach-
ers’ time was minimal, this initiative 
was considered the standard bearer 
for quality professional development. 
University experts designed the pro-
gram, which included in-depth study 
of content, modeling, and opportuni-
ties to experience as well as practice 
inquiry-based science. Also, there 
was ongoing support for teachers as 
they tried to implement what they 
had learned back in their classrooms. 
Mathematics
Another highly regarded profes-
sional development opportunity 
was a National Science Foundation 
Mathematics grant, again, designed 
and led by the University of 
Washington. In two-year cycles, 
the project provided professional 
development for teachers at differ-
ent levels. First, the focus was on 
elementary teachers, then middle 
school teachers, and ﬁnally, the next 
two years shifted to high school. 
The focus was on leadership training 
and constructivist math pedagogy. 
Teachers participated in classes and 
worked together to look at student 
work. This was part of a six-district 
collaborative grant administered 
by the University of Washington. 
Although those who participated 
had high praise for the university 
program, participation by Seattle 
teachers was voluntary and therefore, 
the training reached only a small per-
centage of math teachers.
New Teacher Academy and 
STAR Mentor Program
Like most diverse urban districts, 
Seattle has had a difﬁcult time keep-
ing new teachers. They were losing 
up to 40 percent of their teachers 
in their ﬁrst ﬁve years of teaching, 
many of them in their ﬁrst three. As 
a result, a joint effort between the 
teachers’ association and the district 
Seattle Appendix B:  District Professional Development Initiatives
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focused on supporting new teachers 
through the STAR mentor program 
(as well as veteran teachers who 
sought support or were referred to 
the program). Each year the program 
has evolved. Beginning in 2000, the 
district launched the New Teacher 
Academy with a one-day orienta-
tion for new teachers. The program 
has now expanded to three days, 
with periodic follow-up sessions 
throughout the school year. All new 
teachers are assigned a STAR men-
tor. Mentors are also assigned to 
veteran teachers who seek assistance 
or who are referred to the program. 
STAR mentors are teachers on full-
time special assignment who provide 
in-class support to new teachers. All 
mentors have been trained to use the 
Professional Practice Standards as a 
guide in assisting teachers. Funding 
for this program comes from the state 
TAP (Teacher Assistance Program). In 
Seattle, there are a total of 12 STAR 
mentors, resulting in a caseload of 
about 18 new teachers per mentor. 
As a result, the mentors are severely 
taxed. 
Teacher Consultants
The district provided support to 
schools through teacher consultants 
for standards support, literacy, and 
elementary science and mathemat-
ics. There were three elementary, 
one middle school, and one high 
school standards support consultants 
to work with teachers and schools in 
implementing the district’s standards. 
Similarly, there were three elemen-
tary, one middle school literacy con-
sultant, and a few consultants funded 
by the National Science Foundation 
grant for elementary science and 
math. Consultants’ work varied; 
sometimes they worked with indi-
vidual teachers, sometimes teacher 
teams, or whole schools.
Summer Institute
The biggest professional development 
event of the year was the Summer 
Institute, which was a week-long 
smorgasbord of two- to three-hour 
classes. The 2001 Institute made an 
effort to be more focused in the offer-
ings than in the past, with courses 
organized under four main headings: 
“Getting to Standards and Beyond,” 
“Closing the Gap—Diversity,” 
“Literacy,” and a catch-all category 
of “Expanding Repertoire,” which 
included everything from math cur-
riculum, full-day kindergarten, web-
site development, Student Groups, 
to Socratic Seminars. The sessions 
tended to be introductory in nature. 
The majority of teachers in atten-
dance were relatively new teachers, 
and most were from elementary 
schools. While the Institute was free 
to all Seattle Public Schools staff, 
teachers were not paid for their time.
Building Leadership Training
Beginning in the spring of 2001, 
Building Leadership Teams attended 
workshops to learn such skills as 
facilitation and decision-making 
strategies. This initiative was funded 
by an external grant but collabora-
tively endorsed by the district and 
the union, and was designed and 
conducted by external consultants. 
Although the training had no direct 
focus on instruction, the goal was to 
provide training to support schools 
in the transformation process so that 
schools could focus on improving 
teaching and learning. The training 
was mandatory, but only a small 
number of schools could be trained 
at one time, so schools participated 
in different cycles.
Principal Leadership Institutes
Professional development for school 
leaders was conducted through four 
full-day institutes throughout the year. 
Topics varied from diversity to guide-
lines for the transformation process to 
teacher evaluations. The relationship 
to instruction was often indirect, and 
principals had no input into the focus 
of these professional development 
days. Funding for these institutes 
was provided by the Alliance for 
Education.
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Seattle Appendix C: District Reform Highlights
1978 The Seattle Plan for desegregating the schools implemented in the fall.
 
1989 Cresip Report issued charging that the Seattle School Board was dysfunctional and the administration of 
the district was poor.
 
1992 The superintendent, with strong support from the executive director of SEA, initiated district reforms 
including restructuring central ofﬁce and moving toward site-based management including increasing the 
funds allocated to each school and allowing decisions about the use of funds to be made by principals 
and school staff. 
  District/SEA contract set parameters for, and was a precursor to, many decentralization efforts over the 
next 10 years.
 
1993 Washington State passed a sweeping education reform law calling for rigorous academic standards, 
assessments, and accountability measures.
 
1994 A joint team of representatives from the business community, community activists, the mayors ofﬁce, the 
SEA, and the district created scenarios for the future of public education in Seattle for the year 2000.
 
1995 John Stanford became superintendent, changed how the district functioned, gave new authority to princi-
pals, and brought in private funds.  
  Seattle Alliance for Education joined the Fund for Excellence and Partners in Public Education to become 
the Alliance for Education. The Alliance created the Principal Leadership Institute to support principals. 
 
1997 The Trust Agreement created between the Seattle School Board and the Seattle Education Association, 
a radical departure from traditional teacher contracts, ended seniority in teacher assignments and gave 
teachers signiﬁcant involvement in decisions over budgeting, hiring, and curriculum development.
 
1998 Supt. John Stanford passed away and Chief Financial Ofﬁcer, Joseph Olchefske, became superintendent. 
  The district adopted the Performance Agenda that created a tight-loose management model where the dis-
trict was purportedly clear on the outcomes but loose on how schools got there. 
  Seattle publicly declared a “standards-based district.”  
  Weighted Student Formula implemented in 1997-98 school year. Principals and teachers gained increased 
ﬂexibility over budget, staff, and programs. 
 
1999 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation provided a ﬁve-year, $26 million grant, which supported the 
Transformation Initiative. 
 
2002 Financial crisis announced publicly. $34 million overspent from 2001-02 and 2002-03 budgets.
 
2003 Superintendent Olschefske resigned and Raj Manhaus hired.
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APPENDIX A:  
Research Design and 
Methodology
Our study is based on data that 
includes interviews, observations, 
and document collection at both 
the school and central ofﬁce levels 
in these three districts. Interviews 
were conducted during the 2001 and 
2002 school years. During the 2003 
school year, we analyzed the data 
and supplemented it with follow-up 
interviews.
The data were collected from 185 
school-level personnel represent-
ing 23 schools across three districts 
(11 elementary schools, four middle 
schools and eight high schools.) In 
each school, we interviewed eight to 
10 school-level personnel including 
school administrators, teachers across 
different grade levels, and gover-
nance council members or parents. It 
includes interviews with 82 cabinet 
and mid-level central ofﬁce staff. 
Staff members working in regions or 
sub-districts and those at the central 
ofﬁce were treated as central ofﬁce 
staff.
Researchers interviewed central 
ofﬁce and school staff asking gen-
eral and speciﬁc questions about 
instruction including their ofﬁces’ or 
schools’ instructional goals; strategies 
for reaching these goals; interactions 
they had with schools or central 
ofﬁces; district turning points and key 
players; instructional reform priorities 
at the district, school, and classroom 
levels; testing policies; understanding 
and use of standards; content area 
initiatives; tools they used to under-
stand and implement policies; views 
of exemplary district reform strate-
gies; district problems and successes; 
non-district inﬂuences on work; and 
direction, type, focus, and frequency 
of interactions between school and 
central ofﬁce staff members.
Cross-site analysis for this paper 
occurred in several ways. We used 
a computer-based software program 
called NUD*IST to code and index 
the data according to constructs 
derived from our theoretical frame-
work. We ﬁeld-tested codes to ensure 
inter-rater reliability. For the purposes 
of the case studies, we focused our 
analysis on individuals descriptions 
of: 1) history of instructional reform 
in district; 2) current district instruc-
tional initiatives; 3) how district 
administrators act on and communi-
cate policy messages around  
instructional reform to the schools;  
4) how school people view the 
district’s priorities; 5) tools impor-
tant to school or central ofﬁce staff 
members’ work; 6) leadership roles 
school personnel use to implement 
district policies and practices; and 7) 
how districts matter relative to other 
factors—federal and state mandates, 
third parties, unions, etc.
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APPENDIX B: District Demographics 2001-2002
   
 Chicago Milwaukee Seattle
   
City Population 2,896,016  597,005  564,158 
   
Number of Public School Students 437,418  97,762  47,449 
   
Number of Schools 597  208  124 
   
% Students eligible for free 81.9 75.4 40.8
and reduced lunch   
   
% Amer. Indian/Alaska Native 0.2 1.0 2.6
Alaska Native   
   
% Asian/Paciﬁc Islander 3.2 4.3 23.4
   
% Hispanic 35.8 16.1 10.8
    
% Black, non-Hispanic 51.3 60.3 23.1
   
% White, non-Hispanic 9.5 18.3 40.1
   
Source: Characteristics of the 100 Largest Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts in the United States: 2001-2002, National Center 
for Education Statistics.
Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform
99
1 These plans spelled out each 
school’s strategies for reaching  
district goals
2 Schools failing to meet reading 
and math cut-off scores were put 
on probation until their scores 
improved. These schools were 
overseen by probation managers 
who had signiﬁcant control over 
curriculum, instruction, stafﬁng, 
and budget. 
3 It should be noted that professional 
development in the three cities had 
started to be reorganized towards 
the end of our study.
4 Learning coordinators were certi-
ﬁed middle school teachers who 
were released from some or all 
classroom responsibilities to sup-
port and coordinate instruction in 
the school. They played an impor-
tant role facilitating communica-
tion between teachers and admin-
istrators at the school and district 
level. The teachers who performed 
this function at the elementary 
school level were called imple-
menters. While most schools in this 
study had a coordinator, imple-
menter, or both, depending on 
grade levels served in the school, 
most MPS schools did not.
5 Milwaukee Public Schools K-12 
Academic Standards and Grade 
Level Expectations. (November 
1998). p. MA-10, MA-11.
6 Background information on MPS 
proﬁciencies is taken from a 2001 
report of an in-depth study of the 
initiative. See Clune, W. H., Mason, 
S., Pohs, C., Thiel, C., & White, 
P. (April 2, 2002) The Milwaukee 
Middle School Proﬁciencies: 
Systemic School Reform Through 
High-Stakes Assessments and a 
Network of Schools. Madison, WI:
 Center for the Study of Systemic 
Reform in Milwaukee Public 
Schools, Wisconsin Center for 
Education Research. 
7  Historical note: At the conclusion 
of this institute, the MPS superin-
tendent, who had been in ofﬁce 
during the entirety of our study, 
announced his resignation.
8 Between 1977 and 1995, the num-
ber of white students dropped from 
65 percent of overall enrollment 
to 40 percent, and those propor-
tions have remained fairly constant 
since.
9 The Peter Principle, deﬁned by 
the American Heritage Dictionary, 
Fourth Edition (2000), as the theory 
that employees will advance to 
their highest level of competence 
and then be promoted to and 
remain at a level at which they are 
incompetent. 
10 Cresip is part of a Washington DC-
based consulting ﬁrm.
11 Ouchi, W., Cooper, B., Segal, 
L, DeRoche, T., Brown, C., and 
Galvin, E. (2002). The organization 
of primary and secondary school 
systems. (Unpublished manu-
script). This study found that Seattle 
remained more top-heavy than 
most districts, especially site-based 
districts.
12 A reorganization after the comple-
tion of our data collection has 
brought all professional develop-
ment under one department.
13 ATLAS Communities is a compre-
hensive school improvement initia-
tive designed to help create high 
performing schools that serve all 
students well (www.atlascommuni-
ties.org).
14 Nesholm Family Foundation pro-
vided grants supporting three high 
poverty middle schools.
15 This code in our database con-
tained no entries.
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